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ABSTRACT
￿e Right to Information (RTI) – a right every individual has to access public information held
by governments – is now established in more than ￿￿￿ countries. RTI laws set up a new logic in
government: availability of public information is the principle and secrecy the exception. RTI laws
create new public information arenas where several actors request, release and use public information
for several purposes. In this work, I seek to explore why RTI arenas based on similar principles,
work diﬀerently leading to diﬀerent outputs.My explanation is based on a historical- institutionalist
perspective arguing that origins of these laws and previous institutional structures matter. I argue that
three factors help to shape these arenas: the level of participation in the policy-making process, the
professionalisation of state bureaucracy and RTI enforcement institutions. ￿e combination of these
factors gives us three diﬀerent kinds of arenas: functional, mixed and contested. I develop a conceptual
framework, operating at a middle-range theory level, to analyse the role RTI laws, requesters, the
state, and the existence of RTI enforcement institutions play in each configuration. I show how these
arenas evolve and work, running a structured and focused comparison of three case studies: Uruguay,
Chile and New Zealand. ￿is work shows how these arenas ended up diﬀering in outputs such as
availability of public information and eﬃciency in processing RTI requests, as well as the existence of
eﬀective accountability mechanisms to resolve disputes about public information.
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Keep Ithaka always in your mind. Arriving there is what you are
destined for. But do not hurry the journey at all. Better if it lasts
for years, so you are old by the time you reach the island, wealthy
with all you have gained on the way, not expecting Ithaka to make
you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvellous journey. Without her you would
not have set out. She has nothing left to give you now.
Ithaka, Cavalfi Poems translated by Edmund Keeley/Philip Sherrard
￿ere is in the South more than one worn gate, With its cement
urns and planted cactus, Which is already forbidden to my entry,
Inaccessible, as in a lithograph. ￿ere is a door you have closed
forever And some mirror is expecting you in vain; To you the
crossroads seem wide open, Yet watching you, four-faced, is a
Janus.
Limits, Jorge Luis Borges
Este libro es sin tapas porque es abierto y libre: se puede escribir
antes y despues de él.
Felisberto Hernandez : El libro sin tapasa




In Uruguay, a small democratic country in Latin America, a journalist filed an access-to-information
request to get data about primary and high school repetition rates. At the time, public education in
Uruguay was at the centre of a fierce debate involving several conflicts with trade unions. ￿e request
received a mixed reply: the primary school authority replied with a good degree of detail about the
schools, which allowed the journalist to make a partial comparison between them. ￿e high school
national authority did not respond. ￿e journalist asked for the information again and was again
refused. ￿e justification was that the information could be used to promote discriminatory practices
among students and educational centres. In short, if someone got to know who the worst performers
were, various forms of discrimination would result. Furthermore, the high school authorities expressly
criticised the primary education authorities on their decision to share the information. ￿e journalist
decided to sue the government using the special provisions of the right-to-information (RTI) law.
After a lengthy legal battle, the information was partially released. Repetition rates were alarming,
something that was known by a small niche of experts, but relatively unknown by the public. A
vigorous debate ensued, which ended in the removal of the president of the high school national
education authority. In this case, public information was not initially available, it was diﬃcult to get
such information and only after a lengthy and diﬃcult process was it possible to access it.
In the same region, but on the other side of the Andes, data on secondary education is available in
Chile, providing full descriptions of schools, numbers of students, average grades, average grades in
national performance tests and other data. Information is available on line. ￿is was the situation
even before the enactment of a RTI law in that country. However, finding information about how
the system worked in terms of granting access to university was more elusive. A group of civil society
leaders struggled for years to get information about a controversial test that determines who gets
￿￿
entrance to university. ￿e test also evaluated high school performance and was important to establish
the benefits students can access. ￿e test was evaluated by an external contractor and the results of
such evaluations were never made public. In addition, the test allegedly created several inequalities in
terms of access to higher education, and there were no appropriate controls. A court denied access to
the evaluation on technical grounds (Zavala Guzman c/Rector de la Universidad de Chile, ￿￿￿￿).
With the enactment of an access-to-information law, the Council for Transparency, an autonomous
organisation in charge of enforcing the law, finally recommended the release of a significant amount of
information (including a copy of the evaluation report), but the debate still persists in Chile (Salazar
y Peña, ￿￿￿￿). In this case, public information was initially available. Yet, when more details were
requested, problems emerged. An eﬀective appeals system managed to intervene, ordering the partial
release of the information requested.
Across the Pacific Ocean, New Zealand is considered one of the most transparent countries in the
world, having a history of RTI dating back to ￿￿￿￿. Information about the education system had
traditionally been open until, in ￿￿￿￿, the government of the day decided to create a national standard
reporting on school mechanisms. ￿e scheme was heavily debated, with the government, unions
and parents hurling accusations at each other about fairness and the implications of transparency
in the system. ￿e main argument was that the release of information would create losers and
winners and unfairly portray student and school performance. Journalists requested access to student
performance categorised by individual schools, and even went to each school requesting the data.
After several controversies, New Zealand’s Oﬃce of the Ombudsman ordered the release of the data.
￿e government released the data through a website that showed the results, albeit with very cautious
warnings about how those results should be interpreted. In this case, systems were in place to deal
with an access-to-information request. ￿e release was resisted but followed standard procedures, the
final result being that information was made available and was contextualised for public use.
￿ese cases all dealt with the same issue: citizens requesting public information in the education
sector. All the cases show the existence of a similar RTI law, establishing similar principles, but
diﬀerent reactions from governments when dealing with it. ￿ey represent the central puzzle this
study aims to understand: Why do right-to-information regimes that operate under similar principles work
diﬀerently and lead to diﬀerent outputs? In this chapter, I provide an introduction to the transparency
field, focusing on RTI. First, I provide a discussion of transparency and access to information, showing
its historical roots and evolution as a multidisciplinary field. ￿en, I focus on how the comparison
￿￿
of public information institutions evolved in the literature, identifying issues that I seek to address
in this work. Finally, I provide an overview of the structure of this work. ￿e chapter shows that
there is a need to develop comparative research frameworks that give room for context and history in
explaining why right-to-information regimes work diﬀerently, leading to diﬀerent outputs.
￿.￿ ʀɪɢʜ￿ ￿￿ ɪɴ￿￿ʀ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ: ʜɪ￿￿￿ʀʏ ￿ɴ￿ ￿￿ɴ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ʟ￿ɪ-￿ɪ￿￿ɪ￿ʟɪɴ￿ʀʏ ￿ɪ￿ʟ￿
Transparency is now in demand around the globe. It is virtually impossible to argue against the
principle of transparency; it would be like arguing against motherhood and apple pie (Piotrowski,
￿￿￿￿). As noted by Hood (￿￿￿￿), transparency is now the secular equivalent of ‘holier-than-thou’
(Hood, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿) in debates about governance. Politicians from all parts of the political spectrum are
in favour of transparency. For instance, the conservative UK Prime Minister David Cameron recently
proposed a ‘transparency revolution’ in the UK (Worthy, ￿￿￿￿). In the United States, President
Barack Obama, a democrat, in his first days of government issued an Open Government Directive
aimed at enhancing access to public information. In Brazil, the left-of-centre government headed by
Dilma Roussef approved an access-to-information law in ￿￿￿￿, the first of its kind in Brazil, allowing
Brazilians access to public records and enhancing government accountability. ￿e recently created
international alliance￿e Open Government Partnership￿ includes countries such as Indonesia and
Tanzania, who expressed a strong commitment to advancing significant governance reforms, such as
establishing freedom-of-information laws and better accountability mechanisms.
Transparency studies have flourished in economics (Stiglitz, ￿￿￿￿, Akerlof, ￿￿￿￿, Vishwanath
and Kaufmann, ￿￿￿￿), international relations (Donaldson and Kingbury, ￿￿￿￿, Stasavage, ￿￿￿￿),
technology studies (Camp, ￿￿￿￿), cultural studies (Teurlings & Stauﬀ, ￿￿￿￿), fiscal transparency
(Head, ￿￿￿￿, Khagram et al. ￿￿￿￿) and anthropology (John, ￿￿￿￿), among other disciplines. ￿e
recently set up Transparency Conferences￿ aim to organise and systematise a wide range of disciplines
that deal with how transparency, institutions and actors work together in several fields. In this work,
I focus on a subset of this field, dealing with access-to-information regimes from a public policy
perspective.
Right to information (RTI) – the regulation that establishes the presumptive right of citizens to
￿￿e OGP is an international partnership that brings governments and civil society together to work on transparency,
collaboration and participation.
￿￿ere have been three global transparency conferences, in New York (￿￿￿￿), Utrecht (￿￿￿￿) and Paris (￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
access government information (Birkinshaw, ￿￿￿￿) – can be considered a sub-set of transparency
studies. ￿e original idea can be traced back to Anders Chydenius￿ who in ￿￿￿￿ promoted the
adoption of the first access-to-information regulation, in what was then the Kingdom of Sweden. A
true representative of the Swedish Enlightenment, Anders Chydenius advocated for several economic
and social reforms, including transparency in the public sector. ￿e oﬀentlighetsprincipen or ‘principle
of publicity’ was established in Swedish law after lengthy discussions￿ and eventually it was left to the
Ombudsman (another Swedish invention) to enforce it, when the institution was created in ￿￿￿￿.
￿is regulation endured in Sweden￿ until today, establishing the principle of openness of public
records.
While freedom of the press and freedom of communication would find its way to several liberal
constitutions, in America and others parts of the world, access to public information, the idea that
the information the state produces should be open to public scrutiny, did not find its way so easily.
Brandeis, an American judge, who coined the popular phrase ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant, electric
light the best policeman’ (Brandeis, ￿￿￿￿),￿ was an adamant defender of access to information, in
particular policy realms, such as financial regulation, banking and city governance (Berger, ￿￿￿￿), but
he never argued for it as a universal principle. ￿e ground-breaking report by Harold Cross (￿￿￿￿)
‘￿e People’s right to know’ summarised the complexities of access to public information in the United
States, arguing for the need to establish a specific right to inspection of public documents held by
the government. In ￿￿￿￿, after an intense campaign led by California Representative, John Moss,
Lyndon B. Johnson signed (reluctantly) the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)￿ that would become
landmark legislation, and would subsequently be hailed as an example for other democracies to adopt
(Schudson, ￿￿￿￿).
In the international arena, the adoption of several United Nations treaties on human rights also
led to an acknowledgement of freedom of expression and, indirectly, to access to information. In
￿Chydenius was member of the clergy, operating initially from Alaveteli, a small town in Finland
￿According to Manninen (￿￿￿￿), while Chydenius had in mind publishing the records of the Parliament (Diet in
Swedish terms), he was more focused on freedom of the press and abolition of censorship, but others such as the Historian
of the Realm Anders Schonberg provided in-depth lists of documents that should be public.
￿And generally in the Nordic countries after the Kingdom of Sweden lost Finland to Russia and Norway got its
independence.
￿￿e phrase can be traced back to Bryce (￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿￿) who notes ‘Public opinion is a sort of atmosphere, fresh, keen
and full of sunlight like that of the American cities, and this sunlight kills many of those noxious gems which are hatched
where politicians congregate... Selfishness, injustice, cruelty, tricks and jobs of all sorts, shun the light, to expose them is to
defeat them’. I am indebted to Al Roberts for a tweet where he mentions this point.
￿According to Kennedy (￿￿￿￿), Johnson signed this law reluctantly, after intense pressure and lobbying from Moss
and several civic groups.
￿￿
￿￿￿￿, the Inter-American Court of Justice ‘established access to information as an autonomous right’
(IACJ, ￿￿￿￿ Claude Reyes vs. Chile). ￿e European Court of Human Rights and other international
bodies have followed this trend.
Ackerman and Sandoval (￿￿￿￿) and Banisar (￿￿￿￿) report an explosion of freedom-of-information
laws across the world. In the last accounting, the number of RTI laws had reached ￿￿￿ by ￿￿￿￿
(McInthosh, ￿￿￿￿). RTI is now a right established in a significant number of countries around the
world.
Such a proliferation of laws is matched by significant literature on the matter. From an empirical
public administration, policy and legal perspective, case studies about how access-to-information
legislation emerges and works have flourished in several countries and regions.￿ In a legalistic and
normative vein, there are studies about global standards (Mendel, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿), and how they should
be enforced globally. ￿ere are also studies showing the complexity of enforcing RTI standards
globally considering the particular contexts in the developing world (Darch and Underwood, ￿￿￿￿).
Other studies have focused on the role the state machinery plays in RTI. Roberts (￿￿￿￿) notes how
bureaucracies are able to adjust to new access-to-information regulations to minimise their eﬀect.￿￿
While transparency was at the core of New Public Management (NPM) reforms (see for instance Scott,
￿￿￿￿, Hughes, ￿￿￿￿) structural reforms in terms of contracting out services led to significant changes
in how right-to-information legislation works, leading private contractors to handle large amounts of
public information which did not necessarily fall under the scope of an access-to-information law
(Roberts, ￿￿￿￿, Piotrowski, ￿￿￿￿, Roberts, ￿￿￿￿, Taggart, ￿￿￿￿). Also related to NPM reforms and
transparency, there are concerns about how transparency may aﬀect impartial (or ‘free and frank’)
advice from the civil service (Mulgan, ￿￿￿￿).
As the public sector incorporates new technologies, collecting, storing and eventually disseminating
public information are now also crucial to understand how information flows in an era of what Meijer
(￿￿￿￿) calls a ‘computer-mediated transparency’. Release of public information on line can significantly
alter work routines in public administration, leading to discomfort and complex trade-oﬀs for public
￿Such as the UK (Hazell et al. ￿￿￿￿, Worthy, ￿￿￿￿, Birkinshaw, ￿￿￿￿), Latin America (Michener, ￿￿￿￿, Lanza,
Fumega y Scrollini, ￿￿￿￿), Australia (Snell, ￿￿￿￿, Hazelll, ￿￿￿￿), New Zealand (Eagleson et a￿￿￿￿). (White, ￿￿￿￿), (Price,
￿￿￿￿), (Hazell, ￿￿￿￿), China (Xiao, ￿￿￿￿), United States (Katz, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, Gianella, ￿￿￿￿, Sofaer, ￿￿￿￿, Furby, ￿￿￿￿,
Kreimer, ￿￿￿￿), Canada (Hazell, ￿￿￿￿, Roberts, ￿￿￿￿), Germany (Holsen and Pasquier, ￿￿￿￿, Larsen and Wallby, ￿￿￿￿),
Sweden (AndersoHazelln ￿￿￿￿), Chile (Schonsteiner, ￿￿￿￿), India (Jenkins and Goetz, ￿￿￿￿, Jenkins, ￿￿￿￿, Sharma, ￿￿￿￿)
Ireland, (Felle and Adshead, ￿￿￿￿),￿e Netherlands (Meijer, ￿￿￿￿), Switzerland (Villeneuve and Pasquier, ￿￿￿￿, Holsen
and Pasquier, ￿￿￿￿) and Mexico (Lopez Ayllon y Arellano, ￿￿￿￿, Lopez Ayllon, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿Gregory (￿￿￿￿) also makes this observation about when the New Zealand Oﬃcial Information Act was introduced.
￿￿
servants (Halachimi and Greiling, ￿￿￿￿). Some are dubious about how much technology-enhanced
transparency can deliver in terms of public administration and social outcomes, particularly where data
provision cannot be automated (Bannister and Connolly, ￿￿￿￿). Furthermore, the internet has led to
new ways of interacting with citizens, automating access-to-information requests, publishing more
information on decision processes and, generally speaking, changing citizen–government relationships
(Margetts, ￿￿￿￿). Archives and information management usually remain under-studied subjects in
this field. Snell and Sebina (￿￿￿￿) look in detail at the diﬃculties that lack of record management
policies can create for FOI laws, leading to the ‘empty cabinet syndrome’ (Flinn and Jones, ￿￿￿￿) or
absence of public information once requested.
Not all academic and practitioners’ voices are fond of access to information and openness. Some
argue that transparency and openness create dysfunctional governments, preventing policymakers
from deliberating to make balanced decisions. In the American context, Fukuyama (￿￿￿￿) argues
in favour of discrediting the notion of transparency as an unrivalled value in a democracy. In a less
elaborate yet frank fashion, former PM Tony Blair notes that the freedom of information act was ‘one
of the domestic legislative measures I most regret’ (Blair ￿￿￿￿). As noted by Roberts (￿￿￿￿), new trends
and pressures also operate against RTI such as privatisation of public services and the expansion of the
security apparatus as a result of the ‘war on terror’. In short, while access to information might sound
in principle like an idea inherent to democracy, it is not by any means guaranteed its full expression.
￿e basic but powerful idea that government information should be open is still controversial.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿ɪ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ɪɴ￿￿ʀ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ: ￿ʜ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ʜ￿ ￿ɪ￿ʟ￿
In the above review, I noted access to information has a long and diverse history, but only recently
is it emerging as a research field in several disciplines. I also note diﬀerent studies emerging in this
field from a public policy / public administration perspective. However, for all the studies available,
only a few provide a set of concepts and frameworks to understand why right-to-information regimes
operating under similar principles work in diﬀerent ways obtaining diﬀerent outputs.￿ere are case studies
that try to understand why and how RTI spreads globally. ￿ese studies deal with particular regions,
trying to understand why these regimes emerged in the first place. Studies such as those of Darch
and Underwood (￿￿￿￿) in the developing world or Michener (￿￿￿￿) in Latin America provide
in-depth and valuable discussions about specific processes of setting up access-to-information regimes
in several developing countries, as well as descriptions of how some of them work, but do not provide
￿￿
a systematic way to compare them, nor do they explain the reasons why they work diﬀerently.
In terms of the reasons behind countries adopting these laws, Grigorescu (￿￿￿￿) emphasises the role
of international organisations. He argues that international organisations provide more information
to societies than the governments themselves, forcing governments to adopt access-to-information
regulation to become more credible. Bennett (￿￿￿￿) provides a discussion about the extensive use of
policy transfer as a conceptual device in the field of privacy, access to information and accountability.
Bennett argues that in the OECD context, the adoption of these policies is the result of an interaction
in policy communities between early adopters and other countries. In the case of access-to-information
regulation, Bennett argues that legitimation and not learning was the main motivation for the diﬀusion
of these laws. ￿ese studies provide explanation about how RTI laws emerged, but not at the links
between the origins and the way RTI regimes work.
Along these lines, Berliner (￿￿￿￿) argues that models at a regional level play a significant role when
countries decide to adopt access-to-information laws through several emulation processes. ￿is is
noticeable in terms of institutional design, as most laws would share common principles. Berliner
notes that there is no systematic evidence that international organisations play a significant role in
spreading these laws. While a methodologically sound study, Berliner understates the role actors and
international institutions play in this field. Due to the methodological approach, Berliner’s study
cannot go deep into the cases looking for specific patterns and links with history and context.
Stubbs (￿￿￿￿) poses a diﬀerent explanation from a transnational historical materialist point of view.
He notes that the general shift to transparency is a radical change in the way citizens relate to the state.
He explains that the expansion of these laws to ‘Hobbesian’ states is a ‘passive revolution’ in these
states, usually in deep inter-relationship with transnational movements, supporting the adoption of
access-to-information laws. According to Stubbs, the change and evolution of capitalism across the
world would have also changed the way citizens relate to the state, even in countries with no ‘Lockean’
tradition, associated with this right. Stubbs’ study provides an ideas-related account of how these
regimes spread but does not go into detail about the way they work or whether ideas aﬀect this.
￿us, the aforementioned set of studies helps in understanding why a country would potentially
adopt a RTI law. Some of them may go into the specifics of particular countries but they do not
provide an explanation of why these regimes work diﬀerently and how this is connected to the way
RTI policy was set up.
Other studies focus more on the role politics play in adopting RTI. Along these lines, in a later
￿￿
paper, Berliner (￿￿￿￿) argues that political competition in the domestic political system is significant
when approving an FOI law. In this view, if incumbents are about to leave, an access-to-information
law might work as a guarantee to gain access to information in the future. Berliner’s contribution
might explain why, in some cases, RTI reforms would emerge, but does not account for equifinality:
the possibility that other factors might also contribute to the same end. Furthermore, this work does
not link the politics of RTI with implementation. Along these lines, Michener (￿￿￿￿) argues that
the timing of the reform is important and presidents might delay the implementation of such a law.
Michener argues that two factors shape the way RTI laws are set up and how robust they end up
being. Based on a set of examples from Latin America, Michener notes that strong executives with
full control of the cabinet of a single party and parliamentary control are less likely to support RTI
reforms. On the other hand, multiparty cabinets open the possibility for RTI reforms as politicians
might be more inclined to open up diﬀuse control to the citizenry. Michener’s contribution links
structural conditions in the executive with legal robustness of these measures, but does not explore
the connection between structural conditions, legal robustness and how these regimes work.
Other set of studies provide a more comparative and historical approach to RTI, connecting adop-
tion with larger institutions. McClean (￿￿￿￿), developing a study of RTI in developed democracies,
argues that institutions aﬀect the way these laws are adopted. McClean argues that power relationships
among certain groups such as citizens, public servants, politicians and interest groups (and particularly
who is an insider and an outsider in a given policy process) aﬀect the making of these laws. McClean
argues that competitive two-party systems are more prone to politicise access-to-information rights.
Furthermore, he argues that relationships between the parliament and executive aﬀect how politicised
or not access-to-information rights become. McClean notes as well that diﬀerent configurations in
terms of political party alliances aﬀect how RTI regimes emerge. He also notes that in countries
where firms are organised in a non-competitive manner, through associations representing them,
freedom-of-information policies tend to be delayed as insiders already have the information they need
to operate. Finally, McLean notes that relationships between bureaucrats and politicians also aﬀect
how RTI works. Where organisations operate at an arms-length of political power, senior political
figures may lean more towards setting up a RTI regime. McClean’s study provides a set of relevant
variables, and shows the diﬀerent paths consolidated democracies followed to approve these laws.
By taking a comparative and historical approach, McClean manages to capture the complexity and
diversity of these paths. Yet McClean does not explore how these regimes end up working, or how
￿￿
history connects to the subsequent development of these regimes. In addition, while identifying
several important variables, his work is unable to run structured and focused comparisons. Along
these lines, Sharma (￿￿￿￿), in a case study about India, argues that historical factors and contextual
political variables are also essential to explain diﬀerent processes in the adoption of public information
institutions and the outcomes of transparency regimes, putting emphasis on context. He oﬀers impor-
tant insights in the specific case of India, oﬀering a diﬀerent narrative about the emergence and initial
working of the law. Furthermore, he stresses the role of international organisations in this process.
Sharma contributes with an important specific case study, but does not provide a systematisation that
could help in a comparison with other countries
In terms of a conceptualisation of how access-to-information institutions work, there are also a
few studies. For instance, Heald (￿￿￿￿) discusses what he calls ‘transparency habitats’, building on
Hood’s (￿￿￿￿) policy habitats idea. A habitat is where transparency policies unfold and work, yet
the idea of a habitat is not specifically defined in Heald’s framework and reflects macro factors that
could aﬀect transparency policies, rather than a specific description of a transparency ‘habitat’. In
a more detailed way, Meijer (￿￿￿￿) provides a heuristic model of how transparency works from a
constructivist perspective. Meijer defines transparency as the availability of information about an actor
that allows other actors to monitor the performance of the original actor. Assuming complexities in
terms of strategy, cognition and institutions, his framework provides an analysis in three dimensions:
strategic (based on power games between stakeholders), cognitive (the frame stakeholders use in
the process) and institutional (institutions aﬀecting transparency). Meijer’s framework assumes that
the interaction between stakeholders establishes complex dynamics in terms of how transparency
works, and how multi-actor interactions result in transparency, as well as how transparency influences
multi-actor interactions. ￿e multidimensional analysis provides a rich description of the complexity
of transparency policies in the specific case studies he provides (European Union and Dutch schools),
yet it might be unable to travel to other policy fields or areas. Moreover, while three lenses are useful
to understand the complexity of the field, the framework does not provide an explanation of how the
institutional playing field, where the lenses are deployed, actually works.
In the Canadian context, Roberts assesses the compliance of the Canadian government identifying
key factors concerningf coverage, scope and challenges for enforcement institutions (Roberts ￿￿￿￿). In
this paper, Roberts identifies three types of ways in which governments behave around RTI: malicious
non-compliance, adversarialism and administrative non- compliance. Malicious non-compliance
￿￿
assumes bad faith on the side of governments. Adversarialism assumes a will to test the limits
of RTI, and non-compliance assumes issues around resources and practices in the administration.
Adding to this typology Snell (￿￿￿￿), working on a comparative study between Canada, Australia
and New Zealand includes administrative compliance and administrative activism. Administrative
compliance assumes the administration process requests according to the law, while administrative
activism assumes that the administration takes special care in processing RTI requests. ￿is typology
is particularly useful when considering a government behaviour, but not necessarily user’s behaviour.
Snell (￿￿￿￿) adds the user dimension to this discussion by considering a particular group of users.
Also in the Canadian context Roberts (￿￿￿￿) argues that laws alone are far from being the only
component of an access-to-information system. Roberts performs an analysis of a Canadian gov-
ernment agency showing that contentious access-to-information requests, usually filed by political
parties and journalists, have longer processing times than the average. Administrative discretion is as
a key component in terms of how fast requests are processed. ￿e ‘internal law’ of administration is
one of the most important issues to address in a system, although the paper does not explore other
components of the system. In a subsequent article, Roberts (￿￿￿￿) examines in detail the Canadian
case adding that adversarialism and scope are the two challenges Canadian RTI law faces. ￿e paper
provides more information about requesters and conflicts around the law, as well as analyses the
role of enforcement institutions. Roberts (￿￿￿￿) notes that a decent record-keeping system and a
professional civil service, as well as suﬃcient resources, are likely to have an eﬀect on how the law is
implemented. Further, Roberts notes that in some countries (notably where RTI has been recently
established) it is worth asking whether civil society organisations have the capacity to use the law
eﬀectively. Finally, Roberts (￿￿￿￿) explores the idea of a RTI system noting that RTI laws should be
considered the backbone of a RTI system. Roberts argues that the right to information depends on
more than the law itself. In particular Roberts notes that:
We can state, more positively, the elements that are necessary for a RTI law to realize its potential.
￿ere must be a community of potential users who understand how to make requests; administrative
capacity within government departments so that requests are handled properly; and similarly capacity
within enforcement agencies so that complaints are addressed properly. In the long run, there must also be a
well-organized constituency of non-governmental stakeholders who are capable of articulating complaints
about weaknesses in the law, monitoring against governmental backsliding, and importing innovations in
law and practice from other jurisdictions.
￿￿
Roberts ’ work establishes the need to consider other elements beyond RTI laws, and focuses on
the extensive experience Canada has acquired in the last ￿￿ years. In particular, Roberts’ work focuses
on one particular variable which is public administration. ￿us, there is room to consider in detail
some of these elements, as well as to explore relationships among them. Further there is room to
explore these elements in other cases to compare the relevance of diﬀerent state bureaucracy models.
Along these lines, Pasquier and Villeneuve (￿￿￿￿) provide a framework for understanding docu-
mentary transparency. ￿e framework focuses on which types of barriers accessing information faces.
￿ere are contexts in which there is no access-to-information law, under the justification that it is
not necessary to have transparency. ￿ere are contexts in which, having access-to-information law, it
is possible to identify illegal behaviours such as averted transparency (where organisations disobey
the law), obstructed transparency (where organisations resist releasing public information), strained
transparency (where organisations would comply but have no capability) and maximised transparency.
￿e study does provide a set of possible behaviours by public organisations that can be useful for
a comparative endeavour, but does not fully take into account the requester (demand) side of the
relationship. Furthermore, the framework deals basically with documentary information, which is a
subset of public information.
Worthy and Michener (￿￿￿￿) have drawn up a typology of types of requests and requesters, noting
that RTI can be understood as an information-gathering device. According to their analysis, the
political dimension is important to consider as well as the orientation the requester has when making
a request. As a result, they create a matrix where two dimensions are important: political importance
and publicness of the request. ￿ey also identify diﬀerent kind of requesters based on their intentions.
￿e framework presents good insights and analysis dimensions based on four cases, but does not
provide an analysis beyond the ‘demand side’, thus not providing a more comprehensive view of what
they term transparency systems and their eco-systems.
Kreimer (￿￿￿￿), writing in the American context and from a constitutional theory perspective,
defines how the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) works in an ecology of transparency. Kreimer’s
main argument is that the American Constitution provided guidance about neither transparency nor
secrecy, as the Constitution relied mainly on the executive to carry out tasks and the division of powers
to keep a balanced system. In the aftermath of ￿/￿￿, much criticism of the FOIA emerged from judges
and government oﬃcials, reflecting a tension between advocates for institutional checks and balances
and advocates of social control or ‘do it yourself ’ oversight. Kreimer provides an in-depth description
￿￿
of issues aﬀecting FOIA such as suppression of files and the role of the integrity of public servants in
the administration of FOIA, as well as the several strategies public administrations can use not to
release files. Furthermore, Kreimer provides a description of users of the law, particularly the media,
NGOs and lawyers, and the challenges they face in a very contentious and litigation-oriented regime.
Kreimer’s description focuses on how, through the use of revelation and inside sources, users of the
law can get access to documents that otherwise would be ‘lost’ in bureaucracy. Kreimer also argues
that key infrastructures supporting FOIA are a strong civil society, willing lawyers and a free press.
Finally, Kreimer notes that FOIA requests trigger ‘cascades of transparency’ where oﬃcial information
release activates watchdog units inside government.
Kreimer’s framework provides a very insightful discussion about the American case, but does not
provide a systemic view of the phenomenon that could help a comparative endeavour to understand
how RTI policies work in diﬀerent settings. Some of the behaviours Kreimer describes are similar
to other countries, and have been documented, but it is not yet possible to organise and compare
them. Along these lines, a recent World Bank study (Dokeniya, ￿￿￿￿) also broadly reflects on the
idea of ‘enabling environments’ for transparency policies, in particular, access-to-information policies.
Focusing on a set of six countries, the practitioner-oriented study provides an overview of what makes
an access-to-information law eﬀective. ￿e study identifies formal accountability institutions (namely
regulators) as key to creating awareness and support for an FOIA law. ￿e study also identified
as key factors the underlying political economy relationships and governance environment for the
implementation of an access-to-information law. However, the study does not provide an in-depth
analytical framework, to understand fully the relationships between key actors in a transparency
system.
Other studies focus more on proactive or reactive publication of public information: this is the ‘push
vs. pull’ model of transparency and access-to-information laws. In the pull models, citizens try to get
information from the state by using access-to-information laws (e.g. filing an access-to-information
request). Increasingly, there has been a shift to push models where the state increasingly publishes
information so citizens can use it for several purposes (Xiao, ￿￿￿￿, Schartum, ￿￿￿￿, Darbishire, ￿￿￿￿).
Push models are often associated with technological change while pull models are often associated with
‘antagonistic’ and individually oriented request-for-information practices. In the context of recent
open government data policies, the push model is favoured by politicians to ‘make FOI redundant’
(Maude, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
￿e push model focuses on proactive transparency (i.e. publishing information). From a quantita-
tive perspective, Islam (￿￿￿￿) provides a study that links availability of public information to better
economic and political decisions. Drawing a parallel with markets, Islam notes that more information
implies that citizens will be able to make better judgments about government policies, while the
government will be more wary of citizen’s demands. Furthermore, she notes that data availability
could increase coordination among government departments, promoting eﬃciency in the public
sector. From a practitioner perspective, Darbishire (￿￿￿￿) notes the increasing importance of proactive
transparency as a central element of RTI. She argues that, increasingly, regimes should publish public
information in an available, findable, relevant, comprehensible, free or low-cost, and up-to-date
way. Darbishire finds that the drivers behind the increasing importance of proactive transparency are
more accountability, the expansion of public services and demands for more participation. All of this
requires more proactive transparency.
It should be noted that, even in push models, the release of government information is governed
by right-to-information laws, which establish specific categories about which information to release
and how to release it. ￿us, it is unlikely that FOI per se will be made redundant.￿￿ Looking at pull
vs. push models is a convenient strategy to analyse how an aspect of RTI works, but conceptually
does not allow a full comparison explaining why RTI works like this.
In terms of RTI enforcement institutions (i.e. institutions which ensure that public information is
available), previous research has identified them as key to explaining how access-to-information regimes
work (Neuman, ￿￿￿￿, Holsen and Pasquier, ￿￿￿￿, White, ￿￿￿￿)￿e role of enforcement institutions
in resolving the release of public information as well as handling the withholding of information in a
fair and non-partisan manner (Holsen and Pasquier, ￿￿￿￿) is essential in access-to-information regimes.
Neuman (￿￿￿￿) distinguishes three models: the Judiciary model, the Information Commission or
Tribunal with the power to issue binding orders, and the Information Commissioner or Ombudsman
with recommendation powers. ￿e Judiciary model trusts that the judges will deal with ultimately
enforcing the release of public information. Courts have wide-ranging powers to investigate and order
￿￿Linked to this, but diﬀerent, is the concept of targeted transparency, which is defined as a ‘more focused approach to
public information in which government compels companies or public service agencies to disclose information in standardized
formats in order to reduce specific risks or improve services. Such policies are more light-handed than conventional regulation
because they rely on the power of information rather than on enforcement of rules and standards or financial inducements to alter
choices’ (Weill, ￿￿￿￿). According to Weill, it diﬀers from the general right to know and open government eﬀorts which are
broader. Yet, to some degree, there is a similarity with ‘push models’ as all targeted transparency policies involve certain
actions from government. ￿e government is the only player who has the power and legitimacy to order the release of
information for a defined public purpose (Fung et al. ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
the release of public information. Another part of their main function is to uphold the rule of law
and, as a result, ordering the release of public information is part of their natural duties. However,
courts are potentially ineﬃcient due to the length of time that the process could take, as well as the
access barrier requesters might face.
Another model, the Information Commissioner with binding powers, is a recent development
in the international context (Holsen and Pasquier,￿￿￿￿) ￿￿ entrusting a particular institution with
the role of ordering the release of public information. Practitioners consider this the best model,
as it is an independent institution, with specialist knowledge and usually with low entry barriers
for requesters. As noted by Holsen and Pasquier (￿￿￿￿), this model can be classified as two types:
the Commissioner model (e.g. Slovenia, UK) and the Tribunal model (more than one member, e.g.
Chile, Mexico). Finally, the Ombudsman is an institution dealing with administrative injustice that
emerged in the Nordic countries (Rowat, ￿￿￿￿). It is usually a Parliamentary oﬃcer appointed by
the Parliament for a fixed period of time.￿￿. ￿e aforementioned research has argued consistently
in favour of specialist institutions to deal with the enforcement of public information regulation,
but there is little understanding of how diﬀerent regimes compare to each other and the advantages
and disadvantages they may present from an empirical perspective. Furthermore, while the three
models are indeed the most used, little is said about the role of administrative units dealing with RTI
coordination such as the French or Uruguayan cases. A synthesis of this issue is provided in Table ￿.￿.
To sum up, the availability of frameworks to compare RTI institutions work is limited. Part of
the literature explores why and how RTI regimes spread across the world, but does not address the
way such regimes work. Other parts of the literature address important comparative elements to
understand RTI regimes, but they do so in partial ways, focusing on requesters or the government.
For instance, while the literature singles out public administration tradition as an important factor to
consider, it is not clear from a comparative perspective how exactly this element aﬀects RTI regimes.
Most of the literature is single case studies or is not designed to generate and use concepts that allow
comparability between the several models of access-to-information institutions available. Moreover,
the literature available has limited understanding of how enforcement institutions work in ensuring
the release of public information. Furthermore, the connection between adoption and eventual
￿￿Information Commissioners with binding powers have been available at state level in Canada (Quebec,￿￿￿￿) and
Ontario (￿￿￿￿). In this way they are not a new development. Nevertheless in Latin America and elsewhere have gained
notoriety as advocates keep pushing for these new institutions which had no previous precedent in these regions. ￿is was
the case for instance in Mexico, Guatemala and Chile
￿￿Holsen and Pasquier (￿￿￿￿) propose four types of institution including administrative tribunals
￿￿
implementation of access-to-information regimes is often not covered at a comparative level. Either
the literature explores the emergence of these institutions or how they work at a certain point in time,
but not the process of how adoption is linked to the evolution of these institutions. None of these
studies, to the best of my knowledge, connect the adoption process of these laws with the way they
ended up working in diﬀerent ways, leading to diﬀerent outputs. My work seeks to address this.
￿e expansion of access to information as a general principle and the normative imperative to enact
legislation changes the logic of how governments operate, making comparative endeavours relevant.
Advocates promoting these reforms have in mind a particular scenario that never fully materialises
once reform is enacted. Eager international organisations willing to support the expansion of RTI
across the world often indicate that, once the law was approved, change did not follow. Partly this
is about expectations of how these institutions work in other jurisdictions being regarded as good
examples. ￿is research aims to address this academic–practitioner gap, looking in detail at the
diﬀerence in terms of how RTI works. As a result, this research will generate a framework that will
help to compare more systematically how these institutions work and explain why they produce
diﬀerent outputs. It will add value by exploring the connection between the ways these institutions
originated, previous institutions in place, and how these factors influence the way RTI regimes work.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿ʀ￿ɪ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ʜɪ￿ ￿￿ʀ￿
￿e rest of this work is structured as follows. In the next chapter (Chapter ￿), I specify the research
question. I specifically develop a comparative framework: RTI Arenas. ￿e framework provides a
set of elements and concepts to allow a structured and focused comparison of the case studies. In
particular, the framework identifies the state as a nodal (central) actor in a given society and RTI laws
as a foundation that establishes a shift in government and citizen expected behaviours around public
information. ￿e framework aims to capture several of these behaviours and provides a typology
of requesters and enforcement institutions. ￿rough the development of this framework, I provide
examples from the cases and from the available literature to strengthen its descriptive power. ￿e
framework is a heuristic device to guide the structured comparison in this work. In Chapter ￿, I
explain my methodological approach and theoretical lenses. I show the scope and limits of this work
and of its methodology. I explain the criteria to select the cases presented in this research. In Chapters
￿, ￿ and ￿, I discuss the New Zealand, Chile and Uruguay case studies following the framework
advanced in Chapter ￿. In Chapter ￿, I compare the cases selected, explaining the diﬀerences among
￿￿
RTI regimes, according to the framework provided in Chapter ￿. Finally, I provide a set of conclusions
showing the contribution of this work to the larger literature, exploring its limits, providing advice






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































R IGHT-TO- INFORMATION ARENAS
‘￿e map is not the territory’ (Korzybisy, ￿￿￿￿)
￿.￿ ￿￿￿ɪɴɪɴɢ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿￿
￿e key question in this research is: Why do RTI regimes operating under similar principles work
diﬀerently leading to diﬀerent outputs?
￿e question requires a set of clarifications that leads to the introduction of key concepts in this
chapter. In this study, I consider access to public information as a central institution in a given country,
establishing the rules that govern particular type exchange of public information between the state
and all other actors￿￿. Such an institution is designed to ensure transparency but this is not always
guaranteed.￿￿ In this research, I consider RTI regimes are a system of institutions, actors and practices
￿￿As I discuss in the next pages, when describing the elements of this framework, there are other laws that govern other
types of exchanges of information with the state such as privacy laws, copyright laws etc
￿￿ ￿ere are objective definitions of transparency emphasising the role of a flow of public information that should be
reliable and timely. For instance, Vishwanath and Kaufmann (￿￿￿￿) and Kaufmann (￿￿￿￿) define transparency as the
‘increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political information, which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders’,
while Lindset and Naurin (￿￿￿￿) note that transparency is ‘the release of information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating
those institutions’. In these definitions, information has to be available in a certain manner to allow the evaluation of a given
institution. Candeub (￿￿￿￿) notes in the American context that the most important government statutory regime in terms
of transparency is the RTI law (FOIA) as it mandates the release of public information but argues that transparency or
access does not exist if accessing and securing information is costly in time and eﬀort for requesters. A diﬀerent approach is
when the definition considers in more detail the audience of public information. In this view transparency focuses more on
the ability of stakeholders or citizens to understand and use information. Transparency would be ‘the ability to look clearly
through the windows of an institution.’ (Den Boer, ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿ cited Meijer, ￿￿￿￿) or transparency implies that information is
visible and inferable (Michener and Birch, ￿￿￿￿). Inferable here being used in the sense that is possible to draw conclusions
from the information released. Subjective definitions usually also tend to understand transparency as a relationship. For
instance, the Utrecht definition stresses the availability of information about an actor allowing external actors to monitor
￿￿
dealing with the exchange of oﬃcial information between the state and society. ￿is definition is linked
with the idea of regimes that is used in other areas of public policy such as regulation, institutional
analysis, governance and economics (Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, ￿￿￿￿). I will use the term RTI
arenas instead of regimes, because it captures the conflict that usually emerges in these systems. As
noted by Fox (￿￿￿￿), the limits within which the relationships between state and society operate are
in constant flux and part of cumulative processes where actors keep pushing the boundaries, for more
or less information
￿ere are four central assumptions behind RTI arenas that are grounded in the available literature
in this field. ￿ese assumptions are: ￿) the need for a RTI law, ￿) the state as a nodal actor, ￿) that
there is an inherent tension between stakeholders and the state, and ￿) that RTI arenas do not cover
all the information exchanges, only oﬃcial information.
First, a RTI arenas framework assumes that there is an institution in a given setting ensuring
the release of public information. It is not possible to understand an RTI arena without a central
institution that establishes that information should be public. As noted by Candeub (￿￿￿￿), RTI laws
are not the only regulation mandating the release of public information. Other laws in several domains
(such as finance, health, consumer relations and so on) also mandate the release of public information,
but the crucial issue about a RTI law is that it establishes a general principle: the expectation that all
public information should be public. In some cases, RTI laws superseded laws that established secrecy
as a principle, such as the Oﬃcial Secrets Act in the United Kingdom. Now the principle operates
the other way around: public servants could be sanctioned for hiding information. Other institutions
and regulations play a role in a RTI arena, such as oﬃcial secrets laws, privacy laws, copyright laws
and whistle-blower protection, but they have to accommodate this new principle. ￿is assumption
excludes the potential use of this comparison in polities where such an institution is not present.
Second, a RTI arenas framework assumes that public information is held by the state, which is a
nodal actor in any given society. Nodality is defined as the capacity of a given state to operate as a
node in information networks, assuming the state plays a central role in society (Hood, ￿￿￿￿, Hood,
￿￿￿￿, Hood and Margetts, ￿￿￿￿). How information is collected, processed and stored and, later on,
released are important features in a RTI arena. If countries do not have a state apparatus in place, as
the actions and decisions of that actor (Meijer, ￿￿￿￿; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, ￿￿￿￿). In the context of public services,
Stirton and Lodge (￿￿￿￿) note that transparency combines two elements: answerability to citizens i.e. being informed
about the state of the world) and the possibility of citizens incorporating feedback, elements that come from control and
democratic theory.
￿￿
could be the case for fragile states, the framework developed would not be applicable.
￿ird, a RTI arenas framework assumes a certain degree of conflict between society and the state in
terms of release of public information. As a result, RTI arenas sit in the interface between society and
state relationships, and are a relatively fluid rather than a fixed arrangement. In this way, RTI arenas are
a bit like shifting sands. As noted in a diﬀerent context by Fox (￿￿￿￿), RTI arenas are where diﬀerent
forces struggle, and there are several alliances that can be formed that change the power balance
about who controls public information. In other words, the essential rule of these environments
is not set in stone. Conflicts provide feedback loops in a RTI arena that have the potential to
change the way RTI laws works in terms of scope of the institution, access mechanisms, time, and
who can request information, among other significant issues. Berliner (￿￿￿￿) notes that changes in
transparency are usually costly once access-to-information laws are enacted, particularly since several
stakeholders (citizens, business, opposition political parties, and international organisations) would
be able to mobilise resources to stop negative changes. However, backlashes are possible in a RTI
arena, regardless of how costly they can be, as the examples of Hungary and Uruguay recently showed
(Cainfo, ￿￿￿￿,Transparency Hungary, ￿￿￿￿).￿￿ Furthermore, it should be noted that stakeholders in
RTI arenas have complex incentives to retain and release information. ￿e state does not always want
to hold information and requesters might not be always willing to dig as much as they could.
Fourth, a RTI arenas deal with only a fraction of the exchanges of information in any given society.
People exchange information constantly with the state, and it is not always through RTI requests or
proactive transparency. For instance, people may give personal details to the state that are covered
by other regulations such as Privacy Acts. What makes RTI arenas relevant is that they deal with
the particular fraction that is supposed to be oﬃcial information. By oﬃcial information, I mean
information that is held by the State. Oﬃcial information is allegedly more reliable than other kinds
of information (such as private records) as it provides certainty and is the underlying base in terms of
exercising legal powers and rights.
While not an assumption per se, it should be noted that RTI arenas increasingly take place in a
computer-mediated environment. Digitalisation leads to more requests and proactive publication
of information being made online and the use of e-mail is now extensive. ￿us, RTI arenas are
becoming an environment where information is relatively easy to store and distribute, in a cheap
and eﬃcient way. ￿is means transparency in modern times (Meijer, ￿￿￿￿) is what is provided on
￿￿Both countries experienced a significant reform in their access-to-information laws.
￿￿
computer screens.
￿.￿ ￿ʀɪɴ￿ɪ￿ʟ￿￿ ￿￿ ʀ￿ɪ ʟ￿￿￿
In my research question I indicate that RTI laws operating under similar principles work diﬀerently,
leading to diﬀerent outputs. ￿e global explosion of RTI laws mentioned in Chapter ￿ led to the
introduction of a set of similar RTI norms across the world. As noted by others, RTI has a set of
principles that makes them very similar across the world (Bennett, ￿￿￿￿, Stubbs, ￿￿￿￿, Mendel,
￿￿￿￿) ￿￿. When I use the term principles I refer to a set of norms that are often present in RTI laws.
￿ese principles can be summarised as follows:
a Establishment of a presumptive right to information held by public authorities.
b Duty to publish public information (or Proactive Transparency): ￿e state has a duty to provide
certain information without any request. Usually this includes organisation information, budget
information and decision-making information.
c A request mechanism: ￿is usually establishes diﬀerent kinds of processes to access information
from the requester’s perspective and diﬀerent degrees of limitations on making a request,
including being a national of the country, format, etc.
d Limited exceptions: Exceptions allowing the non-release of information are usually few and
should be interpreted in a restrictive way. Examples of common exceptions are national security,
trade secrets and financial stability.
e Duty to assist: ￿e state should assist requesters when using the law, providing guidance to get
the information requested.
f Accessibility: Information should ideally be free, and fees should only be charged to recover
costs for accessing information.
g A conflict resolution mechanism: ￿ere should be a mechanism in which conflicts about the
release of information are resolved. Usually, this is done through a specialist institution or the
￿￿I return to the definition of principles and its comparability in chapter ￿ where I provide a justification for the use of
these principles in this research
￿￿
judiciary.￿￿￿￿
RTI law is the foundation of a RTI arena, as it structures the basic ways stakeholders will relate to
each other, as well as what can be (formally) done and what cannot be done with oﬃcial information.
RTI laws are- in other words- the constitution of the arena. As Berliner (￿￿￿￿) notes, the key role of
these laws is to institutionalise transparency in rules and procedures.
￿.￿ ￿ɴ ￿ɪ￿￿￿ʀ￿ɴ￿ ￿ʏ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿￿ ￿ɴ￿ ￿ɪ￿￿￿ʀ￿ɴ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In this research, I asked why RTI regimes based on similar principles lead to diﬀerent outputs. I argue
that RTI regimes can be grouped in three diﬀerent categories that exhibit diﬀerent outputs. ￿ese
categories are: functional RTI arena, mixed RTI arena and contested RTI arena ￿￿ I argue that three
diﬀerent factors (or variables) contribute to shape these RTI regimes, leading to diﬀerent outputs:
participation in the policymaking process, the state bureaucracy and enforcement institutions. I now
turn to explaining these factors and how I will use them in the course of this research.
￿.￿.￿ Participation in the policymaking process
I argue that the participation in the policymaking process by diﬀerent stakeholders in a given country
aﬀects the design and implementation of the RTI law. High levels of participation would lead to more
robust policy design and the evolution of a policy community that supports RTI implementation.
By participation I mean the active involvement of local stakeholders in the policymaking process.
My argument is that high levels of participation by local stakeholders when a RTI law is set up (this is
to say, in the formative moment) leads to a more functional RTI arena. ￿e fact that all stakeholders
are able to contribute to the process leads to a better design and implementation of the RTI.￿e
group of stakeholders that participates in setting up a RTI usually remains in place after the approval,
acting as a policy community, fostering the development of the arena. ￿is is a stark contrast with
processes where only a few actors participate, leading to a small policy community in place. ￿us,
participation in the early stages of the policy- making process is essential to understand the way
RTI regimes (or arenas) end up operating as functional, mixed or contested. A particular aspect to
￿￿A similar list has been established by Grigorescu (￿￿￿￿) in his study on what drives a country to adopt transparency
regulation.
￿￿Arguably, there could be more principles (Mendel ￿￿￿￿) but, in the context of this research, these are the ones most
relevant to understanding a RTI arena.
￿￿I provide a definition of this classification in this chapter.
￿￿
explore about participation, is the influence international actors such as international foundations
and multilateral organisations play in the policymaking process. My argument is that international
organisations play a role mostly in the policy stream, supporting several stakeholders during the
policymaking process, as well as supporting the work of advocates through implementation. Evidence
gathered in this research shows that international organisations play an influential but limited role
in RTI policymaking processes, usually supporting eﬀorts of local stakeholders but not as central
stakeholders in the policymaking process.￿￿
To explore the policymaking process, I use Kingdon’s (￿￿￿￿) well-known heuristic model.￿￿ In
this model, the emergence of a policy can be understood as the confluence of three streams: policy,
politics and problems. When these streams meet, a ‘window of opportunity’ opens for a new policy to
emerge. ￿e problem stream is usually a list of several issues demanding attention from policymakers
and in need of a solution. For instance, in the context of this research, a corruption scandal could
be considered a problem that policymakers might be inclined to address through the enactment of
access-to-information legislation.
When a problem emerges, decision-makers need to have a set of options ready to solve the problem.
￿ese options are developed in the policy stream where ideas are constantly being traded. Finally, the
political stream is where certain decisions or changes might lead to policymakers adopting a decision.
For instance, a change of government might be a good opportunity to address the issue of access-
to-information law. ￿e streams are usually independent from each other and policy entrepreneurs
are the actors involved in bridging them. Policy entrepreneurs have ideas, connections and enough
￿￿In the literature, these processes are considered policy transfer (Dolowitz and March, ￿￿￿￿) or ‘lesson drawing’ (Rose
￿￿￿￿) among other terms often used to describe external influence and adoption of new policies in policymaking. As noted
by James and Lodge (￿￿￿￿), these concepts are influential and often used in a broad way, which can in fact be confused
with rational policymaking (in the case of lesson drawing) or other ways of policymaking. I avoid getting into an extensive
discussion of this in this work. Concurring with Page (￿￿￿￿), I think that ‘who, what, how, where and why policies were
transferred do not generally require a previous intellectual investment in a set of complex concepts or a voluminous theoretical
literature, but can be explained and grasped using common-sense terms and categories’ (Page, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿).
￿￿￿ere are several models to explain the policymaking process. Lindblom (￿￿￿￿) proposes an incrementalist approach
to public policy decision-making, Baumgartner and Jones (￿￿￿￿) propose the theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ and
Sabatier (￿￿￿￿) the advocacy coalitions framework. As noted by Meijernik (￿￿￿￿), these frameworks can mostly be seen as
complementary rather than competing when explaining policy stability and change, but they also oﬀer room for competing
hypotheses about how the policy process works. My decision to use Kingdon has more to do with the descriptive power of
the framework rather than with a dogmatic view of how the policy process unfolds. One of the main objectives of this
work is to connect the origins and evolution of what I termed RTI arenas. ￿us, I decided to use Kingdon’s framework as it
was able to capture specific developments in each of the streams which later influenced these arenas. While the debate
around the policymaking process is indeed extremely important, this work does not seek to address it. I do address that in
these particular policies it is important to consider participation among a community of actors, regardless of how the policy
process evolved.
￿￿
persistence to advance an agenda. For instance, some public servants and some NGO leaders might
act as policy entrepreneurs.
Policy entrepreneurs are the ‘policy middle man’ (Heclo, ￿￿￿￿), those advancing the reforms in
several settings. As a window opens, it is important to recognise the opportunity as it might easily fade
away; it is the job of policy entrepreneurs to pursue these opportunities. Looking at the configuration
of these streams, it is also possible to understand who were the actors, individuals and interest groups
that took part in setting up these regimes. In this work, I characterise these actors, exploring their
motives, resources and influence. In some of these cases, entrepreneurs are organised interest groups
with specific political skills that can translate into policy proposals and influence (Eckstein, ￿￿￿￿),
while in other cases a handful of people were able to advance the reform.￿￿.
In countries such as New Zealand where there was a high level of participation by several actors,
there is evidence of a more robust institutional design and implementation.￿￿ Level of participation
is related to the establishment of a subsequent policy community that remains in place when the law
is established. By policy community, I mean a relatively loose group of individuals and organisations
that remains in place, sharing an interest in this policy area and who, over time, succeed in shaping
the policy (Wilks and Wright, ￿￿￿￿).￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Professionalisation of the state bureaucracy
I argue that professionalisation of the existing state bureaucracy aﬀects the implementation and outputs of
a RTI regime. High levels of professionalism will lead to a more consistent implementation of a RTI regime.
￿e state, in particular those agencies collecting, releasing or mandating the release of information,
￿￿￿e fact that not only interest groups but individuals are also active in these arenas creates complexities in terms of
developing an analytical device that could capture both developments in a comparative fashion. ￿us, while this work deals
with interest groups, it does not go deeply into a theory of how these groups influence decision-making in all the cases
selected, as it would exceed the boundaries of this work
￿￿￿is contrasts strikingly with more externally-driven processes which ended up little or no participation, such as
the recent approval of an FOI in Tunisia, where the World Bank played a significant role through a loan to the interim
government (World Bank, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿e literature has extensively debated policy communities and networks (Atkinson and Coleman, ￿￿￿￿, Dowding,
￿￿￿￿, Blanco et al. ￿￿￿￿). At the core of the debate is the problem of defining the very idea of what community and
networks are and if these are useful conceptual devices when exploring policymaking processes. For instance, Rhodes (￿￿￿￿)
sets a very restrictive concept of community, characterised by stability, restrictive membership, vertical interdependence and
insulation from networks and institutions. Other definitions include Heclo (￿￿￿￿) issue network (more at a microlevel)
and Sabatier’s (￿￿￿￿) in the advocacy coalitions framework. More recent debates on this matter includes the concept of
governance networks (Blanco et al. ￿￿￿￿). ￿e definition I borrowed here seeks not to engage in this highly theoretical
debate but to use the concept in a way that helps to explore the connection between the context, origins and outputs of
these arenas. By using the idea of a community, I seek to use it as a device to explain how a group of individuals remained
influential (or not) after a RTI law was passed.
￿￿
play a central role. ￿￿ State bureaucracy is singled out by the relevant literature (Roberts, ￿￿￿￿, White,
￿￿￿￿, Hazell et al. ￿￿￿￿, Piotrowski, ￿￿￿￿, McClean, ￿￿￿￿) as one of the most important factors to
explain how RTI institutions work.
Noting the state bureaucracy is an important factor the main issue is to specify how it becomes
relevant. State capacity to manage information records and answer requests is often signalled as one
of the issues in RTI (Roberts, ￿￿￿￿, Snell and Sebina, ￿￿￿￿, Trapnell and Lemieux, ￿￿￿￿, White
￿￿￿￿). If there are no resources allocated to deal with RTI and archives policies, then it is likely that
retrieving and finding information will be diﬃcult, causing problems concerning implementation.
Further, some organisations inside the state will have more state capacity to manage information
records than others as all the cases in this research show. Delays, problems applying rules, lack of
proper procedures among other issues, can be attributed to diﬀerent levels of state capacity.
Another issue about bureaucracies is the relationship between public servants and politicians, also
known as public service bargains (Hood and Lodge, ￿￿￿￿). ￿is relationship often goes at the core
of politics in a given country and delineates responsibilities of public servants and politicians when
dealing with multiple issues arising from administrative practice. Most of these relationships are not
formal. In some countries public servants act as ‘trustees’, this is to say ‘public servants are expected
to act as independent judges of the public good (i.e. the interests of their beneficiaries) to some significant
extent, and not merely to take their orders from some political master. ￿e notion of a trustee relationship
implies that public servants possess a domain of autonomy...’ (Hood and Lodge ￿￿￿￿ p.￿￿). In other
jurisdictions public servants act as agents of political principals, following orders from political masters
in exchange for certain rewards (Hood and Lodge,￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). To put this in other words public
servants can be more or less autonomous from a political master. ￿￿ To understand this relationship is
important as in the RTI field, public servants and politicians play a vital role when ordering the release
of public information. As noted by Roberts (￿￿￿￿), White (￿￿￿￿) among others, public servants
might well choose to not write down material, potentially obstruct the working or the RTI Act or
￿￿Max Weber noted, in an era where transparency was not in vogue, that ‘￿e concept of the oﬃcial secret is the specific
invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude... in facing a parliament, the
bureaucracy, out of sure power instinct, fights every attempt of the parliament to gain knowledge by means of its own experts or
interest groups’ (Weber, ￿￿￿￿p. ￿￿￿)
￿￿Another way to distinguish is to approach this issue is drawing a distinction , between instrumental vs. autonomous
bureaucracies to use Knill (￿￿￿￿) terminology. Instrumental bureaucracies often have strong executives and low levels of
entrenchment of the public service and relatively low levels of political influence hence orders by the Executive are easier to
implement. Autonomous bureaucracies often have weak executives and high levels of entrenchment and high levels of
political influence. ￿is work is unable to cover all the aspects related the diﬀerent arrangements public servants have in
diﬀerent type of bureaucracies.
￿￿
they could even uphold the law in spite of their political master wishes. ￿is largely depends on what
kind of relationships public servants and political masters have. ￿￿ Along these lines, Dalhstrom et al
(￿￿￿￿) notes that professional bureaucracies are the ones where public servants and political masters
interests are separate; they are responsive to diﬀerent chains of accountability (Dahlstrom et al. ￿￿￿￿
p. ￿￿￿). Clear indicators of such a bureaucracy are meritocratic recruitment, non-politicisation of
public service posts and internal promotions. ￿e common theme in this discussion, refers to the
level of influence politicians have (or not) over a bureaucracy.
Borrowing from these discussions, and for the purposes of this research in the RTI field, I define as
a professional bureaucracy as the one staﬀed by civil servants operating in an institutional arrangement
that secures their independence from their political masters and with enough resources to carry out
their tasks. A bureaucracy with low levels of professionalism is staﬀed by civil servants that are less
independent from their political masters and with insuﬃcient resources to carry out their duties.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e existence of RTI enforcement institutions
I argue that diﬀerent kinds of RTI enforcement institutions might lead to diﬀerent outputs in a RTI regime.
￿e more autonomous and able such institutions are, the more information is released in a given regime.
RTI enforcement institutions make decisions about potential conflicts in terms of public infor-
mation. In this research I focus on RTI enforcement institutions that are (or should be) accessible
to users when facing a conflict over access to RTI. As noted in the first chapter, there are diﬀerent
kinds of RTI enforcement institutions including special administrative units, ombudsman oﬃces and
specialised tribunals. Some of RTI enforcement institutions work more eﬀectively than others and
some of them are limited by institutional constraints. Diﬀerent kinds of RTI enforcement institutions
might lead to diﬀerent outputs in a RTI regime.
￿.￿.￿ ￿ree diﬀerent configurations: Functional, mixed and contested arenas
￿e factors presented in the previous section give room for at least eight possible combinations. Some
of these combinations are hypothetical in the sense that they could exist logically but not empirically.
Table ￿.￿ shows the possible logical combinations and as shown in Table ￿.￿, from these combinations
at least three types of regime can emerge.
￿￿Note that certain types of agency-type bargains with a strong component of delegation in Hood and Lodge (￿￿￿￿)
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I argue that these arenas exhibit diﬀerent outputs. Defining outputs in the RTI field is often complex.
For instance, in the UK context,Hazell et al. (￿￿￿￿) explored the diﬀerences between outputs and
outcomes of RTI laws. To do so, these researchers identified the main objectives of the RTI law in the
UK.￿ese objectives are : openness and transparency in government, accountability of government,
improving the quality of decision making, improving public understanding in government, increasing
public trust in government, and increasing participation in government ￿￿. According to this line
of research, outputs are closely related to immediate results while outcomes are related to long term
results. In this way, transparency and accountability in government are closer to the definition of
‘outputs’ while trust in government would be closer to the definition of ‘outcomes’.
In a similar vein, I define outputs as verifiable (observable) results linked to the combination of
factors in each arena. ￿e outputs I identify here are specifically suited for this framework. Further,
this framework does not reflect the linkage of RTI outputs with outcomes such as trust or participation
in government. ￿is is to say, the outputs identified in this research are modest and strictly linked to
the operation of a RTI law.
￿ese outputs are : the proactive availability of public information, eﬃciency in answering RTI
requests,accessibility, and eﬀectiveness to resolve disputes. Table ￿.￿ provides a definition of each
output.
A functional RTI arena, shows high availability of public information, eﬃciency in dealing with RTI
request and an accessible and eﬀective way of solving disputes. Authorities publish the information in
￿￿￿e authors note the diﬃculties of isolating these objectives, and they ran an extensive analysis of supporting
documents, such as the Hansard Records, declaration from MPs, etc. to support their conclusions. (Hazell et al. ￿￿￿￿ p.￿￿)
￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Outputs
Availability of public information on a proactive
basis
It refers to information published by the state
proactively as mandated by the RTI law
Eﬃciency in dealing with RTI requests It refers to the process bureaucracy undertakes
to reply to a request
Accessibility and eﬀectiveness to resolve disputes It refers to the possibility of requesters easily
accessing an appeal system to resolve conflicts
and to get an eﬀective solution in a reasonable
time
a timely and regular manner and information is easy to find and properly structured. ￿e bureaucracy
abides by the rules and processes requests in due time. When there is a conflict between requesters
and the government, there is an eﬀective mean to resolve this conflict. ￿e system to resolve disputes
is accessible and eﬃcient. By labelling this arena as ’functional’ I mean it works as it is supposed to
work according to the RTI law. It does not imply a normative judgement on whether the arena is
better than other arena. In functional arenas there are conflicts as well and many stakeholders would
argue are far from ‘ideal’ arenas.
A mixed arena, shows a good degree of availability of public information, authorities abide by
the rules and process requests mostly on time, and there is a system to resolve disputes. Authorities
often publish information, but some might not do it on time and it could be diﬃcult to find. ￿e
bureaucracy abides by the rules and processes the requests but there may be inconsistencies and political
influence in the implementation. When there is a conflict between requesters and the government,
there is an eﬀective and eﬃcient way to resolve this conflict, though it might not necessarily work at
its best or have adequate resources. ￿e mechanism to resolve the conflict is accessible but might be
costly in some cases. By labelling this arena as ‘mixed’ it shows that it does not work fully according
to the RTI law in place. ￿ere may be discrepancies and issues, which are observable according to the
outputs. ￿is does not make a ‘mixed’ arena worst than others per se, but it means that it does not
deliver on its own standards.
A contested arena, shows a poor degree of availability of public information, low eﬃciency in
dealing with RTI requests and absence of eﬀective ways of solving disputes. Authorities do not
often publish information, and if they do, it might not be relevant or timely. Bureaucracy does
not necessarily abide by the rules and there are inconsistencies arising from political influence in
￿￿
RTI implementation. Where there is a conflict between requesters and the government, there is no
eﬀective way to resolve the conflict. Mechanisms are not accessible and often costly. By labelling
this arena as contested it shows that it does not work according to the RTI law in place. ￿ere are
severe discrepancies in terms of what the law says and what actually happens in practice. ￿is is not a
normative judgement per- se, but it implies the arena is dysfunctional.
Table ￿.￿ provides a comparative view of diﬀerent outputs of RTI arenas.
Table ￿.￿: Diﬀerent outputs of RTI arenas
Functional RTI
arena • Public Information readily available, published regularly by the state
• Bureaucracy receives and processes RTI requests on time
• Requesters can access an independent institution and resolve conflicts
within a reasonable timeframe
Mixed RTI arena
• Public Information readily available, published regularly by the state
with certain inconsistencies
• Bureaucracy receives and processes information inconsistently
• Requesters have a certain degree of access to an institution and resolve
conflicts within a reasonable timeframe
Contested RTI arena
• Public Information is seldom available and is not published regularly
by the state
• Bureaucracy does not receive and process RTI requests on time or
does it showing resistance
• Requesters have diﬃculties in accessing an independent institution
and resolve conflicts within a non reasonable timeframe or may not
resolve the conflict at all
￿.￿ ￿ʟ￿￿￿ɴ￿￿ ɪɴ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿￿
￿e framework in RTI arenas contains five key elements: ￿) a RTI law which is the foundation for
information exchange or ‘constitution of the arena’, ￿) the state and a set of particular core agencies
inside the state, ￿) a group of stakeholders that use this regulation and information, ￿) an information




RTI laws set the way oﬃcial information is released and requested in a given RTI arena. RTI has a set
of principles, which makes it very similar across the world (Bennett, ￿￿￿￿, Stubbs, ￿￿￿￿). Notably,
most of these regulations also establish a set of very similar exceptions around issues such as national
security, internal workings of government and commercial protection, among other issues (Mendel,
￿￿￿￿, Stubbs, ￿￿￿￿, Bennett, ￿￿￿￿). ￿￿
RTI laws set a new logic in motion in each RTI arena but also engage with previous informal
institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, ￿￿￿￿). In this way, RTI foundation also has an informal side that
is shaped by the interaction between the law, the state and stakeholders. Informality is not necessarily
dysfunctional. For instance, some requests may be very simple for public servants and would not need
much processing time. In this way, instead of following the procedure, the public servant might just
point the requester in the right direction. However, informal institutions can also lead to ineﬀective
results. For instance, when civil servants decide not to write down information, for several reasons, it
becomes an issue in a RTI arena, as information cannot be trusted and is not recorded.
RTI is intertwined with other regulations relating to privacy, public records and copyright. Privacy
is a major limit in terms of how information is published. Privacy, understood as the basic right of
the individual to protect personal information about him/herself, is usually embedded in privacy and
personal data protection regulations. Because the state collects information about persons, privacy
regulation operates as a restraint in terms of sharing that information when RTI regulations operate.
￿￿. In addition, some institutions in charge of ensuring access to information have the jurisdiction
to deal with access-to-information issues and privacy issues, such as in Chile or Mexico, or such a
jurisdiction can be separate as in the cases of Germany, Uruguay or New Zealand. ￿ese institutional
features show the degree of interdependence of these rights and institutions.
Copyright regulation on public information is an important issue, as it could limit the flow of
public information. If the release of information is subject to state (crown) copyright, then it means it
￿￿Despite this, depending on the jurisdiction’s legal tradition, some have put a public interest clause that assesses the
benefits of releasing oﬃcial information even where such information was initially covered under one of the exceptions
￿￿However, this relationship with privacy heavily mediated by culture. Some countries, such as Norway, have no issues
with releasing personal data about taxes. For an account of this situation http://info-a.wikidot.com/norways-publishes-all-
tax-returns-on-line accessed ￿￿May ￿￿￿￿. Norway eventually reassessed the release of this data which allowed citizens to
check exactly how much their neighbour is contributing to public finances. Countries such as the United Kingdom, New
Zealand and Uruguay would find such an approach troubling
￿￿
cannot be republished or redistributed. Copyright legislation and tradition does vary across countries
and is usually a manifestation of how much value is placed on intellectual property, and is also often
part of the games to prevent the release of public information. Finally, archive regulations indicating
how to preserve and classify public information is crucial for a RTI arena to work. Storage and
integrity of public information, in the digital age, becomes an essential part of the system to ensure
trust. Public records are usually underplayed as an important factor in RTI arenas.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e state
As mentioned the state plays a nodal role in an arena. By nodal I mean a property of being at
the centre of social and informational networks (Hood and Margetts, ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿e state collects
information about most of the activities of citizens, businesses and the state itself in a given arena.
By ‘state’, I mean not only the executive branch but all public institutions, including the three
branches of government. In daily operations, the state produces large amounts of oﬃcial information
through several activities, including transactions, production of documents, etc. Oﬃcial information
is essential to exercise rights, as well as to exercise authority or even to question authority. ￿us, the
importance of information produced by a nodal actor in a given setting which also has the monopoly
of production of oﬃcial information is significant.
￿e nodal role of the state does not imply that the state is actually a monolith: it is a fragmented
organisation. Formally, the state has divisions such as branches of government; administratively,
the state has divisions such as departments or ministries. Informally, the state also has several other
divisions usually not reflected in its organisational chart. As a result, large organisations such as
the state face internal asymmetry-of-information issues. Sometimes the left hand might not know
what the right hand is doing, which is what Hogwood and Peters (￿￿￿￿) termed as ‘information
pathologies’. Sometimes there are good reasons for compartmentalising information, in order to
protect privacy, for example,￿￿ but it could also lead to severe ineﬃciencies, maladministration and, in
worst-case scenarios, corruption. Transparency helps to reduce such asymmetry, albeit imperfectly. As
a result, while the state is indeed a big node of public information, it should also be seen, depending
on its structure, as a set of nodes that do not necessarily link to each other or share information with
￿￿Hood and Margetts and Hood (￿￿￿￿) use the term nodality as one of the tools government has to aﬀect societal
change. I use the term in the sense that the state plays a central role in a given society.
￿￿Although states are increasingly implementing laws to share personal information among several departments, in
order to stop asking people for their details for every transaction.
￿￿
each other.
I identify core agencies that are able to collect as much information as they need, usually interacting
with key political stakeholders in a RTI arena ￿￿. Core agencies can be defined as particular nodes in
the state with the power to retrieve information from others through the use of hierarchy, networks or
persuasion. For instance, in the context of the United States of America, the Oﬃce of Management
and Budget, the Treasury and the Oﬃce of Personnel play a prominent role in handling and collecting
public information from several sources. ￿ese oﬃces are very active in debates around public
information.￿￿
Core agencies usually have a legal mandate to collect certain kinds of information, or are powerful
enough to request it from other agencies.
￿e state also includes the parliament, the judiciary and other independent public bodies. Usually,
these public bodies are covered by an access-to-information law, but this is not a universal principle.
For instance, New Zealand’s judiciary and parliament are not included in the access-to-information
law, while in Chile they are partially covered. In Uruguay, the law includes every single public sector
body. Whether the judiciary and the parliament should or should not be included in access to
information regimes is usually a heated debate between activists, who have long been pushing for
including parliament, as well as the courts, in access-to-information regimes. From a more systemic
perspective, every public body should be to some degree under democratic control, which includes
providing information about its activities. ￿e recent review from the New Zealand Parliament argues
in this way (NZ Commission, ￿￿￿￿).
￿us, the state can be visualised in this framework as a large reservoir of public information that is
constantly being collected, used, produced and released, where certain agencies play a more relevant
role, depending on the RTI arena. Agencies such as the presidency, the treasury, management and
budget oﬃces and archives are usually the more relevant central agencies, where a large amount of
public information is placed.
￿￿Core Agencies are also known as central agencies. ￿e New Zealand Treasury (￿￿￿￿) provides a good description of
their role as a "Corporate Centre" to lead a State sector that New Zealanders can trust, and that delivers better public services,
including outstanding results and value for money. ￿is requires the Corporate Centre to take an active role across the sector, and
provide system-level coordination, a clear focus and strong leadership... ￿is central agency role reflects the unique position that
the three agencies share. ￿ey each have, through their individual roles, a State sector system-wide perspective, engagements and
connections with every other agency and significant State sector performance levers available (such as the Government?s strategy,
Budget and chief executive performance. For an evolution of central agencies in New Zealand see Norman (￿￿￿￿). ￿ese
agencies can be found in Uruguay and Chile as well, as they cover key functions of the State
￿￿For instance, these oﬃces are now involved in discussing technical standards to release financial data from government
http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=￿￿￿&sid=￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&pid=￿&page=￿ accessed ￿￿ February ￿￿￿￿
￿￿
￿e civil service plays a key role. Although the framework proposed is unable to go into internal
organisation behaviours,￿￿ it is able to identify key players in the field: information receptors, decision-
makers and specialists. Receptors are the ones in charge of first dealing with a RTI request. ￿ese
are usually known as FOI oﬃcers or FOI liaison oﬃcers and, in most RTI arenas, there is usually a
civil servant tasked with this job. Occasionally, there is a division between civil servants working on
‘reactive’ transparency (i.e. answering requests) while other teams work on ‘proactive’ transparency
(i.e. publication of information). Information receptors acknowledge, assess and eventually answer
requests.￿￿ Receptors are also in charge of following the information requested across the organisation.
Depending on the level of politicisation of the administration, some information receptors might also
evaluate the request in political terms. When requests activate political alarms, it is highly likely that
coordination between core agencies happens, involving key decision-makers. Sometimes organisations
will set up special administrative systems to deal with access-to-information requests. Such systems
usually alert organisations about the timeline and importance of the requests.
Specialists are in charge of evaluating the release of public information. Specialists consist of several
kinds of professional in the bureaucracy. ￿is category ranges from topic experts, to lawyers, to
communications oﬃcers. Lawyers play a significant role in this process, assessing whether they can
release the information. Communication oﬃcers also play a significant role in terms of how and when
to release public information. If information involves very sensitive topics, political strategists might
also step in to coordinate the ‘defence’ or release of information. Ministerial advisers also play a crucial
role when party politics gets in the way, following requests as well as keeping relevant government
politicians informed. ￿ese actors usually provide the strategy behind complex answers, delays and
other less subtle games that requesters, politicians and public servants might play.
Decision-makers are the ones with formal authority to release public information. ￿ey are usually
placed in the highest authority echelons in each organisation. Decision-makers are depending on the
case, politicians, political-appointees or public servants In New Zealand, chief executive oﬃcers (i.e.
public servants) are the ones in charge. To order the release or non-release of oﬃcial information,
decision-makers need to provide an explanation and their decision will eventually be reviewed by
an enforcement institution. As a general rule, the more professional an organisation is, the more
chances there are to get better teams dealing with requests. However, this does not in itself imply
￿￿For an ethnographic description of how FOI policies work in an oﬃce, see (John, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿￿is research does not deal with the micro-level (inside the organisation) issues of FOI such as John (￿￿￿￿) does in her
ethnographic study of the FOI Commissioner in Scotland, though they should be taken into account in in-depth studies.
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more transparency, but probably a decent performance of the functions according to the law.
￿.￿.￿ Demanding information in a RTI arena
Activities in a RTI arena are carried out by a relatively small group of individuals and organisations
with a peculiar interest on getting information out of the state. ￿ey usually include journalists and
non-governmental organisations and businesses. ￿e way the law is used is seldom described, amidst
accusations that access-to-information regulation is for ‘nutty NGOs’ or ‘corporate sharks’.￿￿ In this
section, I describe the most common users from the demand side. During the course of this research,
several interviewees in diﬀerent settings are mostly referred to as ‘the usual suspects’. (ISNZ￿, ISCUY￿,
ISCUY￿)
While every individual potentially has the right to demand oﬃcial information from the state,
this is seldom the case in a RTI arena. Individuals usually do not work alone, and usually groups,
firms, civic associations or particular professions have an interest in access to public information. As
noted by Roberts (￿￿￿￿) in the Canadian context, the success or failure of access-to-information
requests also depends on the identity of the requesters, for better or worse. Who demands information
influences the answer.
Journalists were traditionally early users of these laws. Behind most of the RTI regulation across the
world, journalists are some of the most prominent backers of this regulation. Journalist associations
or groups push for this kind of regulation in the name of freedom of expression. Journalists also have
more specific incentives to use this kind of regulation as tools to improve their work, particularly when
doing research for investigative reporting, which usually demands more detailed information as well
as confirmation of facts. However, journalists might also be disinclined to use access-to-information
regulations. First, journalists usually have a public profile, which may or may not help them when
receiving public information. ￿e fact that the person who has to release information actually knows
the identity of the requester plays both ways for journalists. ￿is is one of the reasons why some
access-to-information regulations, such as in Mexico, protect the anonymity of the requesters.￿￿
However, even with such protection, it is relatively easy to find out or at least guess who is behind a
request in specific policy domains or small polities.
Second, journalists still rely heavily on traditional ways of doing journalism, which involve the
uses of traditional sources of information, access through informal means, and leaks. ￿is was noted
￿￿See for instance ‘Brussels hits out at nutty NGOs and corporate sharks’ (Rettman, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿It has been noted that in Mexico even Mickey Mouse could fill a request for access to public information.
￿￿
as early as when the FOIA was implemented in the US (Gianella, ￿￿￿￿) and continues to be a trend
today. Journalists do have an incentive to get the ‘exclusive’, and access-to-information requests
can actually alert other journalists that they are pursuing a story on a certain matter. Furthermore,
newsrooms are under time pressure, and thus cannot usually aﬀord to just file a request and wait.
Traditional journalism methods can be combined with access-to-information requests. Information
obtained informally about oﬃcial information can actually then be requested through RTI.￿is is
usually done to prevent exposing the source or using information that could be classified as secret.
As noted by Coronel (￿￿￿￿) ‘journalists are not always torchbearers for freedom-of-information laws.
Accustomed to having privileged access to information because of their press passes, they are not always
enthusiastic supporters of laws that would democratize access’. Similar concerns have been voiced in the
Swiss context during the approval of the transparency law (Pasquier and Villenueve, ￿￿￿￿).￿￿
Civil society is a regular user of RTI in every environment in terms of access to information. As a
matter of fact, in the three case studies selected for this research, civil society played a significant role in
advocating for these laws and using them. A particular type of organisation is one of the most relevant
in this field. ￿is type of organisation￿￿ was formed to push for these laws, usually in the form of
coalitions which ended up later in oﬃcial and formal organisations with a specific mandate to promote
access to public information. ￿ese organisations not only demand information but also provide
advice to other requesters, as well as continuing to push to expand the right to information. ￿ese
organisations also provide monitoring services in terms of how proactive transparency is working and
keeping the state accountable in terms of fulfilling its duties. In terms of resources, they have the
capacity to monitor, influence and potentially resist changes in RTI arenas.
Increasingly, other more ‘traditional’ civil society organisations are also using the law in their
respective policy domains. In particular, environmental organisations and human rights advocates
are among the most significant users in the cases selected. Even public sector unions use access-to-
information laws to obtain information from the government on issues related to pay and conditions
￿￿While a general argument can be made about the existence of a robust press as a sign of a healthy and vibrant RTI
arena (Stiglitz, ￿￿￿￿), this claim should be qualified. First, indicators about freedom of the press are largely reputational,
usually ignoring some issues about self-censorship and certainly not taking into account how easy or not it is to get public
information in a given jurisdiction. Second, these sets of indicators largely ignore how media structure plays a role in
terms of demanding public information. Media-concentrated environments might have no incentives to request public
information, particularly when they rely heavily on government policies and publicity to survive. Furthermore, even if the
media has the will, large media outlets would have a relatively large network which would allow them get information from
their sources. In this way, investigative journalists and small media are sometimes crucially important in terms of the use of
access to information from a journalistic perspective, even though resources for these kinds of initiatives are usually scarce.
￿￿An example of what Eckstein (￿￿￿￿) defines as a pressure group or what is more generally termed as an ‘interest group’
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of work.
In the selected cases, a new breed of organisations combine web technologies to foster access to
information.￿￿ ￿ese organisations set up online RTI request websites which allow users to send a
RTI request to government oﬃces and get a reply on line. ￿is is a new development in several ways
and this study cannot fully cover it. It should be noted that the platforms are built on free/open-source
software and that they are built without any previous consent from the government in a RTI arena.
Platforms target e-mails from public organisations and set up a portal where citizens can ask public
sector organisations to show the expected reply date and whether or not the government replies. ￿ese
platforms also allow users to comment on each other’s requests in order to help each other when
getting or not getting a government reply. ￿ese platforms are the result of the interaction between
information right activists and technology activists. Portals are more or less successful depending on
the RTI arena in which they evolve, as these case studies can show.
In this research, I found only a few grassroots organisations that would engage in requesting public
information through this tool. At a global level, the notable exception is the well-documented case of
India (Pudepphatt, ￿￿￿￿).￿￿ Grassroots organisations would usually benefit from mediators that help
them to access information relevant to their ends. In several cases, those mediators are either diﬃcult
to find or too expensive. Indicators about the strength of civil society are not reliable proxies to
represent this diverse group of users. A general argument would be that the strength and autonomy of
civil society in a given arena provides for ‘healthy’ RTI arenas, but other variables are also important,
such as policy areas, the structure of civil society and the level of awareness about access to information.
Academics are also users of these laws in all RTI arenas. It is not unusual in interviews with civil
servants to hear that answering some requests is ‘like doing someone’s thesis’ (ICNZ￿). Academics,
from all sorts of fields, usually fill requests when they are unable to obtain the data through easier
means, as sometimes the FOI is used as a last resort. Academics are usually of good value when
providing scrutiny and triangulation of several public data.
With the rise of ‘digital government’,￿￿ websites become increasingly important in government
activities, as well as technology allowing their existence. As a result, in the context of the release of
public information in reusable formats, mostly under the banner of Open Government Data policies,
￿￿￿e first organisation to set up a portal was the British NGO My Society. Currently, at least ￿￿ portals operate
world-wide.
￿￿Note that there is no agreement among scholars on this topic. For a diﬀerent view, see Sharma (￿￿￿￿) and Roberts
(￿￿￿￿). Both authors note the role elites played in India in diﬀerent parts of the process.
￿￿See Margetts and Dunleavy, (￿￿￿￿), and, for a cautionary note, Lodge and Gills, (￿￿￿￿)
￿￿
software developers are also interested in using government data, becoming a new constituency
intertwined with civil society or private entrepreneurs. Developers are usually interested in large
datasets that could be used for new applications, and usually argue for better technical (data) standards
in the release of public information. Some of these datasets can be obtained through access-to-
information requests￿￿ while others are covered under open government data policies. It should be
noted that Open Government Data and Access to Information communities, while advocating for
similar issues, are not that closely connected (Fumega, ￿￿￿￿).
Companies are increasingly using public information to get better information about where to
invest, or to challenge government decisions in new RTI arenas such as Chile and Uruguay. It is
not unusual among public servants to complain about how large companies are taking advantage of
oﬃcial information and, to some degree, how these requests can intimidate them (Wong et al. ￿￿￿￿).
Determined companies have the resources and legal teams to push through requests. Some companies
use public information in order to foster their business models or set up new ventures. New examples
are websites that allow users to monitor public procurement, providing analysis about the process.
Lawyers are also part of this arena, though usually as a tool rather than as requesters themselves.
However, lawyers provide significant expertise and doctrinaire development around the boundaries
and limits of RTI regulation, hence they are particularly influential in shaping the way access-to-
information laws work. Lawyers are generally involved in the litigation phase in every RTI arena as
solicitors (advisers) or as barristers. Lawyers are active in working with NGOs and other requesters
and they often have important professional incentives to participate in access-to-information cases.
Exceptionally, lawyers may use access-to-information regulations to get evidence, when assessing if
there is merit in a case. ￿is is what in common law terms is considered ‘pre-discovery’.
A way of classifying requesters is according to their level of expertise and level of use of the law as
Table ￿.￿ shows:
￿￿￿e UK has modified its access-to-information law to include the right to demand datasets. In other jurisdictions,
this is still uncertain.
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Table ￿.￿: Typology of RTI users
Expertise Usage
High Low
High Expert and Willing user: NGOs
with specialisation in the matter are
likely to have more expertise and are
intensive users of the law. MPs, po-
litical parties and politicians are in-
creasingly among this group once
they learn the ropes. ￿ey are usu-
ally an elite group. ￿ey constitute
an ‘elite task force’
Expert and infrequent user: ￿is
group seldom use the law but when
they do, it is very eﬀective. Lawyers
are particularly adept at using the
law when needed, as are firms. ￿is
group was considered by an intervie-
wee as ‘snipers’
Low Low expertise and High usage:
Some journalists file ‘fishing expe-
ditions’ which are likely to be re-
jected by authorities. A public ser-
vant noted that this group is ‘firing
salvos’.
Low expertise and Low usage: ￿e
‘average citizen’ does not usually file
access-to-information requests and
when they do, they lack the support
to carry through the request. ￿ey
are considered ‘innocent requesters’.
￿ere are two elements that aﬀect how access-to-information requests work in any given environ-
ment: political considerations and complexity.
Political considerations refers to how decision-makers evaluate the risk and opportunities for them-
selves, the organisation or the state as a whole. As the aphorism goes, ‘where you stand depends on
where you sit’, which means that each organisation and decision-maker will have a particular view of its
risk, which could be real or a mere possibility of risk. ￿is dimension is also emphasised by Michener
and Worthy (￿￿￿￿). Decision-makers also have a view of possible benefits from the release of public
information. In any case, the higher the perception of political risk or reward, the greater the chances
that core agencies and politics play a role favouring (or not) the release. If risk is high, these kinds of
requests could potentially be left to the enforcement institution to decide, taking significant time.
Complexity involves how diﬃcult it is for the organisation to answer the request. Complex requests
might have several questions (usually practitioners call these kinds of requests ‘fishing expeditions’).
In addition, information can be diﬃcult to retrieve due to information management practices, lack
of resources or the need to involve several units or agencies to reply. Complexity of the request does
depend on the agencies’ size and institutional capabilities. Table ￿.￿ shows a typology combining
these dimensions.
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Table ￿.￿: Typology of RTI requests
Political Considerations Complexity
High Low
High Diﬃcult to process and assess in-
volving several decision-makers
and parts of the organisation
Information available, resistance
due to possible risk of political
damage. Existence of previous
leak very likely. If there is chance
of a reward, then is seen as an op-
portunity
Low Usually a fishing expedition on a
topic, or information diﬃcult to
retrieve. ￿ere is no incentive to
‘win’ something out of the release
Usually information that
is covered under proactive
transparency duties
Who requests information also aﬀects reply rates. For instance, in the Indian context, Sharma notes
‘a phone call to the right person, or appeal made to the right oﬃcial, written in English and demonstrating
a thorough knowledge of the law and administrative procedures, signed by ‘well-known’ persons, does have
an impact on the way the state machinery responds’ (Sharma ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿￿). ￿is is a subjective element
in terms of how requests are processed and is context-dependent, present in all arenas.
￿.￿.￿ RTI Enforcement institutions
As expected, RTI arenas face conflict when oﬃcial information is not released. Such conflicts are
managed by RTI enforcement institutions in charge of resolving conflicts. Following Mcallister (￿￿￿￿)
I identify autonomy and capacity as two key dimensions to explore about enforcement institutions.
￿ese dimensions capture key normative and operational aspects of how RTI enforcement institutions
work in RTI arenas aiding the comparability eﬀort. ￿￿.
Autonomy: Autonomy means that the RTI enforcement institution is able to formulate and pursue
goals that are not primary reflective of the interests of the regulated entities (McAllister, ￿￿￿￿). In the
field of RTI enforcement institutions, I identify a set of dimensions to understand how autonomous
institutions are. ￿ese dimensions are : screening and appointment, stability, eﬀectiveness, resources
￿￿Unlike Mcallister (￿￿￿￿) I do not go into a full discussion of enforcement styles, which includes other variables such
as the degree of formalism and degree of coercion. ￿e combination of these variables leads Mcallister to provide a typology
of enforcement styles which does not necessarily apply to the cases presented in this research. I adapt definitions from
Mcallister (￿￿￿￿) for this particular part of the work
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and perception. Screening and appointment are important dimensions to this regard ￿￿. Screening is
about making sure that the individuals running these oﬃces are fit to do so.￿￿ ￿ere are several vetting
processes available in diﬀerent governance settings, which allows for a discussion of how open and
transparent processes are. For instance, before the nomination of an Ombudsman in New Zealand, a
round of consultation with major political parties in parliament is held. In the United States, vetting
processes for certain types of federal judges are usually carried out by the Senate in an open forum.
Appointment – the process by which the authority is put in place – is important to provide legitimacy
to the function. If the appointment is made by a direct superior with no vetting process, then it is
highly likely autonomy will be limited. If the appointment is made by a representative body, it is
highly likely the institution will have more independence.
Stability of appointed oﬃcials is also a dimension to consider. Exit and re-appointment strategies
should also be clear. A sign of problems with independence is when a government uses strategies to
not re-appoint existing authorities, or to delay the appointment of new ones. Another dimension
to consider is oversight over the RTI enforcement institution. If the oversight mechanism is not
legitimate or clearly established, then the autonomy of the RTI institution can be aﬀected. Another
dimension of autonomy have to do with resources. If budgetary independence arrangements are well
established it is likely that the regulator will be more autonomous. Finally if the institution is not
perceived as autonomous then, autonomy also can be compromised as other actors may not perceive
the value of the institution. ￿e following table provides a comparative overview of these dimensions
with possible indicators.
￿￿Debates about how authorities should be appointed are often common under a stream of literature known as
‘institutional design’ (Gooding, ￿￿￿￿, Pettit, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿In the words of the American constitutionalist James Madison, ‘￿e aim of every political constitution is or ought to be
first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society; and in







Is the process regulated? How open
is the process to all stakeholders in-
volved?
Which institution is in charge of
appointing the enforcement insti-
tution? Is the institution appoint-
ing the enforcement institution in-
dependent (e.g.. a Parliament)?
Stability Time elapsed in replacement of au-
thorities / discontinuity of the insti-
tution.
Oversight Which institutions can potentially
overrule the enforcement institu-
tion’s decisions and how?
Is this institution independent and
legitimate?
Resources Is the budget allocated taking into
account the enforcement institu-
tion’s estimates?
Perception What is the perception of key stake-
holders about the screening, ap-
pointment and performance of func-
tions by the enforcement institu-
tion?
.
Enforcement Capacity refers to the agency’s ability to implement its policies (McAllister, ￿￿￿￿).
Even if institutions are autonomous agencies need to be able to implement their policies. In the
context of RTI some of them might not have the legal mandate to perform three important tasks:
a) review powers to order an organisation to hand over the information for analysis, b) enforce the
decision, and c) eventually sanction an organisation for not complying. ￿ese legal mandates ensure
the enforcement institution has enough institutional standing to order the release of information.
If information is not handed over (or if there is not a mandate to do so), then the enforcement
institution is unable to perform its task. As noted by Holsen and Pasquier (￿￿￿￿), this is seldom
mentioned in debates about oversight institutions, where most debates focus on enforcement of the
￿￿
decision and not on this crucial power.
Even if there is a mandate, resources might not be in place. Resources go beyond an allocated
budget￿￿ and implies adequate and trained staﬀ, an institutional capacity to perform complex tasks
and access to international networks to foster innovation. Resources are important because, in their
absence, decisions might not materialise or might be slow to materialise, which damages the reputation
of the enforcement institution.
Table ￿.￿ shows potential indicators for this dimension:
Table ￿.￿: Enforcement Capacity
Dimension Indicator
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of review pro-
cesses?
No access, partial access and full access to
documents.
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of enforcement
practices?
Binding, partially binding or non-binding.
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of imposing
sanctions
No sanctions, symbolic sanctions and full
sanctions.
Resources (staﬀ, budget, capacities) to carry out the
assigned tasks
Number of staﬀ over volume of work
Budget over volume of work.
Service delivery Processing times.
Decisions or sanctions eﬀectively applied? Decisions issued/Decisions eﬀectively
applied.
Enforcement institutions might also play an educative and training role depending on the RTI
arena, but the core function is to make the decision about whether information should be made
public or not.
Combining these two information categories, there are four possible categories as shown in Table
￿.￿
Depending on the RTI arena, other accountability institutions can step in. For instance, the
judiciary (when it is not the only enforcement institution available) can settle definitive issues around
access to information in several RTI arenas.
If horizontal accountability institutions operate in a coordinated fashion, there are more chances to
￿￿For the sake of clarity: An institution might have negotiated a budget independently and received enough money but
might be lacking expertise in key areas, or an institution might have no independence to bargain the budget and nonetheless
have enough money to direct to an area where it has an order to allocate such budget.
￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Typology of enforcement institutions
Autonomy Enforcement Capacity
High Low
High Autonmous and able: Able to
deliver complex resolutions in
a RTI arena in an eﬃcient and
eﬀective way. Fiercely inde-
pendent and with resources to
carry out their task. Colloquial
term: ‘Knights Templar’
Principled but futile: regarded
at its best as a complaints fo-
rum and at its worst as an irrel-
evant institution. Colloquial
term: ‘State NGO’
Low Not fully independent but with
resources: While able to im-
plement some decisions, low
levels of independence make it
remain in the shadows. Col-
loquial term: ‘Shadow Institu-
tion’.
Neither independent nor re-
sourced. Can assist in terms
of implementation issues. Col-
loquial term ‘Window Dressing’
reinforce each other’s roles. ￿is reinforcing logic is usually favoured by policy communities working
collaboratively across the issues and challenges that access to oﬃcial information presents, as has been
the case in New Zealand. However, when horizontal accountability institutions do not act in an
aligned way, they start to undermine each other. ￿is can result in ‘turfing’, overlapping competencies
and, in worst-case scenarios, complete uncertainty about the criteria to resolve access-to-information
issues in a given RTI arena.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ʙ￿￿￿ ʟ￿￿￿￿ : ￿ʜ￿ɴɢ￿ ￿ɴ￿ ￿￿ɴ￿ɪɴ￿ɪ￿ʏ ɪɴ ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
Feedback loops are particular points of time in the life on a RTI arena when several actors decide
to seek change in the rules that govern the exchange of public information. ￿ese changes usually
emerge from problem in interpretation of the rules or enforcement issues.￿￿ To put it another way,
‘new policies create new politics’ (Schattsneider, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿).
As noted in this chapter, this framework assumes that there is always a degree of conflict in RTI
arenas. Conflicts appear through activities in the arena (i.e. RTI requests, denials, political struggles
￿￿￿is often materialises in questions about what should be public or not, or who should decide about public information
issues in a given arena
￿￿
about public information, etc.). Use of RTI triggers a set of behaviours which involves several actors
characterised in this framework, creating and accumulating pressure in a RTI arena. When an
opportunity emerges actors will try to reform the constitutive element of the arena (i.e. the RTI
law) in order to cater to their particular interest. Feedback loops can reinforce the path a RTI arena
followed, or can also debilitate this path. An attempt to reform a certain aspect of a RTI law is an
example of a feedback loop. ￿ese matters usually refer to the scope, exceptions and exemptions and
the autonomy or capacity of the enforcement institution in place. In other words, feedback loops are
about what information is available, how it should be classified and, eventually, who should release it
and how.
￿e concept of feedback loops is linked to the historical institutionalism underpinning of this work.
In historical institutionalism literature, the concept of path dependence plays a role in explaining
change and continuity of policies ￿￿Path dependence is defined in this research as a process that
exhibits feedback loops and thus, generate branching patterns of historical development (Pierson
￿￿￿￿). ￿￿.
While I argue in this research that each feedback loop takes the RTI arena a step further into
a particular institutional dynamic, reinforcing a previous path, I do not deny the possibility of
change. For instance, a feedback loop could end up in a major reform, giving more powers to a RTI
enforcement institution, which in turn could help to develop a more functional RTI arena. ￿us, if a
certain configuration of actors provides an alternative in the right conditions, feedback loops could
deliver gradual change in a RTI arena. ￿￿
Feedback loops are present in all arenas. My argument is that each arena has a particular kind
of feedback loops. In functional RTI arenas, the participation process led to the establishment of a
strong policy community, as well as a professional bureaucracy able to implement the law and good
enforcement mechanism in place. As a result feedback loops are mild, often leading to discussions ‘at
￿￿As noted by Kay (￿￿￿￿) historical institutionalism has been mostly used to explain ‘macro’ social issues rather than
specific policies. In this research I am using historical institutionalism lenses to explain the evolution of RTI policy in the
context of a middle-range theory.
￿￿￿e concept of path dependence is often used in social sciences and presents problems of ‘concept stretching’ (Sartori,
￿￿￿￿, Pierson, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e definition provided here comes from Pierson (￿￿￿￿) with a slight modification in the wording as
the word ‘positive’ may confuse the reader
￿￿Mahoney and￿elen (￿￿￿￿) research on diﬀerent dynamics to explore institutional change in the context of historical
institutionalism. ￿ey argue that beyond ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theories of change, one could consider more subtle
patterns when the meaning of the rules and enforcement issues arise in a given policy. A good example they provide is the
evolution of the House of Lords in Britain. ￿e concept of feedback loops is designed to capture changes over time. It is
then similar to what Mahoney and￿elen (￿￿￿￿) refers as ‘layering’. I avoid going into a extensive debate of patterns of
change as it is not the objective of this research.
￿￿
the margins ’. ￿ese feedback loops are unlikely to aﬀect the basic structure of the arena. In mixed
RTI arenas the combination of factors led to a situation where discussions are broader. While there
might be a strong policy community in place, the problems of implementation and issues around
enforcement institutions will put pressure for more significant changes. Discussions will be broader
and new developments (not necessarily positive ones) can emerge. In contested arenas, the situation
is more fragile. Discussions are often about the very foundations of the arena and can create and ‘up
for grabs’ scenario where significant aspects of the arenas could be changed. Table ￿.￿￿ provides a
summary:
Table ￿.￿￿: Feedback loops
Case Feedback loops
New Zealand (Functional RTI) Feedback loops at the margins and occasional
positive developments
Chile (Mixed RTI arena) Feedback loops with some important develop-
ments
Uruguay (Contested arena) Feedback loops can be serious. ‘Up for grabs’
scenario
To sum up: in this chapter I aimed to explain the framework I will use in this study to describe
how RTI arenas work. I described the key elements in a RTI arena:a RTI law ,the state, requesters and
users of information and RTI enforcement institutions. In the next chapters, I will use this framework




￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿ɪ￿￿ ￿￿￿ʀ￿￿￿ʜ
To understand why RTI arenas that operate under similar principles work diﬀerently, leading to diﬀerent
outputs, it is necessary to compare these regimes. Comparative methods have a long tradition in social
sciences (Sartori, ￿￿￿￿, Liphjart, ￿￿￿￿, Ragin, ￿￿￿￿, Peters, ￿￿￿￿). At the core, the comparative
methods approach seeks to obtain conclusions, looking at similarities and diﬀerences across diﬀerent
cases. ￿is approach was famously advanced by Mills’ (￿￿￿￿) method of agreement and method
of diﬀerence. By comparing a set of relevant cases, I expect this research to contribute to a better
understanding of RTI arenas in terms of commonalities and diﬀerences.
When taking a comparative approach there are basically two ways to proceed. As Ragin (￿￿￿￿)
notes, the most traditional divide is between variable-oriented researchers and case-oriented researchers.
In variable-oriented studies, generality takes precedence over complexity. In this way, ‘investigators
are usually interested in testing propositions derived from general theories than they are in unravelling the
historical conditions that produce diﬀerent historical outcomes’ (Ragin, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). Variable-oriented
researchers tend to see the social world in this way and, as a result, the emphasis is on finding
correlations among variables to explain certain social phenomena.
In contrast, in this work I am more interested in a small number of cases, from a qualitative
perspective. ￿is is to say:
Historically oriented interpretive work attempts to account for specific historical outcomes or sets of
comparable outcomes or processes chosen for study because of their significance for current institutional
arrangements or for social life in general... Such work seeks to make sense out of diﬀerent cases by piecing
evidence together in a manner sensitive to chronology and by oﬀering limited historical generalizations that
￿￿
are both objectively possible and cognizant of enabling conditions and limiting means—of context. (Ragin,
￿￿￿￿ p. ￿)
In this way, when answering the research question posed, I will be more concerned with concept
formation and causal connections than testing diﬀerent theories. Taking this approach, this research
contributes new concepts to understand RTI arenas and, in particular, the connection between their
origins and their outputs. ￿us, this work is an attempt to provide ‘building blocks’ (George and
Bennett, ￿￿￿￿) to develop further comparisons. Small ‘N’ studies allow exploration of the diﬀerent
and specific paths that a case followed towards a certain outcome, opening ‘the black box’.
￿is research is concerned with the intersection of a set of conditions in time and space that
produces a certain outcome. (Ragin ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿). As noted by Ragin, (￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿), ‘this is not the
same as arguing that change results from many variables as in the statement “both X￿ and X￿ aﬀect Y”
because this latter type of argument asserts that change in either causal variable produces a change in Y, the
dependent variable’. In this way, this research follows the logic of the case study which is fundamentally
configurational. ￿is means ‘Diﬀerent parts of the whole are understood in relation to one another and in
terms of the total picture that they form’ (Ragin, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). In this way, I explore how convergent
causes fit together or combine to lead towards a certain output.
In this kind of approach, evidence and theory are in constant dialogue, but in the context of a
theoretical framework. I provide here a focused and structured comparison (George and Bennett, ￿￿￿￿
p. ￿￿). By structured I mean I compare all the cases selected using the same framework, which includes
the same dimensions of analysis. ￿is framework is presented in Chapter ￿. By focused I mean this
study only deals with the question posed in this section and an appropriate theoretical framework
built on previous literature.
It should also be noted that this work joins a tradition of other studies of theories of the middle
range (Merton, ￿￿￿￿) with limited explanatory power. Middle-range theories usually start with a
particular puzzle emerging from evidence and related to a particular field, aiming to generalise what
is defined in the scope of the theory, providing clear definition of concepts avoiding universal claims
but getting generalisable findings (Ziblat, ￿￿￿￿). In this way, this work operates at a meso level of
analysis focusing on the definition of problems, the setting of agendas, and the decision-making and
implementation processes (Parsons, ￿￿￿￿). In short, I do not seek here to provide a ‘grand theory’ of
RTI regimes.
Finally, a more general point is that the theoretical lenses I use to address this question come from
￿￿
an historical institutionalism perspective. I understand that choices made at an early stage help to
determine the path that an institution follows, thus setting the course of its development. In this way,
there is a path dependency argument in this work: that certain decisions, when establishing institutions,
actually set in motion a set of re-enforcing processes (Pierson, ￿￿￿￿). ￿ese theoretical lenses are
useful because they allow me to look in detail at the process of adoption of these reforms, the previous
institutions and the links which show how RTI arenas are implemented. Literature in this field often
deals with policy transfer processes across countries, distinguishing between emulation, coercion and
policy learning (Bennett, ￿￿￿￿, Berliner, ￿￿￿￿,Grigorescu, ￿￿￿￿). However, the link in terms of the
adoption process and the unfolding of the institution is usually not explored in a comparative fashion.
As noted by McClean (￿￿￿￿), literature in this field tends to be normative (as in prescriptive) or
policy oriented. Comparative historical work is able to depart from explanations that are either too
normative-based or too policy-oriented to shed light on reasons for diﬀerences among these regimes.
In short, while activists and policymakers might be tempted to say that a certain regime is a ‘failure’
or a ‘success’, historical analysis can contribute to understanding the reasons behind such perceptions.
￿.￿ ʀ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿ʜ ￿￿￿ɪɢɴ
To explore why RTI arenas based on similar principles work diﬀerently, leading to diﬀerent outputs,
I identify three factors. ￿ese factors emerge from the available literature and in dialogue with the
evidence from this work. ￿ese factors are: ￿) participation in the policymaking process, ￿) the
professionalism of state bureaucracy and ￿) RTI enforcement institutions. In Chapter ￿, I have
referred in detail to these factors and the key arguments I make about them. From a research design
perspective, these three factors and the arguments I make about them operate as the hypotheses
behind this work. I also argue that there are three types of regimes (or arenas) that result from the
combination of these factors. In this way, I select a set of cases already established and work ‘backwards’
to explain how they arrived at the current configuration and outputs. ￿us, I show the diﬀerent paths
countries followed to set up similar regimes that ended up producing diﬀerent outputs.
Table ￿.￿ provides a summary of how these cases are configured:
￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Case selection
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New Zealand can be considered a functional RTI regime. By functional I mean that institutions
operate as expected, according to the regulation of the arena. Functional is not equivalent to a virtue
nor necessary a sign that this arena is a ‘ transparency heaven’. When I mean functional, I mean it
works as it is supposed to work according to its own standards. In New Zealand Information is often
available, the state is reliable and conflict resolution is swift and established. In New Zealand, as will
be shown in Chapter ￿, there was a high level of participation by local civil servants and civil society
members which helped to pass this legislation in ￿￿￿￿. Furthermore, New Zealand had a Whitehall
public administration model, which, since ￿￿￿￿, established meritocratic recruitment into the public
service. It also established the principle of political neutrality, establishing public servants to serve the
government of the day, and not a particular political party. New Zealand bureaucracy was a strong
Weberian type until major reforms in the ￿￿s under the New Public Management doctrine (Boston et
al. ￿￿￿￿). ￿ese reforms had a significant impact on how RTI operated in New Zealand, but for the
purposes of the current study, I will focus on the period from ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ when those reforms had
not yet been implemented. Regarding enforcement institutions, New Zealand had an Ombudsman
pre-established which took over the role of administering conflict around this regulation, becoming
an independent and able institution. In explaining New Zealand, this research is able to explore
which particular set of events and factors allowed the emergence of such a regime. ￿is is useful, as
New Zealand is often hailed by several international organisations as an example for others in this
￿￿
field. By explaining who was involved and the specific sequence of events and factors, the research
provides context and a pertinent explanation of why the RTI regime worked diﬀerently, leading to a
particular outcome.
Chile is an example of a mixed RTI regime or arena. By mixed,I mean that institutions often
operate as expected, according to the regulation of the arena. Nevertheless, occasionally there is non-
compliance issues with aspects of the RTI law, and dysfunctional situations can appear as a result of
conflict in the arena. ￿is does not imply a value judgement on the arena, but it implies that does
not work as expected according to its own standards.
While the logic of RTI is established in these regimes, there are still issues about how requests and
publication are handled, and the resolution of conflict takes time. In Chile, RTI was established after
a set of corruption scandals and the sentencing of the Chilean government by the Inter-American
Court of Justice. ￿ese events led to the approval of a RTI law. Participation in this process involved
a few politicians and members of civil society. Chile is advanced in terms of managerial reforms
oriented towards the implementation of NPM, particularly in terms of output budget-oriented results,
and partially in terms of senior public management reform (Grindle, ￿￿￿￿, Ramos y Scrollini, ￿￿￿￿).
Chile set up a special enforcement institution with a high degree of autonomy that is independent
and able to carry out its functions.
Choosing Chile provides an opportunity for this research to understand the emergence and
development of a regime that is evolving and how international and local factors interplay to set up a
RTI regime. ￿is specific configuration allows this research to understand more about the role of a
professional yet politicised bureaucracy in dealing with RTI requests, as well as providing a unique
analysis of the relationship between enforcement agencies and such a bureaucracy. By choosing Chile,
I am also able to contrast how a politicised yet professional bureaucracy works compared to a non-
politicised bureaucracy, as is the case in New Zealand. ￿is contrast allows for better understanding
of how this element functions in all configurations. Furthermore, it allows comparison between the
role of a new and specialist enforcement institution and an already established one.
Uruguay is a contested RTI arena. By labelling an RTI arena as contested, I mean that institutions
often do work as expected in this setting. ￿is label is not a value judgement on the arena, but an
indication that exhibits dysfunctional characteristics for its own standards. Conflicts are frequent
and resolved in a costly way. Bureaucracy might not even deal with all requests and the publication
of information is irregular. Uruguay has been a reluctant reformer in terms of the public service
￿￿
(Panizza y Phillip, ￿￿￿￿, Panizza, ￿￿￿￿), less professional than the Chilean bureaucracy (Garcia y
Garcia, ￿￿￿￿), and set up this regulation amidst pressure from civil society and international donors.
It also set up an administrative unit with low levels of independence to control the implementation
and resolve conflicts.
A politicised Uruguayan bureaucracy oﬀers a unique perspective on how RTI requests and release
of public information can be mediated by political interests. Uruguay also allows an understanding
of how weak RTI enforcement institutions work. As a result, Uruguay allows this research to show
the challenges faced by RTI regimes. When a specific combination of factors is suﬃcient to create a
regime but it faces challenges, it also helps to contrast this case with more ‘advanced’ cases to look for
similarities and diﬀerences.
￿ere are two additional benefits of comparing these countries. First, Uruguay, Chile and New
Zealand oﬀer variants of enforcement institutions (presented in Section ￿). As a result, the selection
adds value as it explores three diﬀerent institutional forms with diﬀerent levels of independence and
capacity. In this way, this research can add to an emergent literature on the matter. Second, Chile,
Uruguay and New Zealand are small countries which are perceived to have high levels of integrity
according to several international reputation indexes (Transparency International, ￿￿￿￿, WB, ￿￿￿￿)
as well as solid democratic regimes (EIU, ￿￿￿￿). ￿ey also share a very high or high level of human
development, according the UNDP Human Development Index (￿￿￿￿). Furthermore, these three
countries present a centralised structure of government; this means they are unitary states which allow
a comparison at similar levels, avoiding the complexities of comparing federal and unitary states. In
short, these are small, democratic and comparable units. ￿is is not per se theoretically relevant, but it
eases the comparison.
A first important caveat about this comparison is the timing of the reforms. New Zealand adopted
its regulation in ￿￿￿￿, Chile in ￿￿￿￿ and Uruguay also in ￿￿￿￿. As a result, New Zealand has now
had more than thirty years of experience in terms of access to information, while Chile and Uruguay
have only had five years. ￿erefore, a full comparison between the three cases would be flawed as New
Zealand has obviously accumulated more experience in this field. ￿us, for comparability reasons,
this study will focus on the first five years of each regulation.
Related to the former point, is the issue of principles. Principles established in laws in the RTI field
evolved over time and there is yet no agreement whether there should be global principles about these
laws. Advocates and CSO organisations ( see for instance Mendel,￿￿￿￿) have pushed for establishing
￿￿
basic principles at a general level (such as the United Nations) but this has not yet materialised ￿￿.
￿e Organisation of American States endorsed a RTI Model law which establishes a set of principles
for the Americas in terms of RTI (OAS,￿￿￿￿). In the context of this research, when I use the word
principles, I mean a certain group of norms are often incorporated in RTI laws. ￿ese principles are
present in the three cases selected in this research. In each chapter I show in detail the embodiment of
these principles in each law. A cautionary note is that while a principle may be present in a RTI law,
there could be a matter of scope. For instance, some institutions can be excluded from the scope of
the RTI law for several reasons (e.g.national security) and some forms of information can be excluded
from the scope of the law (e.g. information from private contractors). I list these principles in Table
￿.￿ providing a comparative overview of each RTI law used in this research.
￿￿For a list of all the principles and declarations available check Campaign for Right to Information in Nepal
http://www.ccrinepal.org/resources/principles [accessed ￿March ￿￿￿￿]
￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Principles of RTI laws compared
Principle New Zealand Uruguay Chile
Establishment of a presumptive right to informa-
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A second important caveat about this comparison exercise, is that the three experiences do have
a diﬀerent historical context in which RTI emerges. In New Zealand RTI emerges in a democratic
context, but against what some would perceive as an extremely regulated economic regime (Reardon
and Gray, ￿￿￿￿) and a government that faced serious conflicts on issues on such as the environment.
￿e Oﬃcial Information Act (OIA) was part of a reaction against this state of aﬀairs, as New Zealanders
sought to expand their rights.
Uruguay and Chile present a diﬀerent context. ￿e legacy of authoritarianism in Chile and Uruguay
links the development of RTI to other human rights issues, which were not present in the New
Zealand case. Both military dictatorships operating during a ‘Cold War’ environment committed
gross violations to human rights. Both military dictatorships ended after a negotiation between
civilians and military juntas. Former dictators kept a certain level of formal or informal influence
around some key decisions related to certain institutional issues, including the military. In this way,
RTI was conceived amidst a struggle to recover democratic institutions and civic liberties. Campaigns
for freedom of information would be linked to issues such as access to documents produced during
the military dictatorship about human rights violations and freedom of expression.
In Uruguay RTI discussions started ￿￿ years after democracy was regained. As noted in this
research, Uruguay has been traditionally acknowledged as one of the most democratic nations in the
region setting up advanced social rights and civic liberties early on the ￿￿th Century. Democracy
was lost from ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ in the context of the Cold War. ￿us, Uruguayans returned to their path
of enhancing civic liberties and dealing with a traumatic past. Chile was also acknowledged as a
democratic regime if slightly more conservative in terms of social rights. Democracy was lost and
regained in ￿￿￿￿, opening up a new chance for Chileans to expand their rights. ￿us, the authoritarian
past in both countries is relevant to explain the emergence of these laws and their context, but does
not aﬀect the case selection. When these laws were discussed and passed all these cases were considered
democratic countries (EIU, ￿￿￿￿)
Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge the eﬀect of technology in these arenas. In ￿￿￿￿ NZ oﬃcials
did not have to deal with e-mail and the internet as their Uruguayan and Chilean counterparts did in
￿￿￿￿.
￿is study deals with complex processes with interdependent variables, which implies that this
research makes a considerable eﬀort to describe as accurately as possible how exactly these factors
configure a RTI arena. ￿is means addressing who were the key stakeholders, the sequence of events,
￿￿
the context and the process of adoption, exploring the linkages to its eventual implementation. As a
result, this case study employs process tracing as a methodological device to achieve its goals. Such a
methodological device allows us to link initial conditions to certain outputs (Vennesson, ￿￿￿￿).
As in other case studies and qualitative and comparative research, there are limits. ￿is research
is unable to account for all the possible cases that can emerge. ￿is is to say, the findings are only
applicable to the cases selected, as the objective is to show how they are structured and deliver diﬀerent
outputs. ￿is approach works well when the numbers are small (as in this case) but it may not be
applicable to other cases. (Ragin, ￿￿￿￿). Yet, due to the current state of the field, it is still a valid
strategy to explain why RTI regimes operating under similar principles end up working diﬀerently.
Further theory development and study could enable a refinement of the categories and theory presented
here. Another common critique of qualitative and comparative studies is the argument of ‘selecting
on the dependent variable’. In this way, critics often point out that qualitative researchers select cases
because of the variation (or lack of variation), not exploring the entire range of options to test diﬀerent
independent variables and their eﬀects. In this case, I argue that the selection is purposeful as it aids
in comparing existing outputs and shows the diﬀerent variables at play that led to them. ￿e value of
this work is in identifying those variables and explaining the way they link to the outputs in each
arena according to the literature and evidence available. ￿us, it fits the research strategy I advance in
this work.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ ɢ￿￿ʜ￿ʀɪɴɢ
Data was gathered through three diﬀerent techniques: elite interviewing, analysis of relevant historical
documents including legal records and media records.
In terms of elite (or qualified) interviewing, it has long been considered one valid method to
collect information, particularly when developing conceptual work. Combined with process tracing,
elite interviewing allows for establishing facts that were not documented, contrasting facts and
reconstruction of events. It fits with process tracing as a methodological device (Tansey, ￿￿￿￿). While
the term ‘elite’ may have certain class implications, in this context it does not necessarily mean a
member of the country’s leading political and economic elite, but someone with unique knowledge of
the subject at a political, policy or implementation level. In some arenas, these people were, in eﬀect,
members of the political elite. ￿e sampling and selection of interviewees was guided according to the
desk research performed for each case. In the particular case of New Zealand, I was not able to gather
￿￿
many elite interviews, because legislation was approved in ￿￿￿￿ and some key stakeholders were
either not in a condition to answer or were deceased. Interviews were semi-structured and allowed
input from the interviewees, as it was essential to develop the framework. Interviews were granted
under conditions of anonymity. ￿is was done to protect the interviewees from potential harm to
their reputation or position for taking part in this research. Most of them were willing to go on the
record, but I decided to follow conventions in this field and did not name them. Most of them were
identified according to their position. Interviews lasted for ￿￿ minutes to one hour. I performed ￿￿
interviews￿￿ in three countries according to Table ￿.￿:
Table ￿.￿: Interviewees
New Zealand Chile Uruguay
Politicians/ Authorities ￿ ￿ ￿￿
Public servants ￿ ￿ ￿
Experts/Academics/ Journalists ￿ ￿ ￿￿
Total ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Uruguay demanded more interviews due to the absence of studies and written material, unlike
Chile and New Zealand where there is fairly good documentation. I took part as participant or
organiser in four seminars in these countries, which allowed me to understand better the context in
which practitioners work. Finally, in partnership with a software engineer and colleague, Gabriela
Rodriguez, we set up the prototype for an online access-to-information request website based on free
software Alaveteli for the Uruguayan case study. ￿e collaboration emerged at a conference we both
attended in the context of this research, organised by the British NGO My Society at the University
of Oxford on the ￿nd and ￿rd of April, ￿￿￿￿. ￿e prototype was prepared at the premises of the
London School of Economics and Political Science, Government Department over the next four days
after the conference. ￿e software provides an interface where users can request data from several
government departments covered by an access-to-information law. New Zealand and Chile already
had similar portals, hence the collaboration was useful to explore the Uruguayan setting where no
data was available about the government response. ￿e prototype was fully developed by DATA – a
Uruguayan NGO which I chair – and was turned into the current website www.quesabes.uy. It was
￿￿I carried out a total of ￿￿￿ interviews but only ￿￿ were fit to use in this work. Of those a selected set are quoted in
this text as shown in the Appendix I
￿￿
formally launched as an access-to-information portal in partnership with local access-to-information
activists in this country in October ￿￿￿￿.￿￿ ￿e software also helped to expose a set of reactions from
the administration aiding comparability with the other two cases.
￿e design and implementation of the software in Uruguay requires a set of clarifications about
my involvement as a researcher. My research design does not contemplate an action- research
methodological component as a central element. Nevertheless, this particular development can be
understood under this research approach. Action research assumes the researcher works alongside
members of a given community to develop a solution or knowledge about a certain issue. In this way,
the researchers work with counterparts to generate evidence and potentially develop new approaches
to tackle practical issues (Herr & Anderson, ￿￿￿￿). Central to this approach are matters of ethics and
professional judgement. My involvement as part of this research project was in terms of setting up
the prototype as described above. ￿is meant to analyse the Uruguayan legal framework to ensure
that the prototype complied with Uruguayan RTI law as well as with Uruguayan data protection law.
When the organisation I chair- DATA Uruguay- decided to continue with this project, it was also
decided that all the basic statistical data available from the project would be open to all interested
parties, including government organisations, researchers ,international organisations and civil society
organisations. ￿is is the data that used in this research. In this way no other type of data that
would have required a diﬀerent research and ethical framework (e.g. personal data of requesters, data
from public servants, specific patterns of web behaviour, etc) was used in this research. When the
organisation decided to push forward with the project, I also raised concerns about potential misuse
of this tool (e.g. ‘vexatious’ requests’). I monitored the website to prevent these requests. To date, the
website did not register any vexatious request. ￿us, the portal does not constitute an ‘experiment’
in which the researcher seeks to apply a set treatments to users to achieve a certain goal or probe a
certain point. It does constitute a limited intervention in which- as described- I made a set of choices
in terms of engaging as a researcher in the design and in monitoring potential problematic behaviours.
￿e Uruguayan case also requires an extra caveat about the researcher himself. I am Uruguayan and
I’ve been fairly active in the right to information and public policy community in Uruguay before
conducting this research. As a result, interviewees might have reacted to who I am, and what they
perceived as my views in the past. ￿is is always a risk in qualitative studies and I did my best eﬀort
to check diﬀerent sources and triangulate interviewees testimonies with other data available.




FUNCTIONAL RT I ARENAS : THE L IMITS OF
SUNSHINE IN NEW ZEALAND (AOTEAROA )￿￿
‘￿e Oﬃcial Information Act...a nine day wonder’. Robert
Muldoon, New Zealand, Prime Minister ￿￿￿￿
‘In short, the Queen’s papers have become the people’s’ (Lange vs.
Atkinson ￿￿￿￿)
‘Making the decision to withhold information used to be easy –
the only question was: will it embarrass the Minister?’ Peter
Brooks (￿￿￿￿)
￿.￿ ɪɴ￿ʀ￿￿￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ
New Zealand is consistently recognised as a good regime in terms of access to public information
(Access Info-CDI ￿￿￿￿). ￿ere are reasons for such a well-earned reputation that can be traced
back to the combination of three factors: levels of participation in the policymaking process, the
professionalism of state bureaucracy and the autonomy and capacity of RTI enforcement institutions.
￿￿Aotearoa in Maori means the ‘Island of the long white cloud’.
￿￿
In this chapter, I set out to describe how the access-to-information regime emerged in New Zealand.
Second, I will analyse how the New Zealand RTI arena evolved during the first five years. ￿e
reason for doing so is for comparability purposes among the three case studies presented in this work.
￿ird, I will describe the core government agencies, the roles of requesters and public servants. I will
also provide a brief description of the evolution of the New Zealand RTI arena up to the present,
identifying key feedback loops. Fourth, I will introduce a set of puzzles presented by the New Zealand
case and explain them according to the arguments advanced in this work.
￿.￿ ￿ʜ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ʀ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ɪɴ￿￿ʀ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ: ￿ʜ￿ ￿￿￿ʀɢ￿ɴ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ʜ￿
ɴ￿￿ ￿￿￿ʟ￿ɴ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
￿.￿.￿ A world of secrecy
New Zealand was an early adopter of right-to-information legislation when in ￿￿￿￿ it passed the
Oﬃcial Information Act (OIA).￿e OIA was greeted with scepticism by the prime minister of the
day, Robert Muldoon, as a ‘nine day wonder’. Nonetheless, the law has since been in place for thirty
years, providing a sound anchor for the New Zealand RTI arena. In this section, I seek to explain
the key elements in the design phase of the OIA that allowed this policy to survive the test of time,
turning the OIA into a constitutional convention.
￿ere is compelling evidence that, before the introduction of the OIA, there was an atmosphere
of tension about the use of public and private information by state authorities, as well as high levels
of secrecy. ￿e underpinning legal tool justifying this was the Oﬃcial Secrets Act (￿￿￿￿)￿￿ which
established that public information was the property of the New Zealand Government, and imposed
draconian sanctions on public servants for ‘wrongful communications with anyone outside the state’
(Elwood, ￿￿￿￿). As noted by Gregory (￿￿￿￿), oﬃcial secrecy fitted the tradition of a Weberian
bureaucracy such as the one New Zealand had in place at the time.￿￿
Before OIA, New Zealand was a place where public servants had to sign a declaration of secrecy to
protect public information. As mentioned in discussion records by one public servant:
It has been said, not altogether facetiously, that a public servant who discloses the number of cups of tea
￿￿￿e Act was based on the British Statue of ￿￿￿￿. When NZ gained full independence from the UK, the Act was
incorporated in the New Zealand legal system, dated ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿New Zealand was one of the first countries in the world to legislate and implement centralised meritocratic recruitment
for public servants, providing them with tenure which would ensure consistency across New Zealand’s relatively large public
sector at the time.
￿￿
consumed in his oﬃce is guilty of an oﬀence under of the Oﬃcial Secrets Act. (GS. Orr, ￿￿￿￿)
￿e Oﬃcial Secrets Act led to serious issues in terms of eﬃciency and accountability in the public
sector. For instance, in ￿￿￿￿ the New Zealand Government engaged in a large campaign to get
rid of polio, vaccinating its entire population. However, some of the material might have been
contaminated, which allegedly resulted in serious consequences twenty years later for those involved.
In ￿￿￿￿, speculation about this event had a significant impact on New Zealand’s public. An MP
took up the case and a report followed. ￿e report shed significant light on the process, ending
public controversy, but only when full information was available (Collins, ￿￿￿￿). ￿ere is anecdotal
evidence by journalists and public servants about ‘secret meetings’ to get very basic information about
policies, and even limits in terms of which social events a civil servants could go to due to the secrecy
regulations. For instance, after a major outbreak of possible wine contamination, the answer to the
question about which brands were involved was:
Sorry, we can’t tell you because it could constitute prejudice, and we could deny someone a fair trial if we
try to prosecute them. (Southworth, ￿￿￿￿)￿￿
While the dense web of regulation around oﬃcial secrets provided a framework for secrecy, the
government of the day also had the political will to enforce it. Robert Muldoon, New Zealand
National Party Prime Minister at the time, was very well known as a charismatic leader who often
had major disagreements with the public service (Gustafson, ￿￿￿￿).￿￿ Muldoon promoted a series of
policies whose objectives were to give the state a larger role in the economy: the ‘￿ink Big’ programme.
Muldoon aggressively pushed forward these policies and made sure to release as little information
as possible about the policymaking process. ￿ere is significant evidence of government refusals
to requests from activists groups trying to obtain public information about Muldoon’s government
policies, with responses which ranged from lack of time to replies of ‘not being prepared’ to release
internal reports (Salmon ￿￿￿￿). Information obtained by environmentalist groups via leaks was also a
thorny issue. For instance, a circular from the government of the day in ￿￿￿￿ made this point:
I am quite confident that no committee member would make these documents available to pressure
￿￿Most of this anecdotal information is available on transcripts from a conference in ￿￿￿￿ when campaigners were
pushing for the OIA. Another example was a standard question about new helicopters bought by the NZ Royal Air Force.
￿e journalist asked ‘How fast can an Iroquois helicopter go?’ ￿e reply never came and the journalist just went to a text
book where the speed of the Iroquois helicopter was available. ￿ere are also reports about lack of information for trade
union bargains, and key information delivered in boxes falling oﬀ trucks for the right people to pick up.
￿￿In New Zealand, the constitutional convention of free and frank advice establishes that ministers should receive all the
available information to make decisions, with the best advice from the public servants in an impartial and comprehensive
way regardless of whether or not the advice accords with ministers’ views. (Cabinet Manual, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
groups, and that I regard the matter as one of simple theft. A theft is a criminal oﬀence. I shall have
no hesitation in recommending the application of the law should the identity of the thief be ascertained.
(Director of Forestry ￿￿￿￿, quoted in Salmon, ￿￿￿￿)
Secrecy was established but, in ￿￿￿￿, New Zealand also became the first Westminster democracy
to set up an Ombudsman. ￿e New Zealand Ombudsman was the first set up outside Scandinavia
and established itself as a reliable and legitimate figure where the ‘layman’ could seek remedy against
unfairness caused by the public administration. ￿e oﬃce of Ombudsman was conceived as an
administrative arbiter and it was initially involved in matters of social policy and services (Lundvik,
￿￿￿￿). Although initially resisted by the civil service, by ￿￿￿￿ there was evidence of compliance with
the Ombudsman resolution and respect for its impartiality (Weeks, ￿￿￿￿). As a result, New Zealand
had one institution in place to counter the ‘unbridled power’ (Palmer, ￿￿￿￿) of the executive, where a
‘first-past-the-post’ (FPP) electoral system in place provided considerable room for the Prime Minister
to manoeuvre. ￿e Ombudsman was an important piece of New Zealand’s institutional landscape
when the OIA arrived and a significant check-and-balance institution to protect individuals. ￿ere
was a breeding ground developing for the discussion of RTI. Yet, as in other scenarios, events trigger
reforms.
￿.￿.￿ A ‘fair go’ in New Zealand: RTI and the events that unchained change￿￿
According to historical evidence, two events were important to advance the OIA: the environmental
campaign against the ‘￿ink Big’ government programme and a set of activities by the NZ intelligence
service over a prominent civil servant. In a Cold War context, a respected public servant, William
Sutch, was arrested under the Oﬃcial Secret Act under the charge of spying (Section ￿) which included
obtaining information that ‘may be of use directly or indirectly to an enemy’. According to Gustafson
(￿￿￿￿):
￿e Attorney-General, Dr Martyn Finlay, reluctantly agreed to Sutch being prosecuted and a trial by
jury was conducted in the Wellington Supreme Court ￿￿–￿￿ February ￿￿￿￿. Sutch was found not guilty
and following his acquittal there was considerable public criticism of the SIS, which led to Rowling deciding
to review the Oﬃcial Secrets Act and also on ￿ August ￿￿￿￿ to set up an inquiry into the SIS conducted
by the Chief Ombudsman Sir Guy Powles. Powles submitted his report to Muldoon on ￿ May ￿￿￿￿. It
contained ten findings and ￿￿ recommendations and led to the drafting later in the year of a Security
￿￿A ‘fair go’, in Australia and New Zealand, is a colloquial term meaning a reasonable opportunity to do something.
￿￿
Intelligence Amendment Bill and in ￿￿￿￿ the establishment of a committee chaired by Sir Alan Danks to
consider freedom of information.
Sutch was acquitted but his health suﬀered and he died soon after.￿￿
Another set of events was related to environmental issues. ￿e ￿ink Big programme was an
aggressive state-led industrial programme which promoted a series of environmentally controversial
projects such as dams, methanol plants, petrol plants, and electrification and aluminium smelters.
￿ere is compelling evidence that environmental information about aluminium smelters and other
projects was systematically denied by the government (VUW, ￿￿￿￿). New Zealand cabinet notes
from ￿￿￿￿ dealing with fairly basic evidence were deemed confidential (NZ Cabinet, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e Commission for Environment, whose role at the time was to monitor some of the high-profile
projects, noted problems with secrecy of several processes, which resulted in unclear guidance even in
the government’s own activities:
I have expressed to you and the previous Ministers my reservations about cabinet minutes as a record of
the main decisions taken by government. It does not record the Hon. Venn Young’s argument in favour of
including social impacts in the broadest sense, or the support he obtained from his colleagues. (NZ Cabinet,
￿￿￿￿)
In other words, excessive secrecy was not only undemocratic, but also ineﬃcient for the government
itself (Palmer, ￿￿￿￿). Even the Auckland District Law Society recommended a non-partisan revision
of the handling of public information legislation. Atkins (￿￿￿￿) notes that a small but well-organised
environmentalist group was essential in adding pressure to approve the Oﬃcial Information Act. Other
stakeholders included one member of the opposition who also put forward an access-to-information
bill with no success (Taggart, ￿￿￿￿).
In short, there were two events that can be identified as triggers for the OIA reform: resistance
to the Oﬃcial Secrets Act and pressure from public opinion on environmental issues. ￿e events
unfolded in an existing climate of tension about government secrecy.￿￿
￿￿Controversy about Sutch’s espionage activities remain, although new information available seems to confirm he was
not a spy. (New Zealand Herald, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿Former State Service Commissioner Peter Boag argues that in ￿￿￿￿ there was already regulation about progressively
releasing information although it seems not to have had much impact on the discussion (Boag, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
￿.￿.￿ ￿e policy mix: civil society and unexpected policy entrepreneurs
Key policy entrepreneurs were initially the Ombudsman and a small group of environmentalist
campaigners who helped to trigger the reform.
In ￿￿￿￿, the government set up a Committee on Oﬃcial Information (also known as the Danks
Committee)￿￿ whose main aim was ‘to contribute to the larger aim of freedom of information by
considering the extent to which oﬃcial information can be made readily available and in particular to
examine the purpose and application of the Oﬃcial Secrets Act, ￿￿￿￿’.
Almost immediately, a Coalition for Open Government assembled by civil society and championed
by former ombudsman Sir Guy Powles entered onto the scene.￿￿ Most of the ideas in the policy
stream were discussed through submissions to the Danks Committee.
￿e Committee published two reports in ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ which reflects how the policy stream
fluctuated in those days. ￿ere are three key elements to consider in this ‘primeval soup’ as relevant
to the subsequent development of the New Zealand RTI arena: a ‘close knit’ policy community, a
full awareness of other experiences around the world at the time, and, paradoxically, the extensive
participation of the public service in the process.
New Zealand is a close-knit community of policymakers due to the size and resources the govern-
ment possesses.￿￿ As a result, New Zealand policymakers work very closely with each other and are
used to working with familiar concepts and procedures, thus helping streamline the policy process. At
the time this law was adopted, the New Zealand bureaucracy had not been aﬀected by the radical New
Public Management reform, which would foster more diversity in administrative forms in the public
sector (Boston et al. ￿￿￿￿). ￿erefore, there was a shared knowledge about procedures, principles
and goals for the public service. ￿us, debates about administrative procedures, principles and related
issues were framed by a shared understanding in the public sector.
Policymakers in New Zealand had full access to most of the available international experience,
which gave them a unique vantage point when designing the system. In a civil society newsletter
￿￿Sir Alan Danks, an academic from Canterbury University, was the president of the committee and he and Judge
Kenneth Keith from Victoria University of Wellington were the only non-public servant members. ￿e rest of the
Committee was formed by public servants from the State Services Commission, the Prime Minister’s Department and the
Departments of Justice, Foreign Aﬀairs and Defence. (Taggart, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿￿e campaign was organised with very few resources by a small group of highly motivated citizens in New Zealand.
Being championed by Sir Guy Powles meant the campaign had a ‘heavyweight’ on their side, but a very limited budget.
(COG, ￿￿￿￿, VUW, ￿￿￿￿, No Right Turn, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿At the time of the OIA reform, the NZ public service did not suﬀer from the fragmentation that the New Public
Management reforms would be responsible for years later (Gregory, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
(COG, ￿￿￿￿), there are full descriptions of reform processes in Australia, the U.S.A., Canada, the
Nordic countries, France, the Netherlands and Austria (Powles and Longworth, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e Danks
committee also provided an extensive review of international experience in relevant cases:￿￿
We have followed closely the debate in Britain, Canada, and Australia, since their experience of
information problems arises in settings similar to our own. We have also studied the systems adopted in the
United States and Sweden. Our aim has been, however, to find solutions relevant to New Zealand needs
and circumstances. In seeking the way which might serve best to promote the aim of freer information flows
in this country, we have relied heavily on local sources. (p. ￿)
￿e Committee then engaged in a thorough analysis of New Zealand oﬃcial secrets and related
regulations, which resulted in a major principle shift: openness was the default mode for public
information, not secrecy. In the words of the Danks Committee:
We therefore consider that the system based on the Oﬃcial Secrets Act should be replaced by a new
set of arrangements. ￿e Government should, in our view, reaﬃrm its responsibility to keep the public
informed of its activities and to make oﬃcial information available unless there is good reason to withhold
it. Grounds for withholding information from the public should be set out clearly, along with the basic
principle. (COG, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿)
Besides the international experience on legal and policy analysis, there was also a more local political
reading about the meaning of the Act. In the words of the Danks Committee:
Access to oﬃcial information is part of a wider general issue. It involves the whole interrelationship of
government and the community, and the mutual advantage in communication and co-operation. ￿e
increasing complexity of oﬃcial interventions undoubtedly contributes to community attitudes, and to the
generalised concerns about ability to influence government action, that has, in turn, spurred debate on open
government. (COG, ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿)
￿e New Zealand civil service took a leading role in the debates about the Act. As noted by Gregory
(￿￿￿￿):
￿ere are probably some who will argue that having the Act drafted by a committee composed mainly of
top public servants was akin to the idea that the Society for the Promotion of Community Standards￿￿
should draft indecency laws.
￿￿At the same time, Australia discussed a bill about access to oﬃcial information at a federal level. ￿e bill ended up
being less systematic and more problematic in terms of implementation that the New Zealand one (Snell, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿e Society is still a fairly conservative organisation supporting certain limits to freedom of expression and the
promotion of certain moral values often associated with Christianity.
￿￿
Although there were several voices criticising the heavy participation of public servants in the
Committee￿￿ (Taggart, ￿￿￿￿), this worked to the advantage of policy design. Most of the public
servants involved in this particular group knew the ropes an access-to-information policy would
pull inside the machinery of government. One of the members of this committee, Kenneth Keith,
described this group as mostly a ‘very progressive and forward-thinking group of civil servants’ (Keith,
￿￿￿￿). While they were representatives of the civil service, they also had in mind broader challenges
for the machinery of government as a whole. ￿us, the OIA was seen in a diﬀerent light, as a tool
to enhance participation and collaboration with the public. ￿ey were also a group of traditional
and highly respected civil servants who probably reflected the view of their colleagues and found it
increasingly diﬃcult to live under the Oﬃcial Secrets Act. ￿is group was largely responsible for the
design and analysis that would lead to the current state of aﬀairs in the New Zealand RTI arena.
￿e Committee received ￿￿￿ submissions from people and organisations. Eighty of them were
interviewed, which reflected a wide concern for the topic. Among them, government departments
had the opportunity to submit papers which, of course, made the Danks Committee’s task more
complex (Keith, ￿￿￿￿). ￿ere were also opponents of this law across the civil service and the political
spectrum. Notably, some large agencies were fiercely opposed to releasing information, and most
of the public service considered this law a threat to the provision of free and frank advice to the
government. As noted by the Ombudsman at the time:
No one who has been involved in the development of the new legislation can fail to have been impressed
and not a little dismayed by the guarded and in some instances entirely negative reaction of many public
oﬃcials to the notion that oﬃcial information of any kind should be made more accessible to the public.
￿e same attitudes were common when the Ombudsman Act passed. (Laking, ￿￿￿￿)
In this way, RTI was not an agreed concept among civil servants, but one that was very much
discussed. At some point during the policymaking process, a group of high-ranking civil servants
became convinced of the need for such a law, and went ahead with the plan even in opposition to
some of their colleagues’ instincts. ￿is pivotal shift made possible not only the advancement of the
bill but crucially facilitated early implementation and promoted a certain degree of ownership in the
civil service, as this study will show.
￿e Committee made a set of recommendations that decisively shaped the initial OIA and the way
the current New Zealand RTI arena works:
￿￿In the words of one of the members, a ‘secret committee of bureaucrats meeting in secret’, (Keith, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿
• An evolutionary outlook towards the implementation of the policy: information would be
available progressively. ￿is would ensure a gradual and initially consistent implementation of
the policy.
• A clear and broad definition about what constitutes public information. ￿is would ensure
that practically no information is out of reach in this arena.
• A balanced approach to privacy and oﬃcial information tha would ensure appropriate consid-
eration for privacy and eventually would be outdated by the Privacy Act.
• A set of generally liberal guiding principles to release, classify and retain public information.
￿is would ensure an easy request regime, with relatively little diﬃculty for requesters.
• A large list of authorities who would be subject to the law, including state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). ￿is would ensure exceptions were diﬃcult to justify later.
• ￿e decision to set up an implementation body (the information authority) and an independent
control body (the Ombudsman) to resolve potential conflicts between the administration and
citizens. ￿e existence of ownership in the civil service and a neutral information enforcement
institution would be essential to sustain the system.
• ￿e decision to not involve the Courts in conflict resolution about oﬃcial information requests.
￿is would ensure a non-legalistic approach to access to information.
• ￿e decision to keep public servants in charge of making the decision of releasing public
information or not, which would keep them as stewards of the system and provide them with
partial ownership of the decisions.
• ￿e decision to keep the ministers ‘in control’ through leaving the final call to release informa-
tion to the executive if challenged by the Ombudsman. ￿is would placate politicians’ initial
fears about the access-to-information regime, as well as being aligned with New Zealand’s
constitutional framework at the time.
￿e Committee proposed that the Ombudsman should be in charge of handling complaints
about the Oﬃcial Information Act, but it also noted that such an approach would lead to certain
inconsistencies in terms of the release of public information, due to the fact that decisions made by
￿￿
the Ombudsman were on a case-by-case basis.￿￿ ￿e Committee sought to take advantage of the fact
that the Ombudsman was already an established institution, dealing with the public service, and that
its ‘raison d’être’ was aligned with that of the OIA. Both institutions were designed to deal with the
same issue:
New Zealand is a small country. ￿e Government has a pervasive involvement in our everyday national
life. ￿is involvement is not only felt, but is also sought, by New Zealanders, who have tended to view
successive governments as their agents, and have expected them to act as such. ￿e Government is a principal
agency in deploying the resources required to undertake many large-scale projects, and there is considerable
pressure for it to sustain its role as a major developer, particularly as an alternative to overseas ownership
and control... Our social support systems also rely heavily on central government. History and circumstances
give New Zealanders special reason for wanting to know what their government is doing and why. (COG,
￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿)
￿e Ombudsman, designed as an independent parliamentary oﬃcer, was then the natural arbiter
for any dispute. It was a legitimate actor, created due to the same motivations and respected by public
servants and the public. Crucially, in the New Zealand system the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate all documents from public bodies, acting as an intermediary between the administration
and the citizen. In this way, the new Oﬃcial Information Act’s handling of complaint procedures was
built into an already established routine between the Ombudsman and the administration (Shelton,
￿￿￿￿). In the words of the Danks Committee:
￿e Ombudsman already can and does handle cases in the information field in accordance with their
well established procedures with the mana￿￿ the oﬃce has acquired over two decades. (COG, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿)
As Shelton (￿￿￿￿) notes, the Ombudsman would disseminate public information through special
reports, reports to the Parliament and individual complaints. In the words of the then Ombudsman
himself, George Laking:
I can only see my function in this area as having been materially enlarged. (Laking, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿￿e Committee also advised the setting up of an independent body whose main function would be key to increase
public information progressively, issuing advice on what should be deemed public, what should be withheld, and issuing
advice on grey areas. ￿e Committee went to great lengths to justify its existence, and in modern terms this would be a
unit in charge of ensuring proactive transparency. Furthermore, the Committee argued that such a body would ensure a
certain degree of consistency across the public sector (COG, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). ￿is body was not finally set up in the way the
Danks Committee envisaged it (White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿), and, as a result, all decisions about when and how to release public
information in the New Zealand system continue to be on a case-by-case basis.
￿￿Mana is a Maori term referring to power or prestige in a community
￿￿
￿.￿.￿ An absent political will
Eventually, the law was passed on December ￿￿th ￿￿￿￿ after a brief discussion of less than ￿￿ days.
￿e politics of the day made it very diﬃcult for Muldoon or the opposition to ignore the recommen-
dations of the Danks Committee. In the New Zealand governance system, recommendations from a
Committee are typically accepted by the government of the day. Yet politicians managed to modify
some aspects of the original proposal, most notably the recommendation about the existence of an
information authority, establishing a ‘sunset clause’ for such an authority, which was tasked with the
mission of promoting and standardising OIA requests procedures across the public sector.
Muldoon did not seem to be particularly concerned about this piece of legislation. To some degree,
the law was just seen as a declaration of principles, a salvo more than ground-breaking regulation. ￿e
law passed with little significant discussion, although there is evidence that some MPs were keenly
interested (Keith, ￿￿￿￿). Robert Muldoon called the OIA ‘a nine day wonder’ but it proved to be one
of the most enduring pieces of legislation in the New Zealand constitutional system. ￿e Hon. J.
K. McLay mentioned that ‘the bill represents one of the most significant constitutional innovations to be
made since the establishment of the oﬃce of the Ombudsmen in the early ￿￿￿￿s’ (Belgrave, ￿￿￿￿).
￿.￿ ￿ʜ￿ ɴ￿￿ ￿￿￿ʟ￿ɴ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿: ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿
New Zealand moved to implement the act swiftly after its approval in ￿￿￿￿ and, in July ￿￿￿￿, it
came into force. When the OIA eﬀectively started to work, New Zealand was in transition from a
conservative government led by Muldoon to a new Labour (left-wing) one￿￿. In this first stage, major
changes in the state sector were still being discussed and, as a result, the New Zealand RTI arena
operated under the same administrative structure that had existed under the previous government.
￿is would change with the well-known New Public Management reform of the ￿￿￿￿s.
In this section, I provide an analysis of the original RTI arena up to ￿￿￿￿. First, I provide an
analysis of New Zealand RTI law. Second, I describe the state and the role of the public service. ￿ird,
I provide a summary of feedback loops in the NZ RTI arena. ￿is section shows how the interplay
between core agencies, the government of the day, the Ombudsman and the courts was crucial and
shaped some of the key characteristics of both the current and the early New Zealand RTI arena.
￿￿Robert Muldoon called a snap election and lost it, creating a subsequent constitutional crisis by not following
instructions from the elected government during the transition (or caretaker) period.
￿￿
￿.￿.￿ New Zealand RTI law
Table ￿.￿ summarises the main characteristics of New Zealand OIA law.
Table ￿.￿: NZ Oﬃcial Information Act
Presumptive right to infor-
mation held by public au-
thorities.
Information about procedures, decisions and support documents
should be public. Information is understood in a broad sense (i.e.
not just documents or materials produced by the state; can include
oral histories, section ￿).
Proactive publication ￿e principle of availability establishes the principle that the in-
formation shall be made available unless there is good reason for
withholding it. ￿ere is no set of common categories and formats
for publishing information (Section ￿) .
Request mechanism No special procedure. Requester has to be a NZ national or a resident
of New Zealand. ￿ere is a time limit of twenty working days that
can be extended (Section￿￿) .
Exceptions and Limits ￿ere are conclusive and special reasons to limit the information
release (Section ￿ and Section￿). Among these reasons are: security;
defence; international relationships; prejudice to the maintenance
of the law (including the prevention, investigation, and detection of
oﬀences); personal safety; stability, control, and adjustment of prices
of goods and services, rents, and other costs, and rates of wages,
salaries, and other incomes; international public debt; special provi-
sions around commercial interests of state-owned enterprises, special
provisions concerning privacy; third-party interests; protection of
the free and frank advice convention; protection of communica-
tions; and information about negotiations (including commercial
and industrial negotiations).
Duty to assist Part ￿ Section ￿￿ establishes a duty to assist requesters.
Fees Part ￿ Section ￿￿ In principle, there is no charge for getting docu-
ments. If charges are applicable, they should be proportional.
Conflict resolution System ￿e law establishes the Ombudsman as the conflict resolution insti-
tution.
New Zealand RTI law is a very detailed law in terms of procedures and exceptions. ￿is was the
result of the involvement of the civil service and the availability of legal advice on the matter. As
noted, the process of designing this law was viewed by many participants with suspicion due to the




As noted in Chapter ￿, the state is the largest information holder in any given society. In comparative
terms, New Zealand has always had a large state sector. According to Polascheck (￿￿￿￿) and later
Schick (￿￿￿￿), the New Zealand state always had a small number of large departments (Schick,
￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿). ￿e period until ￿￿￿￿ can be seen as governance by hierarchies (Gill, ￿￿￿￿) where
the state played a larger role in the economy, providing services through trading departments and
local governments. It was a highly centralised system, where central government was a major player
and employer. A Royal Commission in ￿￿￿￿ established several ineﬃciencies of the system; the fact
that there was a meritocratic system in place helped to standardise certain practices across the state,
including storing and archiving information. In short, New Zealand bureaucracy was a sound and
traditional Weberian system. In total, ￿￿￿ organisations were subject to the Oﬃcial Information Act
(Information Authority, ￿￿￿￿).
In this context, the core agencies are the ones that collect information from other agencies, which
mean they are able to convey information about the arena and the state itself. In New Zealand, these
nodes identified are: the Information Authority, the State Services Commission, the Treasury and
Archives New Zealand
￿e Information Authority was created to define and review categories of oﬃcial information
with a view to enlarging the categories of oﬃcial information to which access is given as a matter of
right (OIA, ￿￿￿￿, Section ￿￿, expired). However, it was not the authority as originally envisaged by
the Danks Committee but a transitional implementation agency (White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). As a result,
the Information Authority was in charge of making public information progressively available to
the public, a term known in modern freedom-of-information language as proactive disclosure. ￿e
Information Authority played a key role in leading policy implementation, providing evaluation of
the policy and also providing key statistics about the evolution of the Oﬃcial Information Act. ￿e
Unit also dealt with the review guidelines for personal records (Boag, ￿￿￿￿).￿￿
￿e Authority operated as a centre where public servants could get advice, as well as providing in-
depth analysis of issues that recent OIA legislation aﬀected, such as privacy and archives (Information
Authority, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e Authority performed a key role streamlining previous secrecy
provisions (more than ￿￿￿) and recommending the repeal of several acts, helping the system to be
￿￿￿e Unit also had an advisory board convened by the State Services Commission which involved the Permanent
Heads of the Ministries of Defence, Justice, Social Welfare and Trade and Industry, the Post Oﬃce, the Prime Minister’s
Oﬃce, and the Treasury (Boag, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
more consistent. ￿is coordination role was particularly diﬃcult. ￿e Authority itself noted:
￿e general force of the exercises which have been undertaken is to consolidate and widen the coverage of
the OIA as the centrepiece in the handling of oﬃcial information formulating conditions and clarifying
processes in pursuit of the general ideal of open government. Public agencies could not be rushed into
compliance with suggested changes and painstaking consultations have sought to establish agreement and
promote confidence. (Information Authority, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e authority was disbanded in ￿￿￿￿ as an independent institution, although some of the personnel
and functions were transferred to the Ministry of Justice (Snell, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e disbandment had major
eﬀects in New Zealand as no central records of FOI requests were kept (Clemens, ￿￿￿￿, Hazell, ￿￿￿￿).
For instance, in ￿￿￿￿ a local researcher found that core agencies were responding to requests but there
was an absence of guidance and information policies; this was directly linked to the disappearance of
the Authority. In the words of the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce,
Its role in monitoring the success of the legislation in practice has been vital and will be sorely missed
in future. If there is one lesson from the Authority’s existence, it is that the process of open government
cannot succeed on an on-going basis without some form of continuing oﬃcial oversight at a policy level. It
is not appropriate for the Ombudsmen to have that role; we would accordingly express the hope that the
Authority’s monitoring functions will be assumed by some other body. (￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿)
￿e lack of an authority also shaped the New Zealand system in the way OIA requests are dealt
with at an administrative level, using the broad categories foreseen in the law, but on a case-by-case
basis. ￿e disbandment also resulted in lack of training for public servants, possibly resulting in
inconsistency of procedures across New Zealand public administration.￿￿
￿e State Services Commission performed the key task of briefing public servants about the extent
of the act and how to proceed when releasing information. Wiles (￿￿￿￿) noted that the Services
Commission dealt with thorny issues for the New Zealand public service, such as the constitutional
convention of free and frank advice, the time frames to process OIA requests and the issue of record
keeping. Since the State Services Commission was the most relevant civil service institution at the
time, the issue of the convention of free and frank advice became dominant. In the context of the New
Zealand government, free and frank advice is built in a tradition of a politically neutral civil service,
which means that advice must be honest, impartial and comprehensive to maintain the confidence
￿￿As White (￿￿￿￿) points out, this could also have been the consequence of the change in the role of the State Services
Commission who went through the New Public Management reforms. As a result, the SSC was in charge of hiring chief
executives and evaluating them, but had no obligation to train public servants in several areas.
￿￿
of present and future ministers. (Cabinet Manual, ￿￿￿￿). During the early implementation of the
act, permanent heads of department reported issues with releasing policy written by public servants
(Galvin, ￿￿￿￿, Clark, ￿￿￿￿) that would dominate debates around the OIA among public servants.
Although there is evidence that archivists played a role in pushing for the OIA (Lambeth, ￿￿￿￿),
Archives New Zealand was not an initial big player in this RTI arena (White, ￿￿￿￿). In addition,
by several public servants’ accounts, archives in the public sector were a potential weakness for full
implementation of the law:
I suspect that we all have an uneasy consciences in respect of our record systems. ￿ey have never been
the pride and joy of our respective administrations. If these systems are inadequate for our present needs,
their inadequacy to meet the anticipated pressures of the era of open government will become dramatically
apparent. (Deputy Chairman SSC, ￿￿￿￿)
Some departmental libraries initially took on the role of receiving requests, while other sections,
traditionally linked to library services such as record management, took a more active role. Librarians
were acutely aware of two of the most significant challenges to the OIA: the Copyright Act, and the
Government Printing Oﬃce, who had serious delays in publishing material. Librarians also promoted
the idea of a disclosure log, which would record all the disclosures and could be published once a
year, but the idea never gained currency (Lambeth, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e Treasury was initially hesitant to release public information, most notably around commercial
interests and economic forecasts, which at the time were deemed secret. ￿e Treasury saw an
opportunity in the law to start publishing material that was actually useful for economic decision-
makers. As a result, the Treasury started to proactively release more information. ￿e OIA law proved
a useful tool (at least rhetorically) when the Treasury put forward the set of NPM reforms (￿e
Treasury, ￿￿￿￿), where transparency played a key role. As noted by Mulgan (￿￿￿￿):
Some departments have taken advantage of this new freedom by publishing their own recommendations.
￿is is most notably the case of the Treasury. It has been long-standing practice immediately after an
election for departments to present incoming ministers with briefing papers, setting out the functions of the
department and the main policy issues... ￿e Treasury, after the elections in ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿, took this
process a stage further by publishing their briefing papers in the form of book-length policy manifestos in a
clear attempt to influence the government. (Mulgan, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿)
Most commentators on the Act acknowledged that if the Act were to work well, it depended on
the administrative discretion of public servants (Boag, ￿￿￿￿), and it was not meant to be ‘a charter for
￿￿
whistle blowers’. In other words, information should reach the public through oﬃcial channels.
One of the most pressing anxieties for public servants in the early OIA days was the possibility of a
stampede of requests. ￿is did not materialise. Table ￿.￿ shows data from the Information Authority
from ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿:
Table ￿.￿: OIA Requests in the NZ RTI arena
Year/Requests ￿￿￿￿–￿￿ ￿￿￿￿–￿￿ ￿￿￿￿–￿￿ ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿
OIA requests ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
OIA denied re-
quests
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
OIA partially re-
leased
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
OIA condition-
ally released
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Source: [Author’s analysis based on NZ Information Authority ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿.]







Source: [Author’s calculation based NZ Information Authority ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿.]
On average, in the period ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ the denial rate was ￿￿.￿￿. ￿e numbers show a decrease in
demand as well as a decrease in denial rates by ￿￿￿￿ and are consistent with the qualitative evidence
and reports from the Information Authority that suggest initial tensions around the law and, later,
a partial adjustment on the part of the public sector. In any case, almost half of the requests were
denied. Furthermore, almost all the requests approved were partially released, which suggests that not
all the information requested was released.
￿￿Source: Information Authority (￿￿￿￿). Numbers exclude personal information requests under the same Act.
￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Refusal Rates per Department in NZ RTI arena
Organisation Requests Refusals Refusal Rates




Customs ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
Inland Revenue ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
Labour ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
Social Welfare ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
Transport ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
Total ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
Source: [Author ’s calculation based on NZ Information Authority ￿￿￿￿.]
Table ￿.￿ provides a description of the number of requests departments were receiving in ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿
and the replies they provided.￿￿
￿e numbers support evidence that, after an initial upsurge of OIA requests, departments started
to manage the process and provide more information to the public, if partially modified. Evidence
suggests that the main departments were below the average in terms of request denials.￿￿ ￿e Unit’s
statistics show that up to ￿￿￿ of the decisions to withhold information were challenged in the
Ombudsman’s oﬃce. It also showed that calls for release of information dropped from ￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿ to
￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿. In its final report, the Authority noted that public servants’ original fears
had not materialised and that there was evidence of a shift towards a more open regime.
￿ere is evidence that New Zealand public servants struggled initially to adjust to the Act. A
strategy was devised to channel requests appropriately involving senior civil servants, particularly when
denial of requests was involved (Boag, ￿￿￿￿). ￿ere were initial worries about the time-consuming
process to reply to access requests, lack of guidance on how to proceed with replies, and anxiety about
the release of policy advice to ministers. In addition, the Ombudsman reported a tendency to think
that something should not be released and then find an excuse in the Act (Laking, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e sole responsibility to release public information was in the charge of the public service, through
￿￿￿ere are limitations and errors in the data provided by the Information Authority (￿￿￿￿) in the final numbers (p.
￿￿), hence there can be discrepancies in the same report, particularly regarding the refusal rates.
￿￿However, due to the notation procedures, these numbers should be considered with caution.
￿￿
the Department’s Permanent Secretary. ￿is is to say that public servants, not politicians, were
entrusted with the responsibility of making information available. However, this posed a set of
challenges for the public service, as information released could also damage the confidence of the
minister, which in turn could aﬀect the convention of free and frank advice and impartiality of
the civil service. For instance, if policy briefs emerged showing discrepancies between a minister’s
actions and advice from public servants, then an embarrassing situation could arise. ￿e Information
Authority reported in ￿￿￿￿ that initial fears were settling and that such a situation did not happen.
However, public servants were forced to make decisions that could upset their political masters, who
might see them as disloyal. As a result, some public servants deemed it appropriate to consult with
their ministers whether to release information, a practice that, while it made sense, was not completely
agreed upon, as the minister could have ‘two bites of the cherry’.￿￿ ￿us, there could be consultations
with the ministers in order to check whether to release the information, although the responsibility
remained with the public servant. Section ￿￿ of the act also allowed for the request to be transferred
directly to a minister’s oﬃce.
Another common situation was to transfer a request to other departments. Information is or could
be available but, if it was the responsibility of another department, consultation could be a lengthy
process which would consume time, and usually led to the interaction of several oﬃces looking for
the information involved. In fact, the Ombudsman has criticised agencies approaching the transfer
process based on who had requested information. Two agencies would consult the minister on every
report coming from the media or a political opposition party (White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿)
An unusual response from the civil service would be to charge for the information, if retrieving
it seemed too expensive or costly. While this could be part of a delaying strategy, charging for
information would also be a response to ‘fishing expeditions’, large requests with no clear indication
of what information was sought. Delaying strategies such as requiring clarification, transfer of the
requests to third parties that could be aﬀected, or requesting formalities from the requesters were used
in the system, most of them using the set of exceptions provided in the Act.
￿e ultimate change of attitude is not writing down anything that could be released. As mentioned
by Keith (￿￿￿￿), during the consultation period and in the aftermath of the approval, several public
￿￿￿e expression refers to the fact that ministers would have the opportunity to express their opinion twice: when
consulted and then potentially vetoing the release of information. ￿us, public servants who had ordered the release of
public information would find themselves in a very awkward position after a ministerial veto. ￿is concern became less
relevant when the veto mechanism changed and the Cabinet had to issue an order in council (White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿).
￿￿
servants would suggest that some things might not be written down. ￿is is consistent with research
that shows a trend towards advice being tendered to ministers in a more informal way (Poot ￿￿￿￿,
Shanks, ￿￿￿￿).￿￿ As noted by Voyce (￿￿￿￿):
Ministers do not want to be haunted by a paper trail which could demonstrate that they have made
decisions contrary to the advice proﬀered by oﬃcials.
￿.￿.￿ Demanding information
Table ￿.￿ shows a partial understanding of who the requesters were in the early days. Note that
these requesters were the ones that managed to reach the Ombudsman, which supposes a degree of
commitment to get the information:
Table ￿.￿: Requests per user in the NZ RTI Arena
User/year ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿
Media ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ N/A
MPs ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
Special Interest
Groups
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Individuals ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ N/A
Private Sector ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ N/A
Not classified￿￿ ￿￿ N/A N/A ￿￿ N/A
Source: [Author’s analysis based on Ombudsman’s Oﬃce ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿.]
As noted in Chapter ￿, there are four types of requesters: expert and willing users (‘elite task forces’ ),
expert and infrequent users (‘snipers’ ), users with low expertise and frequent use (‘firing salvos’) and
users with low expertise and infrequent users (‘innocent requesters’).. As in other RTI arenas, journalists,
researchers, MPs and civil society are among the heavy users of this regulation.
￿￿￿is trend was predicted by the Danks Committee: ‘￿e requirements of openness could be evaded, for example, by
preparing and giving advice orally, or by maintaining parallel private filing systems, the record of how decisions are arrived
at would be incomplete and inaccessible...’ (p. ￿).
￿￿￿is category is not specified in the Ombudsman’s report. Only the previous categories are specified. ￿e researcher
assumes that a set of requests was not classified.
￿￿
Elite task forces and firing salvos: journalists and civil society
Journalists were in ￿￿￿￿ among the first users of the OIA, although journalists perceived the law as
not fully eﬀective. As noted also, in other RTI arenas, information is a perishable commodity and as
such, the more it is delayed the less interesting it is for journalists. In the New Zealand case, the OIA
came as a dramatic change for journalists, as what once was secret was now very much public. In the
words of a prominent journalist of the time, ‘Our top news stories, the pieces of oﬃcial paper found on
the rubbish, the governmental briefcase left in a taxi, are all going down in flames, because it’s now all part
of the service under the OIA’ (Priestly, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e quote shows how journalist feared that OIA might
reduce their privileged access to sources or leaks that they managed to get from the public service.
By its own account, the New Zealand media at the time was diverse but lacking in a significant
investigative journalist tradition that could take advantage of the new OIA. Journalists stressed that
‘they were not the enemy’, as usually they would work for the public interest, while other users of the
OIA, such as corporations and specially trained lawyers, would use it for profitmaking purposes. Some
journalists were initially dismissive of the act, describing it as ‘a political huckster trick, the same rotten
deal as the Oﬃcial Secrets Act, in a bigger, brighter and more publicly acceptable package’ (Berryman n.d.,
quoted by Atkins, ￿￿￿￿). An early study organised by journalists in ￿￿￿￿ showed a variety of responses
from public organisations in New Zealand to OIA queries. Some queries were replied to in eight days,
which in comparative terms was a good standard at the time and still is today, but journalists were
initially not satisfied.￿￿ Requests ranged from figures for public salaries to appointment procedures.
Priestley (￿￿￿￿) reports an episode where government oﬃcials (not identified as such) tried to find
out the identity and details of the requesters by visiting the house of one requester.￿￿ Journalists
kept using the law and, crucially, once information was obtained through OIA, this was properly
acknowledged in the papers, a practice that continues until today. ￿e diﬀerent range of interests and
capacities in this group in New Zealand shows that, to some degree, journalists were frequent users of
the law, but not always very eﬀective ones.
Civil society organisations gathered in the Coalition for Open Government remained influential
users of the Act after the law passed. Environmentalist groups were one of the most active. ￿e use of
the law was not merely to gather public information, but, as stated by one member of the Native
￿￿According to Priestley (￿￿￿￿), the State Services Commission drew a time limit of seven days to reply to users but this
timeframe seemed unrealistic at the time. ￿is seems to be confirmed by Boag, ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿￿e incident was related to an OIA request about an appointment to the Poultry Board, and apparently government
oﬃcials were sent to find out who was requesting the information and why.
￿￿
Forest Action Council:
‘Our need of oﬃcial information derives from our desire to participate in the striking of balances in policy
formation. We are not interested in simply being informed of what decisions the government is making for
us; rather, we are seeking to adjust the balance in those decisions by putting forward an alternative strategy’
(Salmon, ￿￿￿￿) p. ￿￿.
Salmon (￿￿￿￿) reports an improvement in the liberalisation of forest and other environmental
information after the OIA came into force. As more information became available, members of civil
society were also able to fine-tune questions and professionalise the way they requested information.
Despite the aforementioned improvement, there is evidence that departments denied the existence of
information when it actually existed and had previously been leaked to other requesters who were
not aligned with the environmentalists’ interests. Furthermore, the timing of responses was also
unsatisfactory, as it did not allow enough room for analysis and participation in several cases. In
these cases, the Forest Service would use the legal exception that the information sought ‘will be
shortly published’. Moreover, information that used to be published before the Act was then not
made available, using the new Act exemption as an excuse.
￿.￿.￿ Snipers and innocent requesters
Politicians were slow in terms of adopting the use of OIA but there is evidence of requests in the
first year of the Act looking for information that could be used to embarrass the government (Knapp
￿￿￿￿). As noted by the MP Gary Knapp in ￿￿￿￿:
￿e Oﬃcial Information Act has as much bite as a gummy sheep. So long as innumerable prohibitions
against disclosure of information are retained in other pieces of legislation, I would go as far to assert,
moreover, that this Act is of more relevance to ordinary citizens than to members of Parliament (Knapp,
￿￿￿￿).
Records in ￿￿￿￿ show that only one MP used the Act and complained to the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman, ￿￿￿￿). According to the Ombudsman’s report (￿￿￿￿), during the period ￿￿￿￿–￿￿,
opposition MPs’ requests surged from ￿￿ the previous year to ￿￿. ￿e Ombudsman noted that
‘though the Opposition was slow to take advantage of the Act it now appears to be using it increasingly
as a major means of obtaining hard information on which to base its critical role as her Majesty’s loyal
Opposition’ (Ombudsman’s Oﬃce, ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿). Parliamentarians were not among the people that
were supposed to use the law, as the lack of discussion in the Danks Committee shows (White, ￿￿￿￿
￿￿
p. ￿￿). ￿e law eventually ended up being used by MPs and even altered some conventions in New
Zealand government settings. For instance, there is evidence of the development of a constitutional
convention where the leader of the opposition would be consulted on the release of documents from
previous administrations (Schoﬀ, ￿￿￿￿).
Individuals used the OIA law with diﬀerent degrees of success. ￿ere is insuﬃcient data to describe
full use by individuals, but lawyers figured among them. Lawyers slowly took up the OIA and used
it for several purposes, most notably to access evidence in the pre-discovery stage. As a result, they
acted more like ‘snipers’ as they had extensive knowledge of the law, and usually had an idea of the
documents that they were looking for. Companies also became users of the law, but with a very narrow
focus. ￿ey also became extensive users of the law due to the restrictive climate that operated in New
Zealand’s business environment. Companies were often looking at public procurement processes or
regulations that used to be secret.
￿.￿.￿ RTI Enforcement institution in the New Zealand RTI arena
￿e Ombudsman plays a central and unique role in the New Zealand RTI arena. ￿e key role of the
Ombudsman is to protect the citizens from maladministration. ￿e Ombudsman Act ￿￿￿￿ grants the
Ombudsman powers to investigate and recommend changes where an unfair administrative procedure
is found.￿￿ As noted in Chapter ￿, enforcement institutions can be classified according to two criteria:
autonomy and enforcement capacity.
Autonomy
Table ￿.￿ summarises the information about the autonomy dimension.
￿e Ombudsman is a parliamentary oﬃcer appointed by parliament for a period of five years and
can be re-appointed for a second period. ￿e Ombudsman is appointed by a Select Committee of the
parliament where all parties should agree on the person to appoint. ￿ere is an extensive screening
process where parties engage in several consultations chaired by the Speaker of the House. ￿e
consensual aspect of this process guarantees the Ombudsman independence and legitimacy. However,
the process is not open to public scrutiny and civil society members do not have a say in terms of who
they select as Ombudsman. Traditionally, the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce has at least two Ombudsmen,






Process regulated involving all parties in New Zealand
￿e Parliament appoints the Oﬃcer
Stability Appointment is regularly performed
Oversight An Ombudsman decision could be vetoed by the Executive
Resources ￿e budget is allocated in consultation with the Ombudsman
Perception No oﬃcial survey available.
one of whom takes the leading role as Chief Ombudsman. Furthermore, this Committee also is in
charge of setting the budget the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce should have in consultation with that oﬃce.
Once elected, the Ombudsman has to report to Parliament every year, but is independent in terms
of the function he/she performs. ￿e Ombudsman is also independent of the Courts and his/her
decisions are not subject to judicial review. Independence from other institutions was won through
several challenges during the Ombudsman’s history. In terms of the OIA, the government tried to
diminish the Ombudsman’s independence by challenging the Oﬃce’s decision in court. ￿e Danks
Committee had not foreseen the involvement of the courts in access to information issues. ￿is logic
made sense in the context of the New Zealand governance system: the executive is accountable to the
people, not to the courts. Unlike other settings, such as the United States of America, the courts in
New Zealand cannot strike down legislation and are seldom involved in mediating constitutional
disputes. In the case Wyatt Co Ltd v Queensland Lakes District Council [￿￿￿￿] ￿ NZLR ￿￿￿, Judge
Jeﬀries observed that:
￿e allegations of errors, unreasonableness and failure to take into account relevant matters are attacks
on the several judgments the Chief Ombudsman had to make in the functions ordained for him by the Act.
￿at Act requires him to exercise his judgment using experience and accumulated knowledge which are
his by virtue of the oﬃce he holds. Parliament delegated to the... Ombudsman tasks, which at times are
complex and even agonising, with no expectation that the Courts would sit on his shoulder about those
judgments which are essentially balancing exercises involving competing interests. ￿e Courts will only
intervene when the... Ombudsman is plainly and demonstrably wrong, and not because he preferred one
￿￿
side against another. (Wyatt Co Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council.￿￿￿￿)￿￿
In this way, as predicted by the Danks Committee, the courts deferred to the Ombudsman, and
to date no Ombudsman’s decision has been challenged in court. ￿e early decision of the Danks
Committee plus the reassurance that the courts would not intervene gave the arena predictability and
clearly established the conflict resolution system. ￿e decisions operated as a reinforcement of the
role of the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce and its independence.
In the context of the OIA (￿￿￿￿), the Ombudsman could only be overruled by the ministerial veto.
￿is could be exercised by the minister and had to be recorded in writing and sent to Parliament, as
well as being properly justified (Williams, ￿￿￿￿). ￿us, ministerial veto was to some degree limited
but its existence made the ministers oﬃcially the ultimate information gatekeeper. In the first six
months of the act, the Ombudsman received ￿￿￿ requests for investigation under review and four of
his recommendations were vetoed by ministers. Most of these requests were resolved informally by
the Ombudsman (Watson, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e veto was then used by ministers in the early days of the OIA. In the period from ￿￿￿￿ to
￿￿￿￿, the Ombudsman issued ￿￿ recommendations and the ministers exercised vetoes ￿￿ times (Law
Commission, ￿￿￿￿). According to Hazell (￿￿￿￿), eight vetoes occurred under Muldoon. Vetoed
information also included the combined electoral roll (sought by a debt recovery company), an
evaluation report on computers in schools (sought by the Post-Primary Teachers’ Association), a
proposal to set up an investment bank, the price of wall plugs purchased by the Post Oﬃce, and a
geothermal report (sought by a mining company).
Vetoes were not initially linked to the political importance of the request. A good example comes
from education policy documents on fairly simple cases that were not released by the relevant minister
challenging the Ombudsman’s authority (Kelly, ￿￿￿￿). Another example was the opposition by the
Ministry of Labour to releasing estimates of unregistered unemployed. ￿e exception of breaching
‘constitutional conventions’ was usually used for not releasing such information, with statements such
as ‘opinions of departmental oﬃcials on unregistered unemployment could well be at variance with those
of the Government’ (Ministry of Labour, ￿￿￿￿). Some legal scholars suggested that this kind of veto
could be challenged in court, but this did not materialise (Baragwanath, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿According to Chen (￿￿￿￿) this decision was later sustained in several court decisions and has been further considered
in Rangitikei District Ratepayers Association Inc v Rangitikei District Council HCWanganui CP￿￿/￿￿ ￿￿ September ￿￿￿￿,
and was referred to in Sanford Ltd v Minister of Fisheries HC Wellington CP￿￿￿/￿￿, ￿￿ October ￿￿￿￿ and Television
New Zealand v Ombudsman [￿￿￿￿] ￿ NZLR ￿￿￿ (HC).
￿￿
A decision to veto an ombudsman’s recommendation was not taken lightly but, in the words of
former Prime Minister Muldoon, politicians were willing to use them:
While on this occasion I am prepared to agree with the decision of the Ombudsman being carried out, it
nevertheless, as the reserve bank directors pointed out, breaches the principle of confidentiality of it, and
whereas as leader of the government, which introduced and passed the OIA, I would be reluctant to override
the decision of the Ombudsman, I consider as a general rule that departmental advice is more important
than the curiosity of the journalists and on a future occasion my decision is likely to be diﬀerent. (Muldoon,
￿￿￿￿)
Enforcement capacity
Table ￿.￿ shows the enforcement capacity of the New Zealand Ombudsman’s Oﬃce.
Table ￿.￿: Enforcement Capacity
Dimension Indicator
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of review pro-
cesses
full access to documents.
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of enforcement
practices
Non-binding initially but enforceable.
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of imposing
sanctions?
No sanctions
Resources (staﬀ, budget, capacities) to carry out the
assigned tasks
Lack of adequate staﬀ (Ombudsman
Reports ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿)
Service delivery Existence of minor backlogs.
Decisions or sanctions eﬀectively applied? ￿￿ vetoes out of ￿￿ recommendations.
￿e Ombudsman had inquiry powers which, according to the Ombudsman Act, allowed this
institution to access files and get information from other public oﬃces. ￿is was (and is) one of the
cornerstones where the Ombudsman’s power lies in the New Zealand RTI arena. ￿e Ombudsman
can issue non-binding recommendations that the government should follow. ￿e Ombudsman cannot
impose sanctions on the civil service; nevertheless, an Ombudsman’s recommendation or a report to
Parliament can be considered a sanction. Reports are not taken lightly by the Civil Service. Formally,
twenty-one days after a recommendation is issued, it becomes public duty and is then enforceable by
the Solicitor-General. ￿e Ombudsman welcomed this new role, noting it was diﬀerent but related
￿￿
to its functions:
I am not, under the Oﬃcial Information Act, deciding whether a departmental decision or action
is unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or wrong. I am called upon to decide, much as a court would
do, whether the department or organisation has, first, interpreted correctly the provisions of the Act and,
secondly, provided an adequate justification of its decision to withhold information. (Laking, ￿￿￿￿)
Inquiry powers were also part of a dispute with the government. In the Ombudsman v the Police
(￿￿￿￿), the Judiciary stated that:
￿e provisions of the Ombudsman Act apply (S. ￿￿ of the Oﬃcial Information Act), and under SS.
￿￿ and ￿￿ they are given wide powers of inquiry and are not confined to the material put before them by
those immediately involved. In the nature of things he who alleges that good reason exists for withholding
information would be expected to bring forward material to support that proposition. But the review is
to be conducted and the decision and recommendations made without any presumptions other than those
specified in the Act.
At the time of the OIA approval, the Ombudsman was an eﬀective institution, as around ￿￿￿￿
complaints would come to the Ombudsman for several reasons and most would be processed on
time. Furthermore, the fact that the Government rarely challenged its (non-binding) advice was also
a matter of great importance in terms of the Ombudsman’s eﬀectiveness (Laking, ￿￿￿￿). When the
OIA was approved, the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce coped with new activity which aﬀected its capability.
Table ￿.￿ provides a picture of the workload the Ombudsman faced in those early time:
Table ￿.￿: Ombudsman’s Oﬃce Workload
Number of Requests
received/ Years
￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿†
*￿is figure is an approximation taken from the Ombudsman’s report produced in ￿￿￿￿. Initial reports
ran from March to March, but eventually the series was discontinued and ran from June to June. ￿e ￿￿￿￿
Ombudsman’s report shows a graphic which does not specify the exact number for the period but would be a
reasonable estimate.
† Data coming from Ombudsman’s Report (￿￿￿￿). Increase due to Local Government Oﬃcial Information
Act.
Source: [Ombudsman’s Oﬃce ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿]
￿e Ombudsman statistics provide a clear picture of the issues in the New Zealand RTI arena in
terms of resolving OIA requests:
As noted, the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce dealt with more work and carried an annual backlog of
￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Types of claim presented to the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce
Review cause/year ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿
Refusals ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Corrections ￿￿ ￿ ￿ N/A
Deletions ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Charges ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
Transfers ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Source: [Ombudsman’s Oﬃce ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿]
unresolved cases. In several reports, the oﬃce noted that an increased budget was needed to carry out
the new functions.
Table ￿.￿￿: Classification of Outcomes




￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Sustained ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿*
Not sustained ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Declined ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
Not pur-
sued/Discontinued
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
Under Investigation ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
* ￿￿ recommendations made.
Source: [Ombudsman’s Oﬃce ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿]
￿e process to challenge an authority not complying with the OIA was fairly simple: the com-
plainant would go to the Ombudsman and then the Ombudsman would notify the agency involved.
￿e Ombudsman would then conduct an inquiry, requesting all the relevant documents and rec-
ommend disclosure of those that seemed relevant to the claimant. Recommendations from the
Ombudsman are not mandatory, but are rarely ignored due to the moral weight they carry. Recom-
mendations are supposed to be implemented after ￿￿ days, as the government has a duty to observe
￿￿￿
and implement them.￿￿
Numbers provided by the Oﬃcial Information Authority showed that calls for release from the
Ombudsman diminished from ￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿, to ￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿ and to ￿￿ in ￿￿￿￿. Some of theOmbudsman’s
work was behind the scenes, dealing with public agencies before issuing formal recommendations,
a practice that remains until today (White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). ￿e interplay between the ministers and
the Ombudsman was then an essential feature of the final stage of releasing public information. ￿is
tension between an Ombudsman with no formal powers and the political powers is indeed one of the
fluid limits of New Zealand’s transparency environment. ￿e successive testing of this limits led to a
series of reforms limiting the power of the politicians and ensuring the Ombudsman’s independence,
which in turn ensured more transparency and more sophistication in New Zealand’s RTI arena
￿e leadership of the Oﬃce is also important in terms of how the enforcement works. ￿is is
obviously an attribute diﬃcult to measure. ￿e approach by the first Ombudsman in charge, Sir
George Laking, was, according to colleagues, essential to combine the requirements of the OIA and
the function of the Ombudsman (White, ￿￿￿￿; Belgrave, ￿￿￿￿). As a result, a personal factor in
terms of the leadership of the Oﬃce can be considered important in the evolution of New Zealand’s
RTI arena. Each Ombudsman brought a set of skills and priorities that would shape the oﬃce’s
development.
￿e above description of this enforcement institution shows that it is an able and independent
institution which fits into the category of ‘Knight Templar’ presented in Chapter ￿.
￿.￿ ￿ʜ￿ ￿￿￿ʟ￿￿ɪ￿ɴ ￿￿ ￿ʜ￿ ɴ￿￿ ￿￿￿ʟ￿ɴ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
New Zealand has now had ￿￿ years of experience with RTI and provides evidence to strengthen the
core argument of this thesis: that the influence of early decisions aﬀects how a RTI arena evolves. As
noted in Chapter ￿, arenas experience feedback loops which reinforce (or potentially change) the
way they work. In this section, I point to a set of significant feedback loops the New Zealand arena
experienced aﬀecting scope, processes and the role of information enforcement institutions.￿￿ It
should be noted that from a macro perspective, the arena was aﬀected by three major factors: the
New Public Management reforms, the Electoral Reforms and the rise of technology. Even with the
impact of these major factors, the arena evolved to strengthen the enforcement institution, include
￿￿￿is duty was potentially enforceable by the courts, though I have found no actual evidence of this.
￿￿Note that it is impossible to provide a full assessment of the New Zealand experience. For a full review, White (￿￿￿￿)
and the Special Commission reports (￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿) provide an in-depth view of the experience.
￿￿￿




In ￿￿￿￿, New Zealand passed a significant reform of the OIA and passed the Local Government
Oﬃcial Information and Meetings Act (LGOIMA).￿e feedback loop was triggered by the need
to review the OIA as originally agreed and planned by the Danks Committee. ￿is opened a major
opportunity for reform in terms of scope and procedures. ￿e logic for this change was that the
experience with the OIA had proven valuable at a national level but that local governments were
not included. ￿is, in eﬀect, enhanced the principle that all information should be public in New
Zealand.
In terms of the scope of the Act, after lengthy debates it was extended to include the SOEs and their
subsidiaries. According to SOEs, the OIA caused severe ineﬃciencies and put them at a disadvantage
with other possible commercial competitors. ￿e general argument from an SOE perspective was
that several report mechanisms already in place to the shareholders’ assembly and ministers was
enough in terms of accountability. Although SOEs acknowledged the importance of being ‘open’,
they maintained that this did not mean they should be subject to the OIA (Allen, ￿￿￿￿, Bauman,
￿￿￿￿). However, in ￿￿￿￿, up to ￿￿modifications were made to the diﬀerent acts to provide a coherent
framework (Donnelly, ￿￿￿￿). Among other tools to avoid the OIA, SOEs would try to include
commercial confidentiality clauses in contracts with providers, a practice that to the Courts seemed
unacceptable.￿￿ SOEs remained subject to the Act and to the public interest test. Some SOEs
competing in the market were in a better position to not disclose information, while others with
regulatory and social functions were under more pressure to release information. (Donnelly, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e Committee specially set up in ￿￿￿￿ to study the situation found that the benefits of having SOEs
subject to the OIA outweighed the possible cost of administration (White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). SOEs are a
source of conflict in several arenas, and New Zealand is not the exception. ￿e battle about the scope
of OIA continues until today where the Ombudsman has mentioned a strong tendency on the part
of new SOEs and public sector bodies to escape from Ombudsman control (Ombudsman, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿In the case Wyatt Company (Ltd) v Queensland Lakes District Council, Justice Jeﬀries stated, ‘￿ere cannot be
allowed to develop in this country a kind of commercial Alsace beyond the reach of the statute’.
In terms of procedure, in ￿￿￿￿ a new regulation ensured that twenty working days was the time
limit for answering OIA requests.￿￿ Previously, the law had not established a time frame in the hope
that Government units would self-regulate. Conflicts about delays prompted its inclusion.
In terms of implementation, the disbandment of the Information Authority in ￿￿￿￿ proved to be an
important blow to the system, with two specific results: the lack of specific and standardized training
for civil servants, as well as the loss of central guidance in terms of answering access-to-information
requests. ￿is would lead to a fragmentation of approaches towards OIA, a tendency that would
be reinforced by the NPM logic which encouraged freedom to manage in each department. Special
Commission reports in ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ mentioned the need for central coordination in terms of
supervision and advice about OIA for civil servants.
In terms of the powers to withhold information, in ￿￿￿￿ the ministerial veto was replaced by
a collective veto by Order in Council. ￿e change made vetoing an Ombudsman’s decision more
diﬃcult, as it required every minister in a cabinet to agree. In the context of the current electoral
system, cabinet ministers could be from diﬀerent parties, making vetoes extremely unlikely.
￿e ￿￿￿￿ Privacy Reform
Another major change was the approval of the Privacy Act, and the Privacy Commissioner, in charge
of dealing with requests for personal information that were initially covered under the OIA Act,
and were later covered by the Privacy Act. ￿e reform eﬀectively separated the streams of work
related to public information and private information and set up a special agency to deal with private
information, relieving the Ombudsman of this duty and setting up boundaries in terms of how the
public sector operates with public and private information.
￿e public duty issue
In ￿￿￿￿, the Ombudsman encountered the first non-compliance case when a school principal refused
to release documents demanded by school parents. ￿e Ombudsman had ordered the release of
this information and the school principal decided not to follow the Ombudsman’s order, eﬀectively
challenging the obligation to fulfil a public duty. New Zealand does not have a solution for this (very
rare) kind of behaviour and, at the time, the Ombudsman invited the Solicitor-General to eﬀectively
￿￿￿e Law Commission (￿￿￿￿) recommended reducing the time limit to fifteen days, although eventually this was not
implemented.
￿￿￿
enforce its decision. ￿e point is not minor: New Zealand’s Ombudsman’s power is based in terms of
legitimacy and persuasion and if agencies do not follow its recommendations, this is a major issue.
Since then, the issue has resurfaced in discussions and a recent review of the law (NZLC, ￿￿￿￿)
suggested establishing this duty clearly in legislation.
￿e Oﬃcial Information Amendment Act ￿￿￿￿
In ￿￿￿￿, a set of reforms addressed the issue of large requests (or fishing expeditions) and lack of
resources for agencies. In cases where public servants are required to collect substantial quantities of
information, they are allowed to charge for information or to extend the time to answer the request.
It also established a consultation procedure with the requesters.
￿e reform also expanded the proactive information duties of the Ministry of Justice, ordering the
publication of more information on line, partially addressing technological change and the rise of the
internet. Furthermore, the reform also included airport companies where the government had more
than ￿￿￿ of control, eﬀectively adding more SOEs to the scope of the Act.
Finally, the reform formalised a previous practice by the Ombudsman of accepting verbal complaints
and asserted their validity, but specified that they should be documented.
￿e Public Records Act: ￿￿￿￿
Technology also played a significant and radical change in terms of the OIA environment in New
Zealand, particularly with the arrival of e-mail. ￿e tendency to use e-mail means more information
which needs to be collated demanding more work and resources. (Ombudsman’s Report, ￿￿￿￿). As
one requester noted, in ￿￿￿￿ there were clerical workers making sure that everything was in order. By
￿￿￿￿, with the major changes in public management and technology , it was becoming increasingly
diﬃcult to access records (Hager, ￿￿￿￿). Managers in several areas also expressed concerns that, with
the introduction of the Public Records Act, there would be trouble such as ‘Files are in disarray, there
is stuﬀ in electronic records, stuﬀ in papers and the two don’t match up sometimes’ (White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿￿).
In ￿￿￿￿, New Zealand passed a major act on public records which eﬀectively determined which
records are to be kept and which records can be disposed of. Record-keeping became an important
activity and the situation in ￿￿￿￿ showed that there were reasonable systems in place but the challenge
of electronic information was not yet being handled appropriately. As White points out, Archives
New Zealand is providing guidance on the underpinning information structure of the government
￿￿￿
or, to put it simply, ‘it is not possible to release information that cannot be found or has not been kept’
(White, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿).
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿: ￿￿ɴ￿ʜɪɴ￿ ￿￿ ɪ￿￿ ʙ￿￿￿, ʏ￿￿ ￿ ʟ￿ɴɢ ￿ʜɪ￿￿ ￿ʟ￿￿￿
In terms of outputs, New Zealand corresponds to what I defined as a functional arena. Table ￿.￿￿
shows a synthesis according to the definition presented in Chapter ￿
Table ￿.￿￿: outputs of NZ RTI arena
Availability of public information on a proactive
basis
Progressively available in all organisations by
￿￿￿￿
Eﬃciency in dealing with RTI requests Bureaucracy adjusted and by ￿￿￿￿ requests were
handled within an average of ￿￿ working days
Accessibility and eﬀectiveness to resolve disputes System in place was accessible and eﬀective. Om-
budsman’s Oﬃce does not charge for services
and cases were resolved within reasonable time-
frames (Ombudsman’s Oﬃce, ￿￿￿￿)
Source: [Author’s analysis based on Information Authority, ￿￿￿￿, Ombudsman’s Oﬃce, ￿￿￿￿]
New Zealand passed a significant reform that has endured more than ￿￿ years. It went from being ‘a
nine-day wonder’ to becoming a significant part of the New Zealand government system that endured
two major changes, the NPM reforms and electoral changes. ￿ere are three factors that explain what
led New Zealand to adopt such a reform: the policymaking process, the level of professionalization of
the New Zealand bureaucracy and the previous institutions in place.
In terms of policymaking process, New Zealand developed a robust process in which there was
a great detail of analysis of other experiences but which was largely focused on its own problems.
￿e process then was largely endogenous and driven by local interests from civil society and, up to a
point, from a group of public servants. ￿e public service took part extensively in this process (and
was heavily criticised for doing so) and some of its key leaders participated actively in the Danks
Committee.
However, in a country with a strong tradition of Weberian bureaucracy, a fair question to ask is:
why would a group of public servants want a RTI arena? Furthermore, once the law was approved
and passed, why would the civil service comply reasonably well with such regulation? A partial answer
to the pivotal role the civil service played in this regulation is the desire for change by a small minority
￿￿￿
of leaders. ￿e New Zealand Civil Service was deeply aﬀected by secrecy regulations, but also showed
signs of resistance once discussions about the OIA started. In other words, it was one thing was to get
rid of the ￿￿￿￿ Oﬃcial Secrets Information Act but a very diﬀerent one to set openness by default.
￿is shift was only envisioned by a few individuals working in civil society as well as on the Danks
Committee. ￿e ideas behind this group of people as well as the early defenders and members of
the Ombudsman’s oﬃce were a sign of New Zealanders’ liberal outlook on rights and guarantees for
individuals. ￿is led to (at least partial) ownership by the public service, some politicians and sections
of the civil society.￿￿
￿e level of participation led to the establishment of a policy community that played a significant
role when feedback loops emerged. Subsequently, the New Zealand regime improved, extending its
scope as well as limiting the power of the executive. ￿e policy community remained influential in
terms of generating ideas and through several reviews, seminars and policy forums. In this way, a
tight community of practice was set up. ￿e disbandment of the Information Authority meant that
New Zealand lost an important reference for this policy community. Without an authority in charge
of collecting information and reporting on the OIA, the arena lost an important function that would
lead to implementation issues in the following years.
￿e second important factor that explains how this arena operates is the professionalism of the
New Zealand bureaucracy. New Zealand had at the time a politically neutral civil service. ￿e civil
service got hit by implementation issues such as time-consuming requests, the need to manage media
and ministerial relations, as well as the possibility of being exposed to the public. On the other
hand, it also gained some control over the Act. ￿e decision to release public information is still
under the control of the Chief Executive, and not in the hands of the politicians. ￿is factor cannot
be emphasized strongly enough: the civil service operated as a counterbalance to political interests
when making decisions about disclosing or not disclosing public information. Even after the NPM
reforms, which were supposed to drive a more politically responsive service, public servants remained
committed to follow procedures as a distinctive mark of their trade. An example of this is the account
of a public servant, dealing with an Ombudsman investigation, telling the Ombudsman’s oﬃce that
she was unable to comply because the relevant papers were in the minister’s oﬃce. ￿e Ombudsman’s
￿￿New Zealand in ￿￿￿￿ was in a complex situation where other forces were also showing discontent with the high
level of regulation. A small group of people were already on the march to reform New Zealand economy and governance,
something they would achieve a few years later (Reardon and Lay, ￿￿￿￿). Was the OIA a prelude of more substantial
changes to come? ￿is is not necessarily the case. Many of these individuals were not directly linked to the issue, but it was
a sign that something had to change in the way government worked in New Zealand.
￿￿￿
oﬃce directed the public servant to fetch them as it was the only lawful solution. She crossed the
street, went to the minister’s oﬃce, fetched them, and eventually released the information. ￿e public
servant in question is today the National Auditor (Donnelly, ￿￿￿￿). A law designed to expose the
potential failings of the machinery of government needs the same machinery to actually perform
eﬀectively. As the civil service in New Zealand still constitutes quite a distinct group with a certain
degree of autonomy, their participation in the design and implementation of the law was one of the
defining reasons why it works somewhat better than in other settings.
￿e OIA Act was designed to expose the work of the machinery of government, which in turn
meant the end of anonymity for public servants. To some degree, the decision to change the status
quo came from the public service, as several of its members advocated directly or indirectly for the
OIA, and took a dominant role in the design and implementation of the law. ￿e words of Mark
Prebble, former State Service Commissioner and an influential public servant in New Zealand are
eloquent about the role of OIA: ‘My view, formed of close experience with the Act is that the OIA remains
eﬀective and relevant...it has been the most significant and valuable reform that has aﬀected the public
service during my career’ (Prebble, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e third factor that explains the endurance of this Act are previous institutions in place: the
Ombudsman. ￿e existence of an Ombudsman since ￿￿￿￿was essential in leading towards an eﬀective
implementation of the law. ￿e logic behind the creation of an Ombudsman was very similar to the
logic behind the OIA, as both instruments are, after all, horizontal accountability tools; they were a
reaction against too much power placed in the executive. ￿e fact that the Ombudsman managed to
secure legitimacy and was already an established part of the New Zealand landscape was essential to
embed OIA practices.
￿is is to say that before the OIA, the Ombudsman was already playing a significant role in NZ
governance, already earning the trust of the public through appropriate interventions, as well as
respect in the public service due to the appropriate and proportionate dealing with public aﬀairs.
￿us, the existence of an embedded institution willing to take up the responsibility and also with the
resources and power to stand up to the political system largely determined the success of the policy.
￿e three distinctive notes of the oﬃce that made it eﬀective according to one of the Ombudsmen
was flexibility, credibility and independence (Laking, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e flexible approach of the Ombudsman, while creating uncertainty about what were the exact
rules of the game, also created room tomanoeuvre for requesters and public servants. ￿e Ombudsman
￿￿￿
Oﬃce is more flexible than the Courts. In this way, the Ombudsman secured a niche among other
horizontal accountability institutions, carefully avoiding turf wars.
￿ere is also a matter of agency. Successive leaders of the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce became really
important in terms of ‘disarming’ initial fears from the bureaucracy as well as balancing competing
interests. To some degree, New Zealand institutions are not overly dependent on the persons in
charge of them, but in this case, who is in charge does matter. It is through the combination of
these factors that one can understand the paradox of a ‘toothless enforcement institution’ whose
recommendations are followed by most of the actors in this arena. Notwithstanding a few exceptions,
most of the Ombudsman’s recommendations are followed.
While originally ministers could veto the release of information, the evolution led towards the need
of an Executive Order in Council to block the release of information. ￿is kind of order has never
been used, and under the current electoral system where coalitions are essential to maintain power, it
is highly unlikely that it will happen. Politicians of all parties also have an incentive to keep the system
working as they have access to a source of valuable information with which a government can be kept
in check. ￿us, while the OIA remains a constant hurdle for the political system, it has a reinforcing
logic behind it, as the political system is also in need of a fair arbiter that is able to sort out diﬀerences
in an acceptable and legitimate way. In this way, the role of the Ombudsman in New Zealand has
evolved from an administrative arbiter to a political arbiter in certain situations, as the more politicians
use the OIA, the more the Ombudsman is exposed to political conflicts, thus feeding this evolution.
Where politics are involved in a request, a diﬀerent set of rules applies: an impartial enforcement
institution that secures fair play, which in this case is the Ombudsman. ￿is shows how far the
Ombudsman has come since ￿￿￿￿ in the New Zealand governmental environment. Initially conceived
as an administrative tribunal, the Ombudsman was supposed to deal with maladministration practices,
which were largely about implementation of public policies aﬀecting the average New Zealander. It
was almost a more flexible administrative tribunal (Lundvik, ￿￿￿￿). By ￿￿￿￿ and largely due to the
regulation imposed by the OIA, the Ombudsman is now an agency which deals with complex policy
issues, which shows an expansion and increased complexity of its traditional role.
Power struggles are an integral part of the New Zealand arena. Because of the way the reform
emerged and the institutions in place, the battle is always at the margins, in sophisticated ways rather
than in more radical approaches. ￿e OIA is now a full, integral part of the New Zealand governance
system. ￿is is the result of a well-informed policymaking process, which ensured the involvement
￿￿￿
of key actors. It is also the result of previous strong institutions being able to deal with enforcing
RTI (the Ombudsman) and being able to process requests (the New Zealand bureaucracy). New
Zealand’s OIA has survived the test of time and is part of the constitutional landscape, but it’s use
keep generating controversies in this polity.
￿￿￿
￿
ACCESS TO PUBL IC INFORMATION IN CHILE : A
MIXED ARENA
Have you heard about it? What? It is the new
access-to-information law. ￿ey can access everything we have.
(Long silence) ...Oh Boy... (Overheard conversation in Santiago
airport between two public servants)
’El puente vale callampa’
’￿e bridge isn’t worth a crap’
‘In the future, the armed forces will be reluctant to collaborate
with civilian authorities when facing natural catastrophes, due to
being forced to display their war material or military equipment’
(Chilean Minister of Defence, using a colloquial Spanish
expression to avoid releasing information about the cost of a
bridge. He resigned over the incident.)
In ￿￿￿￿, an Argentinian student decided to ask the Chilean government who the lawyers rep-
resenting Chile were and how much they were charging in fees for a trial before the International
Court of Justice. ￿e trial was to decide a long-contested territorial limit between Chile and Peru
and was of obvious national importance. Amidst accusations of espionage and strong vocal opinions
about letting an Argentinian ask for information in Chile, the government swiftly denied access to
documents under the excuse of national security and international relations. ￿e student challenged
￿￿￿
this decision before the Council for Transparency, who eventually decided to order the release of the
names of the litigating lawyers and details of their fees. ￿e Council’s decision was challenged in the
courts and, while the Higher Tribunal acknowledged the Council’s decision as correct, the Supreme
Court decided in favour of the government, noting that only the President of the Republic was able
to consider and order the release of this information (Supreme Court of Justice, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e above case shows the diﬀerent dynamics the Chilean RTI arena can oﬀer. Obtaining public
information is not necessarily straightforward and can trigger several complex processes. In this
chapter, I explore how the Chilean RTI arena emerged and its main characteristics. First, I focus
on why Chilean authorities adopted a RTI law, noting it was a reaction to internal pressures, where
exogenous factors had a significant eﬀect in terms of policy design. ￿en I describe the main elements
of the Chilean RTI arena: the RTI law, the state, the enforcement institutions and the requesters. I
conclude by arguing that, while Chile has strong regulation and relatively independent enforcement
institutions, RTI institutions are not still fully grounded.
￿.￿ ￿￿ɴ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿ʏ ɪɴ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿ɪ￿ɪ￿ɴ
Chile regained democracy in ￿￿￿￿ when Augusto Pinochet’s infamous dictatorship finally ended.
Pinochet left a democracy under tutelage (Gonzalez, ￿￿￿￿). Politicians were wary and cautious when
dealing with the military. Chilean activists found support in the international community to make
inroads into Chile’s democratic, yet authoritarian regime.￿￿
Chilean civic liberties struggles oﬀered an ideal battlefield for lawyers. As one participant recalls:
‘￿ere was a division: conservative lawyers vs. progressive lawyers, all were organised and from diﬀerent
universities, but the matter was always debated among lawyers’ (IECH￿).
￿e courts provided a significant source of stability for the newly arrived Chilean democracy but
were also a source of conservatism in terms of new rights. In other words:
￿e Chilean courts have long been highly professionalized and institutionalized. Yet they did little to
￿￿For instance, in ￿￿￿￿ Chilean dictatorial authorities outlawed the exhibition of the film ‘￿e Last Temptation of Christ’.
￿e film was controversial due to several passages that were not in line with the gospels, depicting a more human Christ. In
￿￿￿￿, the film was finally allowed to be shown but a group of conservative lawyers successfully introduced an injunction to
stop this. As a reaction, a group of progressive lawyers took the case to the Inter-American Court of Justice (IACJ) where,
after a lengthy process, the Chilean government was ordered to remove censorship obstacles to the exhibition of films
(Olmedo Bustos y Otros c/Chile). ￿e government had to abide by the classical liberal mandate: freedom of expression
without censorship. ￿e IACJ intervention was not a coincidence as in ￿￿￿￿, with democracy regained, Chile had become
a signatory of the Inter-American Covenant of Human Rights. ￿e international regime proved influential in fostering
civic liberties.
￿￿￿
restrain the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. Nor did they play much of a role in democratization, with
the exception of a single decision of the Constitutional Tribunal that decreed that Pinochet had to hold the
election he ultimately lost. ￿e Chilean judges had internalized an ideology of ‘apoliticism’ along with a
hierarchical, self-reproducing institutional structure that rendered judges unequipped and disinclined to
take stands in defence of liberal democratic principles before, during, or after the authoritarian interlude.
(Ginsburg, ￿￿￿￿)
In this scenario of judicial conservatism and division among legal elites, a set of events triggered a
significant RTI reform.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e ‘window of opportunity’ for RTI in Chile
Events triggering RTI reform: corruption scandals and international pressure
In ￿￿￿￿, an American company presented to the Chilean Government an investment project to buy
a significant amount of land in Tierra del Fuego, a southern province of Chile. Environmentalists
resisted the investment project, noting the damage it would cause to native forests.￿￿ While initially
successful in stopping the project, a new version was approved by the Foreign Investment Committee.
Fundacion Terram, NGO Forja and the MP Longthon submitted a request for access to all the
information regarding the approval of the project. Some information was released, but the most
relevant was kept back by the Administration. Furthermore, the state never justified the reasons
for withholding information. Activists decided to push through the courts to get the documents.
Procedures were unsuccessful, as activists expected them to be (IECH￿). Finally it was decided to
take the case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, an international human rights
organisation in the context of the Organisation of American States. As noted, Chile had now the
option of accessing these institutions and several activists were willing to test this.
￿e Commission stage is mandatory and happens before a trial before the Inter-American Court
of Justice. In this context, access-to-information activists saw an opportunity to advance their legal
cause:
￿e cause was instrumental to our purposes. Of course we wanted to help the environmentalists group but
we also saw a major chance to improve Chilean institutions... We had a clear expectation: to validate some
of the arguments that were made by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and to contribute to
￿￿￿e project was presented by Cetec Engineering Company Inc. and the project was called Rio Condor. Trillium was
the company that finally got the exploitation rights after several contract concessions.
￿￿￿
this right globally. (IECH￿)
￿e case was presented in ￿￿￿￿ and admitted before the Inter-American Court of Justice in ￿￿￿￿.
￿e case received support from regional and international organisations in the form of ‘amici curiae’
(written depositions) before the Commission and later before the Court.￿￿ According to the Court:
￿e Commission stated that this refusal occurred without the state ‘providing any valid justification under
Chilean law’ and, supposedly, they ‘were not granted an eﬀective judicial remedy to contest a violation of the
right of access to information’; in addition, they ‘were not ensured the rights of access to information and to
judicial protection, and there were no mechanisms guaranteeing the right of access to public information.
(IACJ, ￿￿￿￿, p.￿)
￿e Commission provided recommendations which the Chilean government did not fully comply
with.￿￿ As noted by one of the witnesses in the trial before the Inter-American Court of Justice: ‘From
￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿, administrative practices were implemented that favoured the confidentiality and secrecy of
administrative acts, documents and background material. ￿ese practices were based on the Secrecy or
Confidentiality Regulations created by Supreme Decree No. ￿￿ of the Ministry-General Secretariat of the
Presidency. ￿e Regulations transcended the framework of normative jurisdiction, increased the grounds for
refusing information, and gave rise to the announcement of some one hundred decisions by the body of the
Administration that transformed secrecy and confidentiality into ‘the general rule, impairing the principles
of transparency and disclosure’. Another obstacle was the limited and insuﬃcient judicial protection arising
from the special amparo (protection) remedy established in the Administrative Probity Act which, far from
strengthening the principle of disclosure and access to information, has resulted in departmental heads
choosing to ‘wait for a judicial decision’, which also provides little protection to applicants’ (IACJ, ￿￿￿￿ p.
￿). In the meantime, activists led by Fundación Pro Acceso, supported in particular by the Open
Society Foundations, continued a strong campaign of strategic litigation in the local courts.
￿e above-mentioned practices were an insuﬃcient response to civil society demands. It created the
basis for a RTI arena, but showed severe resistance in the public service. In other words, it established
the basis for a very basic RTI arena but with no clear framework. As President Lagos’ term advanced,
a new political constitution was drafted and approved, dealing mostly with Pinochet’s legacy. ￿e
reform included a particular clause in the Constitution which established that all secret or confidential
information should be declared so by law and by a special majority in the Legislative.￿￿
￿￿According to the procedures of the Inter-American Court of Justice, a case first needs to go through the Commission
of Human Rights, which later has to recommend the case to go before the Court.
￿￿￿e government finally released all the information in the hearing before the Commission.
￿￿￿e article was very similar to a recommendation of the Commission for Public Ethics established by Eduardo Frei in
￿￿￿
In ￿￿￿￿, after lengthy international litigation, the Chilean state was ordered to release the informa-
tion and, in more general terms, to guarantee access to information in Chile. In the particular case,
the court ordered the release of information regarding the project or a full explanation of the reasons
for denying it (p. ￿￿￿). Crucially, the Court ordered that:
...Chile must adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the protection of the right of access to state-held
information, and these should include a guarantee of the eﬀectiveness of an appropriate administrative
procedure for processing and deciding requests for information, which establishes time limits for taking a
decision and providing information, and which is administered by duly-trained oﬃcials. (IACJ, ￿￿￿￿ p.
￿￿￿)
￿e IACJ decision was the final stage in a long march towards an access-to-information regulation.
A second set of intertwined events also promoted the advancement of the RTI agenda. Since ￿￿￿￿,
the left-of-centre government of President Lagos had faced a set of corruption scandals, mostly related
to payments of extra salary to members of the executive. ￿ese payments were a hidden ‘extra’ for
several members of the ruling left-of centre coalition led by President Lagos. Other scandals included
privileged access to government information or funds.￿￿ ￿e scandals compromised the integrity of
the government and, according to Olvarria et al.(￿￿￿￿), there were even rumours of the President
resigning. ￿e government reached out to the opposition in order to secure an agreement and
address public opinion concerns. As a result, opposition and government created a Commission for
Transparency and Public Probity and introduced a wide range of changes related to good governance,
such as civil service reform, transparency, reform of political finances, reforms of local and regional
governments, etc. (Segpres, ￿￿￿￿).
￿is set of events was also influential in setting the stage for a RTI reform, and put into motion
measures that included the creation of basic norms about transparency in the public sector. For
an activist pushing transparency reforms, corruption scandals were highly beneficial: ‘Some of the
scandals were beyond the understanding of ‘Doña Juanita’ ( the average Chilean) but some of them like
Chile Deportes￿￿ caused indignation among citizens...the elites needed a way out and the Commission
created this room’ (IECH￿).
￿￿￿￿ (Rehren, ￿￿￿￿). As a matter of fact, the first reference to transparency and access to information was elaborated by
this Commission but most of its recommendations were not adopted.
￿￿￿e cases were known as ‘sobresueldos’, ‘coimas’, MOP-GATE,MOPCIADE, ‘Central Bank’ and ‘CORFO-Inverlink’.
A second set of cases in ￿￿￿￿ were Chile Deportes, an emergency programme in Valparaiso and another case in the Region
of Valparaiso (Olavarria, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿Chile Deportes was conveniently timed at the beginning of Bachelet’s term, exposing funds that were never used and
deceased people as beneficiaries of programmes, among other irregularities.
￿￿￿
￿e above combination of facts shows a close interrelation between two intertwined factors:
corruption scandals and international pressure. While the original events that led to the demand
were of an environmental nature, they were amplified by a set of corruption scandals that put Lagos’
administration under public opinion extreme pressure. ￿e scandals forced the Chilean elites to look
for new measures to protect stability as well as to appease public opinion. ￿e decision from the IACJ
put more pressure on the political system, as it involved the prestige of Chile overseas.
Politicians in need of a solution
￿e political stream moved to reach consensus. However, the newly-elected government led by
Michelle Bachelet, from the same political party as President Lagos, distanced itself, showing more
commitment to approving an access-to-information law according to international standards. Schon-
steiner et al.(￿￿￿￿) noted (based on interviews) that it was corruption scandals, not the IACJ decision,
that prompted the government to pass the new legislation. In this context, two senators, Hernan
Larrain (UDI – Right) and the Socialist Senator Jaime Gazmuri, introduced a bill establishing the
right to access to information. For the bill ‘timing was of the essence, parties needed to show a sign of
commitment to a new way of doing politics’ (IACH￿). ￿e project noted that:
...despite legislative eﬀorts [in the ￿￿￿￿ Probity Act and Act No. ￿￿,￿￿￿ of May ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿], in practice,
the principles of transparency and access to public information are severely limited, converting these laws
into dead letters [...,] owing to the fact that the Probity Act itself stipulates that one or more regulations
shall establish the cases of secrecy or confidentiality of the documentation and background information
held by the State Administration, and this constitutes a significant barrier to the right of access to public
information established by law.
￿e alignment of the Chilean elites was crucial. ‘￿e elites were aligned and the introduction of the law
was a “magic window”’, (IECH￿) noted one of the members of civil society pushing for the reforms.
￿e decision of Michelle Bachelet to create a Commission to study transparency regulation￿￿￿ resulted
in the ‘Agenda Probidad’ and the decision to send a proposal to the Legislative. While Senators
Larrain and Gazmuri presented a project which ensured bi-partisan support, Bachelet’s decision was
essential to deepening and defining the agenda.
￿￿￿￿e Commission was composed of ￿ members: Enrique Barros, Carlos Carmona, Alejandro Ferreiro, Davor Harasic,
Maria Recart, Salvador Valdes and Jose Zalaquet. All of them had significant experience, although Alejandro Ferreiro was
the only one that could be called a techno-pol in his own right.
￿￿￿
Crafting the law: Presidential power, fast policymaking and techno-pols as policy entrepreneurs
Discussions moved quickly through both chambers of parliament and, as a result, the process to
approve the transparency law took only eight months. ￿e initial project presented by Larrain and
Gazmuri established a set of basic principles but did not establish an institutional framework for
access to information in Chile. Many of the ‘transparency loopholes Chile is facing today, is due to the
fact that this was a very quick process’ (Olmedo, ￿￿￿￿).
In ￿￿￿￿, the newly-elected President Michelle Bachelet released a set of decrees to foster trans-
parency in the administration as well as to create a Commission of Experts whose main aim was to
address concerns about corruption, transparency and eﬃciency in the public sector. ￿is Commis-
sion recommended the adoption of a RTI law, and finally included the creation of a Council for
Transparency among its recommendations. Presidential will is a key variable to explain policymaking
and the eventual success of public policies in Chile (Olavarria, ￿￿￿￿). With the bill in place, civil
society organisations led by Fundación Pro Acceso￿￿￿ started a strong lobbying campaign to modify
the initial draft. ‘While it was a good sign, the draft had significant limits on access to information. Our
job was to push for more progressive reforms. I am not sure how far we went but if it had not been for us,
crucial aspects in the design would not have been included’ (IECH￿).
President Bachelet’s proposal did not include an autonomous institution but an agency to implement
transparency legislation. According to Olmedo (￿￿￿￿), this agency was modelled on the Council for
the Higher Civil Service, a body established to ensure probity in the selection of higher civil service
oﬃcials. ￿e Government was unsure whether to create an independent institution but civil society
evidence was compelling. As noted by Olmedo (￿￿￿￿), the Council for Transparency ‘was not part
of the initial government agenda. It was not conceived as an external control organism... we won this
reform in the field’. ￿e IACJ decision helped the final push for a transparency regulation, and also put
Chile in the international spotlight. Chile – due to the composition of its political system and public
administration – is usually responsive to international pressure. ￿e judgment provided civil society
groups with more leverage in the discussion. ‘We were able to influence policy, particularly pushing for
an independent institution to act as a guardian of the new law which was initially resisted or not properly
understood’ (IECH￿).
However, this was diﬃcult in the Chilean context because it would need a constitutional reform.
￿￿￿Olmedo was the Executive Director of Fundación Pro Acceso. Juan Pablo Olmedo would become the first President
of the Council for Transparency and was also the leading lawyer in front of the IACJ.
￿￿￿
￿e solution was to create a ‘sui generis’ institution within the executive, with legal autonomy and
with jurisdiction over administrative acts. As a result, the Legislative, the Judiciary, the Electoral Court,
the Constitutional Court and the Contraloria General de la Republica – all branches of governments
independent of the executive – were partially excluded from the scope of the law. Some organisations,
such as the Contraloria General de la Republica and the Central Bank, actively lobbied to be excluded
from the law, arguing institutional autonomy and – in the case of the Contraloria General de la
Republica – overlapping competences.
￿e process involved several policymakers in the bureaucracy and civil society usually referred to
as techno-pols. As noted by Joignant (￿￿￿￿), the term ‘highlights their competence and power over
the parties as well as their prominent role in the policymaking process, based on the resources of a
technical and political nature that they demonstrate’.￿￿￿ According to Joignant, the influence of this
group declined during Bachelet’s term. I use the term in a broader sense still conveying the idea of
politically powerful policymakers with a strong technical background. As mentioned by Olavarria
(￿￿￿￿), one of the key players was the man in charge of the Presidential Commission on Transparency
and Probity, Alejandro Ferreiro. Ferreiro was a member of the Christian Democratic Party which was
a part of the ruling Concertacion (coalition of left of centre parties) . Ferreiro had significant political
experience and technical knowledge.￿￿￿ However, Ferreiro was not the only techno-pol involved, as
Olavarria’s account suggests.￿￿￿
On the other side, civil society had Juan Pablo Olmedo, a litigating lawyer trained overseas who
was leading the charge in the international field. While other actors played an important role,￿￿￿
these two figures became central when policy formulation and bargaining became crucial. ￿eir
policy expertise gave them a relative advantage and also significantly aﬀected the quality of the final
policy. Support from international organisations such as Open Society and the Ford Foundation was
crucial for civil society to push the agenda forward. ‘When looking back, without the support of these
￿￿￿Joignant identifies ￿￿ techno-pols and explain their competences and the way they achieved influence in Chilean
policymaking.
￿￿￿Alejandro Ferreiro had studied overseas and held significant positions in previous Concertacion governments, such
as head of several regulatory agencies, adviser to the Presidency and Minister of Economics. Ferreiro would become the
second President of the Council for Transparency.
￿￿￿Olavarria (￿￿￿￿) argues that then, what the formulation process of this policy most appropriately expressed is the key role
played by a techno-pol who, together with a group of experts, designed the policy with the strong support of the President. ￿is is
an appropriate description of a part of the process, but through approval of the law, civil society managed to introduce
significant changes, including the creation of the Council for Transparency.
￿￿￿Other actors included Transparency International Chile, the Open Society Groups represented by Helen Darbishire,
Corporacion Participa, Fundación Pro Bono and Fundación Pro Acceso (Biblioteca del Congreso, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿￿
foundations I am not sure how the process would have ended’ (IECH￿).
Olmedo and Ferreiro were the policy entrepreneurs able to speak a common language and eventually
secure the passage of the law. Both would meet again as members of the Council for Transparency
and also as Presidents of the Council. ￿e process could be considered mostly run by the political and
civil society elite. NGOs involved were supported by high-profile advocates (most of them lawyers).
￿e policymaking process was then quick, highly influenced by techno-pols and the international
agenda and a response to a particular political reality: the corruption scandals. ￿e way this process
unfolded would have consequences in terms of institutional design and implementation, as Section ￿
will show.
￿.￿ ￿ʜɪʟ￿’￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
As noted in Chapter ￿, in a RTI arena there are at least five elements to consider: a right-to-information
(RTI) regulation which is the foundation for information exchange, the nodal agent (the state), partic-
ular nodal agencies inside the state, a group of stakeholders that use this regulation and information,
and an information enforcement institution, which is in charge of deciding upon the release of oﬃcial
information in case of controversy. In the next sub-sections, I characterise the main elements of
Chile’s arena.
￿.￿.￿ Chilean RTI law
Chilean access-to-information law is the cornerstone of the RTI arena, establishing the basic rules of
what information should be public and how it should be released.
Table ￿.￿ outlines the basic features of Chilean transparency law.
Chilean access-to-information law establishes clear game rules in terms of who is subject to the
law, how to request information, when to publish information and what are the potential limits. ￿e
Chilean law also establishes a clear conflict resolution mechanism which shapes the Chilean RTI
arena, and also excludes a group of public sector entities from the request mechanism procedures.
￿e request mechanism procedure is relatively simple and informal and it can be done by electronic
means. Chilean law is relatively well ranked among activists groups (Access Info and CDI, ￿￿￿￿) and
generally complies with Inter-American Standards on the matter. ￿e level of detail and sophistication
of the law can be traced back to its technocratic origins, which explains its consistency.￿￿￿ While
￿￿￿Albeit with some flaws in terms of handling private information and institutional design, as it will be noted through
￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Characteristics of Chilean RTI law
Presumptive right to infor-
mation held by public au-
thorities.
Information about procedures, decisions and support documents
should be public. Information is understood in a broad sense (i.e.
not just documented or produced by the state).
Proactive publication ￿e government has to publish on line: structure, functions, norma-
tive framework, tenured and contract personnel, contracts (identify-
ing contractors), public funds transfers to third parties, how to make
an access-to-information request, subsidies information, auditing
information, budget information and entities in which the authority
has participation.
Request mechanism Chilean law mandates a simple request mechanism to be in place.
￿ere are no formal restrictions to non-citizens.
Exceptions and Limits ￿ere is a clear list of exceptions: prevention of crime, previous
deliberation, generic requests, human rights, national security and
national interest including international relationships and commer-
cial interest. Future exceptions should have a special quorum by law.
Other limits include classification of information as reserved for ten
years and potential involvement of third parties.
Duty to assist ￿e law establishes the duty to assist the requester.
Fees In principle, there is no charge for getting documents. If charges are
applicable they should be proportional.
Conflict resolution System ￿e Law establishes a conflict resolution mechanism, setting up a
Council for Transparency as an enforcement institution and judicial
review of Council decisions.
the Chilean law refers to privacy as a limit, it is important to note that Chile has not developed a
strong privacy framework. In this way, the use of privacy as an excuse not to release information is
limited.￿￿￿
Courts, the Contraloria General de la Republica and the Central Bank are not fully covered by
access-to-information legislation. ￿e reason for this can be traced back to institutional design in the
Chilean state which set up these entities as independent, and the institutional dynamics in place in
which these entities defend (vigorously) their independence. For instance, during the discussion of
the law, the Contraloria General de la Republica issued a note stating that:
this chapter.
￿￿￿Except in one case where it has been argued that public servants have the right to privacy, most of the information
about public servants is available on line.
￿￿￿
‘... this organisation feels a duty to express its deep concern about the adverse eﬀects the creation of a
normative and institutional system crafted without the necessary guarantees could have for administrative
transparency; it is important that measures introduced do not impede or limit the Contraloria General de
la Republicaoría’s control function or interfere with its institutional autonomy’. (Contraloria General de
la Republica, ￿￿￿￿)
￿e well-known state-owned copper extraction company, CODELCO, also tried to resist (un-
successfully) being included in the scope of the RTI law. As a result, the scope of this RTI arena
comprises the executive, local governments, regional governments, universities and public companies.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Chilean state
In the Chilean case, public administration has four characteristics that contribute to understanding
how Chilean RTI arenas work: a tradition of secrecy in public aﬀairs, a tradition of relative control and
accountability in public resources, a strong state-sector reform agenda inspired by NPM principles,
and a compliant yet politicized bureaucracy. Chile had a long tradition of secrecy in public aﬀairs
(Olavarria, ￿￿￿￿). A study run by the NGO Corporación Participa in ￿￿￿￿ showed that ￿￿￿ of
Chilean institutions surveyed would not reply to access-to-information requests (Participa, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e legacy of secrecy in the state apparatus was an obvious consequence of Pinochet’s government,
but also an indicator of the low levels of civic participation in Chile and the way public aﬀairs were
conducted by political parties.
Chile started significant state sector reforms in ￿￿￿￿. President Frei established a Commission
on Ethics which, among several measures, promoted a reform of the public sector in terms of
integrity. Crucially, Chile developed a management-for-results framework that incorporated several
principles from New Public Management in public finances and management of the state sector.
Dussange-Laguna (￿￿￿￿) notes the process started with President Frei’s reforms plans to update the
state administrative apparatus and indicators and evolved in a gradualist way. ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ were the
crucial years in setting up the framework and management principles. One interviewee noted that
‘it is diﬃcult to implement a transparency law, but it would be more diﬃcult without certain public
management tools in place’ (ISCH￿). NPM reform focused on measuring performance was useful in
terms of setting metrics and retrieving information.
Chile had a politicized yet compliant bureaucracy in place. When Pinochet’s regime came to an end,
parties had to introduce a new breed of public servants – in the spirit of transition – and managed to
￿￿￿
keep a balance in place with the previous regime. After the corruption scandals in ￿￿￿￿ and the famous
measures described above, a new attempt to professionalize the public bureaucracy was set in motion.
￿e Council for the Higher Civil Service was an attempt to depoliticize public administration and
to establish merit in higher echelons of the bureaucracy. While the process was relatively successful,
institutional design and practice shows that an element of patronage in key services persist in Chilean
bureaucracy (Ramos y Scrollini, ￿￿￿￿). Furthermore, Chile developed several e-government initiatives,
most notably the Chile National Procurement system, whose objective was to centralize and provide
transparency in public procurement, and was also an important precedent for transparency policies.
All in all, the Chilean state is considered one of the most competent in Latin America (Garcia y
Garcia ￿￿￿￿). It is a highly centralised state. ￿e development of the Planes de Mejora de Gestion
(PMG Improve Management Plans) helped to guide public management actions.
￿ere are two core agencies in the Chilean state able to convey and centralise information when
required: ￿e Ministry of Finance and the Secretariat of the Presidency. Both units carry significant
weight in terms of policymaking but are crucial in terms of getting information from several govern-
ment oﬃces. ￿e Ministry of Finance, through the Direction for Budgets (DIPRES), is able to get all
the information about the execution of the public budget and direct action through the Programme
of Management and Innovation (PMI). Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance has direct links with
the Civil Service, as the regulator of the system depends on it indirectly.
￿e Secretariat of the Presidency (SEGPRES) has control over the strategic direction of public
oﬃces. Several units of SEGPRES dealt with transparency-related issues, from the original design
of the RTI law to its current implementation. Core agencies, notably SEGPRES, play a role when
coordinating replies to complex matters that could aﬀect the Presidency or the government As
one public servant noted, ‘￿is is part of the game... they [the opposition] always want very sensitive
information, also the press. When such requests exist, there is always a level of political coordination in
replying. ￿e opposition never rests’ (IACH￿).
Chilean record management was not up to speed when the law was implemented and is still a
problem. As noted by Sousa (￿￿￿￿), when the law came into force, only a few oﬃces were able to cope
with requests and digitalization processes. Unlike other arenas, where archives play a substantial role
in preserving documents, Chilean archives were aﬀected by Pinochet’s dictatorship and a significant
part of the information was lost. Furthermore, digitalization practices in the Administration were still
weak, although this was dependent on each state unit’s capacity. As a result, digitalization practices
￿￿￿
aﬀect the structure and release of information. Archive and record management is still relatively
poor, although the existence of the Council for Transparency helped to create indicators and pushed
for better data collection at the executive level. Archives play an essential role in terms of retrieving
public information. Chile has relatively outdated norms in terms of archives (Guillan, ￿￿￿￿) and it is
one of the weakest areas in this RTI arena. Evidence from a survey carried out by the Council for
Transparency shows a low level of training in handling archives, lack of awareness and hierarchical
importance by staﬀ working on archives, paper as the preferred support mechanism for information
and a lack of indicators about activities (CPLT, ￿￿￿￿).
Implementation of the law in Chile was mostly a top-down process, which reflects the nature of
the Chilean state. ￿e Probity Commission started a central training process, distributing specific
software to deal with legal obligations. ￿e software was partially resisted by certain organisations
which considered it ‘useless’ (Sousa, ￿￿￿￿, p. ￿￿), and the training programme was not fully completed
before the due date. According to Sousa (￿￿￿￿), the involvement of multidisciplinary teams (not just
lawyers) and leadership from the higher echelons of the civil service were considered positive factors,
while ambiguities in the law, poor record-management practices and the timing of the implementation
were considered elements that made the implementation diﬃcult. Furthermore, there is a record
of diﬃcult coordination between the DIGPRES and the Council for Transparency, notably around
the management of requests and the creation of a web portal that would allow the centralization of
access-to-information requests.
￿e state also showed diﬀerent degrees of compliance with the law. While the central government
complied with the regulation in a relatively short time, other institutions such as universities, health
services and local councils, had diﬀerent performances. Local councils exhibited lower performance
levels than central government, showing how centralization and state capacity influences the imple-
mentation of this policy (Iglesias, ￿￿￿￿, Council for Transparency, ￿￿￿￿, Marin y Mynarz, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e initial strategy focused on adapting websites to active transparency requirements set by the norm,
which was done in above ￿￿￿ of cases, according to the Council for Transparency (￿￿￿￿).
Public servants are in charge of delivering information to citizens once information has been
requested. As mentioned in the previous sections, Chilean implementation was mainly a top-down
approach and several procedures were not in place when the transparency law started to operate.
Public servants have three clear tasks when requests arrive: acknowledge receipt, find the information
and eventually release it. ￿e Council for Transparency has a set of contacts which allows each
￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Active Transparency in Chilean Administration
Active trans-
parency rating
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Central Adminis-
tration
￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Hospitals N/A ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Universities N/A ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿ ￿￿.￿
Municipalities N/A N/A N/A ￿￿.￿￿
Source: [Author, based on Council for Transparency (￿￿￿￿).
organisation to be informed about the latest information in terms of best practices. ￿ese links are,
however, weak (Olavarria et al. ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). Most of the requests are through online mechanisms or,
if they are done by letter, public servants digitize the requests. Public servants working at the entry
point sometimes find diﬃculties interpreting what citizens want:
Sometimes the writing is really unclear, very generic, sometimes we are not even able to understand it.
(Castillo et al. ￿￿￿￿)
￿is statement seems to be consistent with the general perception of public servants, as ￿￿￿ of
them mentioned citizens do not know how to use the law (Olavarria et al, ￿￿￿￿).
Public servants also note that there has been an increase in their workload since the law was
approved:
We had to prepare for the law, then document all the replies and set up a process for this. Once a request
is made it, follows a very particular path inside the organisation. (ISCH￿)
Public servants acknowledge that requests are not the easiest or most normal way of interacting
with citizens:
If you are dealing with a request, it is a sign that at some point, something went wrong. Alternatively, it
is people looking for information for studies or a thesis... in both cases, our workload increases. (ISCH￿)
￿is statement is consistent with at least ￿￿￿ of public servants perceiving that access-to-information
regulation has increased their workload and they do not have the necessary staﬀ to cater with requests.
Around ￿￿￿ think that they do not have the economic resources for it (Olavarria et al. ￿￿￿￿).
One of the most sensitive information areas is about public salaries. Initially, public servants did
not fully apply the law, not including names or full salaries on line, arguing that it would violate
their privacy. Nevertheless, it is now possible to check most of these facts on line. A public servant
￿￿￿
remembers that:
Salaries were a big issue. Sometimes we were not even aware of how much money the guy next door was
making. Now we know. As a result, in some cases we also see public servants using this law, either to justify
increases of salary or to challenge how much they are paid. (ISCH￿)
Generally, public servants acknowledge the importance of this law, and while it creates hurdles,
they understand the democratic spirit that underpins it. Evidence from a survey of public servants
shows that at least ￿￿￿ think that the Chilean state is very transparent or transparent. ￿is still
leaves a significant proportion of civil servants unconvinced. ￿e same survey notes that ￿￿￿ of
public servants acknowledge the existence of an access-to-information right and ￿￿￿ consider that
citizens should have the right to appeal if information is not granted. Nevertheless, only a third
of the public service knows about the existence of the Council for Transparency. Public servants
understand that the law fosters civic participation, helps to control state activities and also helps to
disseminate important information to the citizenry (Olavarria et al. ￿￿￿￿). However, when faced
with diﬃcult accountability dilemmas, limits are blurry. Some public servants may choose not to
write down certain things due to political sensitivity:
￿ere are things I am no longer writing down any more. Quite frankly, you have to be careful what to
document and how, due to the risk of political exposure. (ISCH ￿)
￿is practice is linked with a recent case about the privacy of public servants’ emails, where the
Court of Justice finally ruled in favour of public servants and politicians (Courts of Justice ￿￿￿￿). As
one public servant stated, ‘We ... as public servants have a reasonable expectation of privacy’ (Soto, ￿￿￿￿).
Arguments about privacy in the public sector are often used in the New Zealand and Uruguayan
context where information about salaries and functions is significantly less available than in the
Chilean case. Not writing things down is an extreme form of defence some public servants might be
taking in light of what transparency regulations could do to their careers. Not writing things down
means that some conversations never existed. It should be noted that public servants in a Chilean
context often exhibit a degree of politicization, that goes down at least two levels below the minister.
While advisers are now recruited through a more competitive process, recent evidence shows that
new governments bring in their own staﬀ (Ramos y Scrollini, ￿￿￿￿). As a result, there are political
incentives to not write down certain information, because revealing it could be considered an act of
political disloyalty.
￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Demanding information in the Chilean RTI arena
Journalists, lawyers, politicians and NGOs are the main users of this regulation. From a general
perspective, all these users come from the high end of the social spectrum, which means they have
resources, knowledge and interest in pursuing public information. As noted by the former President
of the Council for Transparency, Alejandro Ferreiro, users:
... are male, above ￿￿, middle-high income status, with graduate degrees, and this the reason I say that
users of the RTI law are the social elites. (Ferreiro, ￿￿￿￿)
In ￿￿￿￿, the Council for Transparency ran a customer characterization study which showed that
most customers came from the private sector, were trained in a profession (law being the most
significant one) and half of them were concentrated in the capital (CPLT, ￿￿￿￿). In ￿￿￿￿, a study
showed that ￿￿￿ had completed university or postgraduate education, and ￿￿￿ had completed
technical education, showing the degree of specialization users have. ￿is is consistent with studies
from the Council for Transparency which shows that only ￿￿￿ of the population know about access-
to-information policy (CPLT, ￿￿￿￿). Furthermore, most of these users are in Santiago, the capital of
Chile (CPLT, ￿￿￿￿).
Table ￿.￿ shows the number of requests since the inception of the law:
Table ￿.￿: Requests per year to Chilean administration
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Number of requests ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿ ￿￿,￿￿￿
Source: [Commission for Probity and Transparency ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿.]
￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿ shows the classification of these requests.
Table ￿.￿: Classification of requests to Chilean Administration
Type ofMinistry/Number
of requests
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Political ￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿￿) ￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿￿) ￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿￿) ￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿￿)
Social ￿￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿￿) ￿￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿￿) ￿￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿￿) ￿￿,￿￿￿ (￿￿ ￿)









Source: [Commission for Probity and Transparency ￿￿￿￿.]
However, such high numbers do not tell the full history. As one public servant mentioned,
Numbers are explained by our systems and we count as an access-to-information request every interaction
[that] can potentially become an access-to-information request. (ISCH, ￿)
Journalists: expert and frequent users of the law
Journalists are one of the most influential users in terms of access-to-information law, although use
does not seem be extensive among journalists. Surveys show that on average in the period ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿,
￿￿￿ of journalists used access-to-information legislation to request public information and an average
of ￿￿￿ considered that the law was eﬀective for their work. In the same period, journalists seemed to
agree that, in general terms, the access-to-information situation has worsened.
Table ￿.￿: Journalists’ opinion about the RTI law
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Journalists using the
law
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Eﬀectiveness ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿
Overall positive eval-
uation
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿.￿ ￿￿￿
Source: [Source Adimark ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ ]
￿is shows that one of the most significant groups of users of access-to-information law usually
prefers to gain access through diﬀerent means. As noted by one journalist, ‘we still prefer sources. Of
￿￿￿
course, access-to-information legislation has led to good stories, or to get documents that otherwise we would
have to get through leaks, but overall, sources are the best way to go’ (IECH￿). Another interviewee notes,
‘Traditional media still has its sources, thus do not need access-to-information legislation. ￿ey were not
involved in the process and now seldom use the law’ (IECH￿).
Most of the use made of access-to-information law in Chile is in investigative reporting. For
instance, CIPER Chile, an investigative reporting agency, has used access-to-information regulation
extensively to get contracts and information from the public sector that, combined with other
sources, produce in-depth investigative reporting histories. Reporting about ministerial pardons
(Skoknic, ￿￿￿￿), educational reforms (Skoknic, ￿￿￿￿) and military spending (Ramos, ￿￿￿￿) are some
examples of complex topics where access-to-information regulation played a significant role. However,
investigative reporting is a resource-intensive and relatively expensive practice, which usually takes
a long time to mature. An access-to-information request may also jeopardise eﬀorts when trying
to access public information and may alert the administration or potential competitors about the
imminent coverage.
Journalists also play with political narratives when requesting information for short-term and
impact pieces: ‘Chile is a country that wants to be compared with OECD standards. Chile is always
looking at the OECD to develop standards in areas such as transparency and ministers like to brag about
this. So, we took their word and check in detail what information is published and how. ￿is usually
delivers good news and immediate reaction from ministers. If they want OECD standards, we are going to
give journalistic OECD standards as well ’ (IECH￿).
In short, the use of access-to-information regulation has enabled journalists to get more information,
and potentially improved their work. Journalists are not extremely confident, however, about the
eﬀect the law might have on hard-core accountability issues:
Lobby and conflicts of interests are really the most pressing issues I see for our democracy. And, quite
frankly, this law helps, but does not deliver all that we need to check on them. (IECH￿)
Civil society
Civil society is one of the most noticeable stakeholders in the Chilean RTI arena. Chilean civil
society organisations working on this topic show a high degree of professionalism and expertise in the
legal area. For instance, Fundación Pro Acceso spearheaded the adoption and controlled the initial
implementation of access-to-information law. Fundación Pro Bono – mostly a group of litigating
￿￿￿
lawyers, also took part in several litigation cases previous to the adoption of this law. Corporación
Participa was a pioneer, mapping the state of the field in terms of access to information before the
implementation of the law. Transparency International also played a significant part in terms of
monitoring and implementing the law. Civil society tends to use the law for strategic purposes,
seeking reform in sectors or pushing for new standards. For instance, Fundación Pro Acceso recently
released a study monitoring proactive transparency in the University Sector (Proacceso, ￿￿￿￿). Pro
Acceso has long been involved in issues around accountability and transparency in the education
sector.
Tag team requests are common in Chile?s RTI arena. ‘￿e strategic use of the access-to-information
law on topic, usually teaming up with other organisations to advance causes further’ (IECH￿, ￿￿￿￿).
For instance, Pro Acceso teamed up with a group of bee-keepers to find where genetically-modified
crops were grown in Chile. ￿e decision of the Council for Transparency forced the Secretary for
Agriculture to release the data and it is now available on a geo-referenced map (Huichalaf, ￿￿￿￿).
A new breed of organisation has emerged in the last three years, combining the use of technology and
activism in the transparency field. Ciudadano Inteligente, a Chilean NGO working on transparency
and accountability, set up a web portal that allowed people to exercise access-to-information rights on
line. ￿e portal created an interface that took information from the ministries and centralized the
request process, allowing people to make a request and other users to follow the requests publicly on
line. Setting up such a portal was a deliberate strategy to increase the use of access-to-information
rights, and was done without involving the government. ￿e use of technology provided leverage and
made it impossible for the government not to acknowledge the existence of a demand to improve
access-to-information procedures. Ciudadano Inteligente’s technical team went to great lengths
to ensure e-mails could be delivered, due to the complexity of setting up a proper interface with
government services. Finally, the government decided to set up its own portal as a response to the one
created by civil society.
Another example is the website Poderopedia which allows users to understand who is who in
the Chilean political arena, mapping relationships that are usually not known. By using access-
to-information requests, public records and private sources of information, the website provides
significant information about how the Chilean political system works.
However, civil society is far from a unified and articulated group, even in such a small field
as transparency issues in Chile. ￿ere is a level of competition in terms of getting resources and
￿￿￿
articulating demand which keeps the field dynamic but potentially weak in terms of coordination to
advance reform. Civil society in Chile is financed by international organisations such as the Open
Society Foundations, the Ford Foundation and Omidyar Network, among others. ￿e diﬀerence
with the new breed of organisations is also quite noticeable. While the ‘old guard’ of access-to-
information fighters were originally concerned with human rights, mostly working in the context
of the Organisation of American States, the UN and other international forums, the new breed of
organisations have a more focused and ‘hands-on’ approach mediated by technology.
Lawyers and firms: ‘snipers’ in the Chilean RTI arena
In ￿￿￿￿, a British firm decided to request information about the procurement process to buy a military
bridge. ￿e Ministry of Defence resisted the release of information, invoking a security exception
and a special law that allows the Chilean army to buy war material from a special fund. ￿e firm
challenged the decision before the Council for Transparency where the Ministry of Defence invoked
the same defence. ￿e information was finally released and the case had serious consequences for
the minister involved in this matter (Leal, ￿￿￿￿). As in other RTI arenas, lawyers keep using the
law to find evidence of possible wrongdoing in pre-discovery stages. However, lawyers report an
increasing use of the law to gain unfair advantage from private or reserved material. While there are
no oﬃcial numbers available, lawyers seem to welcome the new legislation as it is becoming useful in
tax, environmental and international law (El Mercurio, ￿￿￿￿).
Innocent requesters
In a small town outside Santiago, a schoolboy requested information about the state of his own
educational establishment. In particular, the boy wanted to know why a new building had not been
built. ￿e case made the national news and was hailed as an example of an active citizen (Access Info,
￿￿￿￿). Such cases are extremely rare in the Chilean RTI arena. ￿e average citizen remains unaware
of access to information as their right, according to surveys from the Council for Transparency. While
new technologies can help to deliver better services and establish less friction with citizens, they are
still unable to reach and grab the interest of most of the potential users in Chile.
￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Council for Transparency
￿e Council for Transparency is the Chilean enforcement institution in charge of promoting the cul-
ture of transparency and, crucially, defining what is and is not public information. ￿e establishment
of this institution was among the key debates in the adoption of the RTI law.
As noted in Chapter ￿, two dimensions are crucial to assess the strength of enforcement institutions:
autonomy and capacity to enforce
Autonomy





Process regulated involving consensus among key political parties
Senate appoints the Councillors
Stability Appointments are regularly performed, although there were some issues in
the first round of appointments
Oversight ￿e Judiciary and the Constitutional Tribunal can overrule the Council for
Transparency’s decisions on several grounds
Resources ￿e budget is allocated in consultation with the Ombudsman
Perception ￿￿￿ of the population know about the existence of the Council. Out of
this sample, ￿￿￿ consider the Council an autonomous institution (Council
for Transparency, ￿￿￿￿.
In terms of autonomy, the appointment process and the institutional position are crucial to
understand what enforcement institutions can do in a RTI arena. ￿e appointment process to the
Council is decided by the Senate, which has to confirm Councillors by a special majority. ￿e Council
is renewed by thirds and the Presidency of the Council rotates. ￿e first appointment of authorities in
the process was an exemplary process where Chilean elites decided to grant the newly-created Council
strong legitimacy, naming a Council with expertise and significant political support. As noted by the
first President ‘that was the virtue of the first Council: it was beyond political parties’ (Olmedo ￿￿￿￿).
However, while relevant experience is indeed a prerequisite to become a member of the Council,
membership is still a highly political process, as noted by Olavarria (￿￿￿￿). For instance, when in
￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ a new appointment process started, two former Presidents of the Council were not re-appointed,
opening a debate about the whole appointment procedure. Civil society noted a lack of consultation
for future names and one of the outgoing Councillors noted that ‘we knew our decisions would make
the political power uncomfortable. It happened during the last Bachelet government and it is happening in
this one’ (Urrutia, Que Pasa, ￿￿￿￿).
Even when it was likely that Olmedo and Urrutia would have support in the Senate to continue
their work, the government decided not to re-appoint them. ￿e subsequent discussions about who
would end up replacing the outgoing councillors cast doubts on the continuity of the Council’s work,
which would have been unable to make decisions without two members. ￿e reasons behind the
decision not to re-appoint Olmedo and Urrutia oﬀer room for several hypotheses, particularly in
terms of how politics play in this institution. Urrutia was linked to the government-allied RN, but,
during his time on the Council, he faced two cases that made the government uncomfortable, which
is one possible explanation for not re-appointing him. Olmedo was close to the leftist PPD but
was largely politically independent. Whether or not the reasons were political, the incentives for
governments to keep re-appointing councillors that potentially damage their political interests are low,
particularly when they have perfectly legal means to appoint other persons. Removing councillors
from oﬃce in the Chilean case is similar to an impeachment process and has to be approved by the
Senate.
In terms of institutional design, the Chilean Transparency Council is a ‘rara avis’. ￿e Council
was an ad hoc solution to find a balance between the original proposal from the executive, which
would have created an administrative organism resembling a modernization unit, and a more robust
horizontal accountability institution such as the one proposed by civil society. As noted by Mendoza
(￿￿￿￿),the concept of autonomy is ‘the ‘vedette’ ( new centrepiece) of administrative law ... everyone
wants to be autonomous and if it is a constitutionally-established autonomy so much the better ... there are
more autonomous institutions than others’. ￿e fact that the Council is an autonomous organisation,
independent of the Presidency of the Republic, does not exclude the Council from other controls (as
in accounting practices, legality of expenditure and potential legality of certain administrative acts).
As a result, the Council is also subject to other controls. ￿e Council has powers to resolve processes
and, crucially, to review the background materials. ￿is power to review the materials of the case has
been challenged in a set of cases regarding public servants’ email which shows the limits of Chilean
institutional design. Mendoza (￿￿￿￿) notes ‘the third element of being autonomous is the courage of who
￿￿￿
run the institutions ... the law can declare an institution autonomous as much as it wants, but it always
depends on who is actually exercising power ... Autoritas and Potestas are two intertwined concepts’.
In the Chilean case, the enforcement institution is overseen by the judiciary and, potentially, the
Constitutional Tribunal. ￿e judiciary can overrule the Council’s decision. ￿e judiciary has mostly
favoured the government’s position, most notably in matters of national security and privacy of emails.
Building legitimacy is also part of standing and holding ground when institutions want to avoid
being monitored. For instance, Urrutia (￿￿￿￿) noted that the Federation of Local Councils initially
resisted being included in this law under the argument that they were autonomous. Navigating this
kind of resistance and other potential threats to the autonomy of the Council is one of the skills of
elected members. Building legitimacy, then, is a crucial task that the leadership of the Council, in
particular the President, need to balance carefully. For instance, Alejandro Ferreiro, former President
and one of the key figures in this setting, notes that ‘We prefer to bother people rather than being
irrelevant’ (Ferreiro, ￿￿￿￿),￿￿￿ a strategy the Council has followed in complex cases, explaining the use
of the law and the reasons behind its decisions. As with other institutions, such as the Ombudsman
(Uggla, ￿￿￿￿), the Council relies on media and public opinion to raise its profile and gain legitimacy.
￿e Council members are former political leaders, which provides them with political clout, contacts
and expertise in handling public opinion. It also leaves them opens to having their independence
called into question, although such criticism has seldom emerged in Chile as the Councillors took
stances that were uncomfortable to right-wing and left-of-centre governments alike.
￿e Council for Transparency gets its funding from the executive and has struggled to get appropri-
ate funding since it was first set up (Olavarria, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e Council discuss the baseline for the budget
with the Presidency and the Ministry of Finance. However, the Council is not allowed to allocate






Table ￿.￿ summarises the enforcement capacities dimension.
Table ￿.￿: Enforcement Capacity
Dimension Indicator
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of review pro-
cesses
Partial access to documents.
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of enforcement
practices
Binding
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of imposing
sanctions?
Ability to impose pecuniary sanctions
established by law.
Resources (staﬀ, budget, capacities) to carry out the
assigned tasks
Lack of adequate staﬀ (Olavarria ￿￿￿￿)
Service delivery Demand side (depending on the type of
customer) evaluates the Council favourably,
oscillating between ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿ (CPLT,
￿￿￿￿).
Decisions or sanctions eﬀectively applied? All decisions are eﬀectively applied.
Challenges in front of oversight institutions
are usually resolved in favour of the
Council .
Table ￿.￿ provides a summary of the current legal challenges to the Council’s decisions before the
High Courts or the Constitutional Tribunal:
Table ￿.￿: Number of Council’s decisions challenged before the courts
Constitutional Tribunal Supreme Court Higher Tri-
bunal







Source: [Author based on jurisprudence available from the Council for Transparency website].
￿e table shows that, if decisions from the Council are challenged, the courts usually uphold the
￿￿￿
Council’s decisions.
Enforcement capacity is the ability to carry forward two key functions: to solve controversies and
to eventually enforce decisions. From a legal point of view, the Council has the authority to resolve
potential conflicts which includes the ability to review the material held by the administration. ￿e
ability to review the materials held by the administration is crucial because it allows an evaluation of
whether exceptions are being fairly applied or not. Furthermore, the ability to impose sanctions is also
part of the enforcement capacity of the Councillors. As will be noted, one of the key challenges this
institution faces from other units in the public sector is in terms of the capacity to review. According
to the Council, a total of ￿￿￿ institutions are under the scope of Council control. Table ￿.￿ shows
the distribution of these organisations.
Table ￿.￿: Number of organisations included in the RTI law








Table ￿.￿￿ provides evidence of the Council’s workload since its inception:
￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿￿: Council for Transparency’s workload
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Received Cases ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Non-admissible cases ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Requester declined to con-
tinue
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Solved cases ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Decision to partially release
information
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Decision to release informa-
tion
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Decision to withhold infor-
mation
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Source: [Council for Transparency, ￿￿￿￿].
￿e table shows a large number of non-admissible cases which are usually the result of a lack of
information from the requesters. ￿e table also shows a significant number of decisions ordering the
release or partial release of public information.
Table ￿.￿￿ provides a summary of the current legal challenges to the Council’s decisions before the
High Courts or the Constitutional Tribunal:
Table ￿.￿￿: Number of Council’s decisions challenged before the courts
Constitutional Tribunal Supreme Court Higher Tri-
bunal







Source: [Author based on jurisprudence available from the Council for Transparency website].
￿e Council has a very detailed process to deal with requests from citizens made up of three broad
phases: admissibility, advice and decision-making. ￿e whole process is relatively swift and according
to Council surveys, ￿￿￿ of users are satisfied with the service (Council for Transparency, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e
￿￿￿
Council also has a fast track decision-making process in order to facilitate simple cases and to engage
in informal talks with public oﬃces in particular situations (World Bank, ￿￿￿￿).
Support from international organisations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
helped to establish a baseline budget and to develop sound administrative systems. ￿e Council for
Transparency would later adopt several NPM practices (Olavarria ￿￿￿￿) showing professionalism
and expediency, thus adjusting to the state sector environment in which they have to operate. For
instance, the Council has deliberately sought validation of its eﬀorts by securing awards such as ‘￿e
most competitive firm of the year’ (Council for Transparency, ￿￿￿￿), as well as the adoption of ISO
standards for several processes (Council for Transparency ￿￿￿￿).
Prizes and public recognition are part of building legitimacy for the Council in its day-to-day
work. In a competitive and NPM-inspired public sector, legitimation in terms of eﬃciency is crucial
to gain respect from institutions that are under the Council’s control. Furthermore, the Council
developed a studies area to develop indicators and perspectives about their working environment. ￿is
is evidence of a strong institutional capacity which allows the Council to perform its work. Since its
establishment, the Council has decided to create a management model that will allow them to carry
out their tasks (Olavarria, ￿￿￿￿, World Bank, ￿￿￿￿). However, only the President of the Council is
full time while the rest of the Councillors work part time.
￿e Council has also used the ‘stick’ in order to enforce its decisions with ￿￿ sanctions. Sanctions
include the possibility of seizing up to ￿￿￿ of the responsible public servant’s salary. Most of the
sanctions have been applied to local councils, which are the weakest link in this arena.
￿e above description leads to characterisation of the Chilean Council for Transparency as a
relatively independent institution capable of enforcing decisions. According to the characterisation
presented in Chapter ￿, this is a ‘Knight Templar’ in the making.
￿￿￿
￿.￿ ￿￿ɴ￿ʟ￿￿ɪ￿ɴ: ￿ ￿ɪ￿￿￿ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
￿e Chilean arena fits the description of a mixed arena. Table ￿.￿￿ summarises the outputs as proposed
in Chapter ￿.
Table ￿.￿￿: outputs
Availability of public information on a proactive
basis
Public Information available proactively at ￿￿￿
across government units.
Eﬃciency in dealing with RTI requests More than ￿￿￿ of requests are received and ￿￿￿
get a reply
Accessibility and eﬀectiveness to resolve disputes ￿ere are no formal limits to accessing the Coun-
cil for Transparency. Courts may charge fees.
Source: [Council for Transparency ￿￿￿￿, Courts of Chile ￿￿￿￿.]
In terms of participation in the policymaking , Chile’s adoption of a RTI law shows important issues.
First local politicians needed to address a very identifiable problem: corruption scandals. Several
accounts mention that these scandals played a significant role in the decision of the government
to adopt RTI. In other words, it was Chileans who decided to advance a RTI law as part of their
eﬀorts to solve a corruption scandal. ￿e Chilean process reflects the relatively closed nature of
Chilean policymaking where techno-pols played a significant role in designing and advocating for
these reforms. Participation in this process was low. A few techno-pols (on the government side and
on the civil society side) had good understanding and owned the issue. As a result, they were able to
set up the networks and find support among certain organisations to advance the agenda. ￿ere were
few political champions in this matter; thus, the whole of the political system had no real ownership.
￿e civil service was mostly absent from the debate and other horizontal accountability institutions
initially resented the establishment of the Council. ￿ese diﬀerences in who was participating, would
then lead to diﬀerences in terms of the implementation and eventual outputs of the arena. ￿e policy
community in place in Chile gathers around the Council for Transparency and a few specialised
bodies in the administration. ￿ey are a small and select group of individuals and institutions that are
eﬀective in shaping the Chilean arena, as well as being involved in other issues related to integrity and
good governance As a result, the Chilean policy community has a very good level of expertise and a
shared understanding of the problems the arena faces. Furthermore, it is a professional and ‘up to
date’ community respected at an international level, yet still does not permeate the whole spectrum of
￿￿￿
the Chilean state and society. ￿e Council for Transparency is instrumental as a focal point to engage
in discussions. Some of the members of this community have connections with political parties,
which reflects the politicised nature of the arena. Most of them would be careful not to stress these
connections as they often act in a technocratic capacity.
￿e Chilean process shows also an interesting interplay between international and national actors in
the policy stream. ￿e establishment of the Council for Transparency is the result of this involvement.
Chilean policymakers argue that the law was passed due to domestic issues. ￿is is correct. However,
these accounts miss a possible counter-factual: the government could have established an alternative
measure such as an Anti-Corruption Board or a new decree about integrity in the public service to
address these issues. ￿us, a second event had to influence government decision-making. I argue
that this event was the Inter-American Court of Justice decision that forced Chile, in the light of
international pressure, to re-think its approach to RTI. ￿us, the decision of the Court had an
influence in the policy stream in terms of standards as well as in terms of setting up an autonomous
body: the Council for Transparency. ￿us the support given by international organisations played
a key role in terms of policy design in the policy stream, albeit they directly not intervened in the
policymaking process.
As noted Chile has a politicised bureaucracy with some level of professionalism. Chilean public
administration tried to adjust for this change but there were coordination issues among several
institutions, notably between the enforcement institution and the executive. Chilean core agencies
were able to adapt quickly (and deploy sophisticated tactics to delay giving information) while
municipalities are still struggling in terms of implementation. Archiving is a major issue in the
Chilean RTI arena, as in many other arenas. Retrieving information can be time-consuming and
some archives no longer exist. Public servants do take into consideration harsh political realities
when answering requests. As a result, behaviours observed in other jurisdictions such as not writing
down certain conversations or ‘just forgetting’ about documents are usual. It should also be noted
that public servants dealing with these requests are usually at the higher end of the hierarchy, and
therefore, often at least, political appointees. ￿is introduces a diﬀerent logic when answering requests
as well. ￿e New Public Management practices favoured transparency in certain areas, such as fiscal
management or public salaries, but did not encourage participation or transparency in more contested
areas.
In terms of enforcement institutions, the Chilean Council had to be set up from scratch and gain
￿￿￿
its own legitimacy. ￿e Council is now a well-established institution beyond its initial ‘rara avis’
nature. It has forged its role as guarantor of access-to-information rights through skilful leadership,
eﬃcient use of relatively scarce resources and professional capacity. ￿e Council took a stand on
several issues that were initially against the interests of the parties that had appointed the Councillors,
showing a great degree of independence.
However, institutional design still shows that the Council is an institution appointed by the political
parties’ agreement or consensus. Most of the Council members played a significant role as ministers,
members of parliament or by being close to one political party. It is fair to say that independent
candidates are not the majority. ￿is raises the question of the degree of politicization of Council
activities, usually operating in a complex and sensitive political environment. A constant challenge
to Council activities relates to the power to classify information, which leads to certain state units
not providing documents to the Council for review. Furthermore, cases around emails or military
defence show complex arguments developed by the other institutions that can review (and limit) the
Council’s position about who should be reviewing documents and the so-called privacy expectation
from public servants. ￿e role of the courts, the Constitutional Tribunal and the Contraloria General
de la Republica are still relatively grey areas in the Chilean RTI arena in relation to the Council’s
autonomy.
Access to information can be used for noble matters or for relatively low political interests, trying
either to hurt or embarrass an opponent or a public servant. While most of the transparency narratives
have a certain aura of innocence, RTI requests are often political tools to cause damage. ￿is is
particularly true in a context where users are still a small and politicised minority and where civil
society might also have close links with opposition or government parties, depending on the political
contexts. As such, access to information enters into political battles at both micro- and macro-levels.
When such instances happen in Chile, there are risks of negative feedback loops that could threaten
the Council’s position. ￿ose feedback loops can actually endanger the RTI arena and the enforcement
institution.
Cases of average citizens requesting government information using RTI as a tool are rare. Civil
society organisations do play a role as intermediaries using access-to-information requests to elicit
certain social demands, or as part of larger strategies, but the law is still manly used by a minority
of well-trained people. Journalists increasingly use the law, although it is not one of the most used
tools, nor the tool they trust most. In the Chilean context, unequal use and access to information
￿￿￿
may be partially a reflection of social inequalities which pervade Chilean society. Challenges to
the Council and relatively low use make the Chilean case a space for mixed transparency where




URUGUAY: A CONTESTED RTI ARENA
In this chapter, I will explore the Uruguayan RTI arena. I will explain how the current situation
is linked to three factors already mentioned in this research: the participation in the policymaking
process, the level of professionalism in the state bureaucracy and the autonomy and enforcement
capacity of RTI institutions. First, I will provide an account of how access to public information
emerged in Uruguay, looking at the key players in the early days of RTI. ￿en, I will analyse the
current status of the Uruguayan RTI arena, explain how it operates, and describe its main elements. I
will conclude that Uruguay is a contested RTI arena.
￿.￿ ￿￿ʙʟɪ￿ ￿￿￿ʀ￿￿￿ ‘￿ ʟ￿ ￿ʀ￿ɢ￿￿ʏ￿’
In ￿￿￿￿, Uruguay regained its democracy. It was a country where even the cost of MPs’ coﬀee would
be considered secret (IEUY￿). Debates in Uruguay in those early years were scarce, and secrecy was
the norm. Public records and judicial decisions were supposed to be public, but implementation was a
diﬀerent matter. ￿e decree ￿￿￿/￿￿ established the public nature of decisions but also established that
if someone wanted to check a particular file, he/she should show direct, personal and legitimate interest.
￿e so-called information rights were not visible during the first stage of Uruguayan democracy. As
an activist from those early times notes, ‘￿is whole agenda was not something politicians in this country
were worried about or had the sensibility to understand’ (IEUY￿).
￿ere is little evidence of systematic studies about transparency or access to information in the
period ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿. During this period, the core issue on the public agenda about public information
was accessing documents from the former military dictatorship. ￿ose documents could shed light
on practices, places and people that had disappeared during those years (El Espectador, ￿￿￿￿).
A high-profile case evolved in ￿￿￿￿ in the context of extradition requests linked to the former
￿￿￿
military dictatorship. ￿e Argentinian government requested the extradition of a group of Uruguayan
military and police members accused of violations of human rights in Argentina and Uruguay. ￿e
government refused to let the judiciary decide about this request, using a prerogative in Uruguayan
Amnesty law.￿￿￿ ￿e law established that the executive could evaluate extradition requests of a political
nature and decide whether to investigate certain claims. Andres Alsina, a local journalist, asked for
the reasons behind this decision, before the Attorney-General’s Oﬃce which was in charge of the case.
When Alsina made the request, the Attorney-General issued a special ad hoc regulation so as not to
release this particular information.
Alsina, supported by a local NGO, challenged this decision in the courts. ￿e request was of
crucial importance, as a large sector of public opinion was in favour of the extradition. ￿e legal
advice was finally released after a lengthy legal battle which involved an appeal to a higher court. ￿e
documents obtained proved that the prosecutor and the government had lied about the arguments
not to extradite the military and police members. It also showed a possible breach to the principle of
separation of powers, as it is the Supreme Court, not the executive, who should rule about extradition
petitions in the Uruguayan legal system (Alsina and Zabala, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e case was the first in which the
judiciary acknowledged the existence of an access to information right in the Uruguayan context. For
Alsina, ‘it was a Pyrrhic victory’ (Alsina and Zavala, ￿￿￿￿) as the information came too late to be used.
An equally illustrative incident took place in ￿￿￿￿ in San Jose, a small district outside the capital.
San Jose is a stronghold of the National Party (Blanco Party) and the administration has not changed
hands since ￿￿￿￿. Enrique Ravinovich, a local journalist, requested the transcripts and recordings of
the Budget Committee of San Jose’s Local Council (local government legislative branch).
Rabinovich was after the budget numbers and a particular statement from the Chief Financial
Oﬃcer. Transcripts and numbers were not traditionally released by local councils. ￿e recording
had been done at the request of an alternate legislator who had little experience in these matters
and wanted to have an ‘insurance’ to carefully analyse the discussion. ￿e journalist tried to get the
information informally. He did not get far, so he decided to ask for it formally, but it was denied by
the Committee and Plenary of the local council, although he was never notified of this.
￿is decision was supported by all political parties, including the left-of-centre opposition of the
￿￿￿￿is law was approved in ￿￿￿￿ amidst severe controversy. ￿e law established the release of political prisoners as well
as the abdication of the punitive power of the state for crimes committed during the military dictatorship. ￿e law was
challenged twice in referendums (￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿) but was upheld by the citizenry. ￿e Supreme Court of Justice declared the
law constitutional but, in a later ruling, declared the law unconstitutional.
￿￿￿
day. ￿e decision reinforced a trend in which the local mayor kept not providing the legislature with
basic information about tax collection and about how the budget was spent. ￿e journalist decided to
take the case to the courts, but was denied amidst a set of unclear arguments, most of them of a formal
nature. ￿e political system formed ranks in order to keep the session secret and one government
member of the local council defended that, saying that by denying information they were protecting
the local council’s reputation. It was finally determined that the recordings had been erased and that
there had never been an oﬃcial resolution from the Local Council Budget Committee. In the words
of a then member of the left-wing opposition, Rodrigo Campanella: ‘I think that our work is strictly
for our own purposes and does not need to be in the public domain. I am convinced of this, I do not know
of any precedents that state otherwise. Political bargains have back-and-forth moments and citizens should
not know them’ (Alsina y Zavala, ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿). ￿e case was eventually taken to the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights.
Secrecy was then pervasive in public administration. For instance, in ￿￿￿￿ two journalists sent letters
to the three branches of governments asking questions relevant to each one of them. Out of thirty-nine,
only four got a satisfactory reply and four others received replies but not the public information
required. Most of the letters (￿￿) were unanswered by public authorities. Journalists found extensive
evidence of diﬀerent kinds of resistance in public administration. ￿e set of behaviours included
resisting the request, suggesting an informal contact with authorities to obtain public information
and questions about the reasons behind the request. Only a few scattered initiatives were launched
in ￿￿￿￿ to promote transparency in public procurement, but those were not significant and had no
impact.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿ ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ʀ￿￿￿ʀ￿: ￿ɪʀ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ɴ￿ ɴ￿ ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿ɴɪ￿ʏ ￿￿ʀ
ʀ￿￿￿ʀ￿
￿e first proposal for a freedom-of-information law was put forward by the opposition left-of-centre
party, the Broad Front in ￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿ MP Daniel Diaz Maynard was the main author. ￿e bill was a
local project which had some references to the international context but was mostly designed by Diaz
Maynard and a close adviser based on local constitutional and administrative legal doctrines.
Initially, all political parties agreed with the proposal. However, it almost immediately ran into
￿￿￿￿e Broad Front Party (Frente Amplio) was the main left-of-centre opposition party in April ￿￿￿￿. ￿e country was
at the time governed by a coalition of the so-called traditional parties: the Colorado Party and the National Party.
￿￿￿
problems as the Ministry of Defence and the Home Aﬀairs Ministry￿￿￿ opposed the project on
the grounds that could aﬀect human rights issues (CUP Debates, ￿￿￿￿). Oddly enough, when the
government executive was engaging in a politically costly campaign to release public information
about procurement and public servant salaries (Busqueda, ￿￿￿￿), it was opposing a RTI law in the
Legislative. ￿e main reason for this paradoxical attitude lies in the divisions over human rights, as a
RTI law could also allow human rights campaigners to request information about the recent former
dictatorship.￿￿￿ ￿e bill was finally approved in the Chambers of Deputies with the votes of the
Broad Front (the opposition party), which had a majority at that time ￿￿￿. ￿e debate was dominated
by high levels of rhetoric where most government MPs agreed in principle with the law, but focused
on various particular details in order not to vote for it (CUP Debates ￿￿￿￿). One of the Government
MPs, Fernandez Chaves, said he was not voting due to the party mandate not to do so, although he
agreed with the law. (CUP Debates pp. ￿￿–￿￿). One of the advocates at the time remembers that:
It was all very well mannered...they would always meet us, they would always listen to us, but...nothing
much happened. (Lanza, ￿￿￿￿)
￿e idea that some who most need it should receive a certain preference in terms of getting public
information was also present in the original project by Dr. Diaz Maynard. In the original project,
journalists would receive certain preferences to request public information. Journalists were not the
only ones arguing for special rights￿e representative of one lobby group, the League of Commercial
Defence, mentioned that:
.... Certain data can have a certain protection, meaning that not everyone could ask for it, but,
unreservedly, we should have access to it... those [of us] who draw up reports of a commercial nature’.
(Senate CLC Records, ￿￿￿￿)
In this way, the whole debate was not about public information available to everyone but public
information available to specific groups such as commercial lobbies, interest groups and journalists.
￿is particularistic approach to certain rights is consistent with earlier observations from Uruguayan
political scientists (Real de Azua, ￿￿￿￿), about the Uruguayan polity (Panizza, ￿￿￿￿, Zubriggen, ￿￿￿￿,
Busquets y Piñeiro, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e law passed to the Senate where, according to former Senator Margarita
￿￿￿Unlike other countries, the Home Aﬀairs Ministry in Uruguay is in charge of the police and other security agencies.
At the time, Yamandu Fau was the Minister of Defence and Guillermo Stirling the Minister for Home Aﬀairs, both from
the Foro Batllista faction of the Colorado Party.
￿￿￿At the time, the government was engaged in a reconciliation process and had created a presidential commission to
deal with it.
￿￿￿￿is majority was due the absence of some mPs from the government in the Chamber
￿￿￿
Percovich (￿￿￿￿), the project ‘was drastically modified’ due to a complex set of negotiations involving
a diﬀerent bill dealing with securing the right to personal data used for commercial purposes. ￿is
law was introduced by senior government senators￿￿￿, to allow data sharing of information that could
aﬀect commercial activities. ￿e RTI reform was not approved.
￿.￿.￿ Policy entrepreneurs get organised
After this initial blow, a group of civil society campaigners decided to organise a platform named
of the Archives and Access to Public Information Group (GAIP).￿￿￿ GAIP’s main purpose was to
advance a freedom-of-information law according to emerging international standards, provided by
UNESCO-funded studies (Mendel, ￿￿￿￿). GAIP was in close contact with several international
organisations, such as the Open Society Foundations, and managed to get on board two Broad Front
MPs: Diego Canepa and Margarita Percovich. GAIP helped to link MPs to international experts and
relevant legal doctrines.￿￿￿ GAIP prepared the draft of a new bill which Broad Front Senator Margarita
Percovich promoted in the Senate and which is largely the basis for the current access-to-information
law in Uruguay. ￿e bill was aligned with international standards and was influenced decisively by
international experts (Lanza, ￿￿￿￿). Support from international organisations such as the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights helped
to raise the profile of these initiatives and was decisive in getting policymakers on board. Unlike other
processes in Latin America, the bill was not influenced by big media corporations (Michener, ￿￿￿￿)
which were not interested in the agenda (Lanza, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e absence of these influential players can be traced back to the media market structure in Uruguay,
as well as the fact that the media has significant links with the government. Edison Lanza, a journalist
who co-led the campaign, notes that:
￿e Uruguayan media has its own interests, particularly in getting oﬃcial publicity contracts. As a
result, owners of newspaper do not often engage in this kind of activism because it could hurt their interests.
￿￿￿Senator Brausse from the Colorado Party and Senator Acosta y Lara from the National Party were the leading senators.
￿￿￿GAIP was formed by the Uruguayan Press Association, the Peace and Justice Service, Amnesty International, Trans-
parency International, the Media and Society Group (GMS), the Communitarian Radio Association, the Institute for Legal
and Social studies, the Librarian Association, the Library Sciences School of the University of the Republic and the Action
for Civil Rights group.
￿￿￿GAIP members managed to get some Broad Front MPs, among them Diego Canepa, Margarita Percovich and Javier
Salsamendi, to attend a meeting in Buenos Aires where they mingled with international activists in the field and got to
understand the rationale behind access-to-information laws. In addition, the British Embassy financed a study tour for
Margarita Percovich and other MPs to study how the law works in Britain, which is mentioned by Percovich (Senate
Records Commission of Education and Culture, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿
(Lanza, ￿￿￿￿)
￿e principles of the law were mainly inspired by models available at an international level. While
there was a previous project, the new one presented was completely diﬀerent, and accorded with what
was considered international best practice at the time. In the words of Edison Lanza: ‘We innovated in
terms of our legal system, setting up a new kind of legal action, but most of the law was designed following
the international principles’ (Lanza, ￿￿￿￿).
￿.￿.￿ Politics and policy in the Senate
￿e arrival of the left-of-centre party (the Broad Front) in government in ￿￿￿￿, with very well-
informed MPs and the presence of a compact group of activists, meant that there was now an
opportunity for a RTI law to be approved. ￿e existence of well-articulated international networks
supported by the Open Society Foundation and the Inter-American Human Rights system was crucial
to getting the proposal oﬀ the ground. ￿e now Senator Margarita Percovich introduced a new RTI
project based on GAIP’s recommendations.
Strong political will was very evident in the initial stages, where Percovich was lobbying ferociously
to get the law approved. However, there was also a lack of information and resistance from several
stakeholders who provided testimony before the Senate Commission dealing with this law. One crucial
issue was access to files from the military dictatorship, which dominated parts of the debate, showing
that divisions over human rights were still very much present (Senate Records, ￿￿￿￿). Another set of
issues raised during the debate was about who could request information, as local administrative law
specialists would argue that requesters should have to demonstrate a specific (legitimate) interest when
filling an access to information request. Furthermore, there were also discussions about a possible
avalanche of requests and possible collapse of procedures (Del Piazzo, ￿￿￿￿).
On the other hand, some senators were keen on establishing the principle of transparency to send a
message to public servants: ‘We need to ensure that public servants release information and they don’t say
‘￿is information is mine, I will keep it, I won’t give it away or I will place obstacles to releasing it’ (Senate
Records, June ￿￿￿￿ p. ￿). Senators also noted the importance of access to information for private
parties: ‘Senator Cid mentioned information about the Ministry of Health which is very interesting but
there are also other Ministries, such as Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock, which has a lot of statistical
data and information for those who make decisions such as the private sector’ (Senate Records, ￿￿ June
￿￿￿￿ p. ￿).
￿￿￿
￿e project stumbled when facing objections from the Agency for the Society of Information
and E- Government (ASIEG). ASIEG is an oﬃce of the Presidency of the Republic with limited
autonomy but significant expertise on e-government. ASIEG was in agreement in trying to approve a
privacy law as this was one of its main commitments to international donors, (BID, ￿￿￿￿) as well as
to align Uruguayan standards with European privacy regulations. ASIEG insisted on approving a
privacy law before an access-to-information law (Senate Records, July ￿￿￿￿). In an unexpected twist
of events, the Senate briefly delegated to ASIEG the drafting of the project so it could be aligned
with the privacy law. ￿is type of delegation is highly unusual in the Uruguayan legal policymaking
process. ASIEG suggested changes in the law around the access-to-information regime, new sets of
exceptions, implementation time-lines and also several redrafting of previous articles. ASIEG also
suggested an extension from ￿￿ to ￿￿ working days for processing requests and an extension from ￿￿
to ￿￿ years for withholding classified information.
￿e bargaining process had consequences, particularly for the future enforcement institution.
Darbishire (￿￿￿￿) reports an interest from Uruguayan authorities in a Parliamentary Commissioner
as a enforcement institution for the RTI arena, similar to the Slovenian access-to-information model.
Initial discussions around this topic showed little or no understanding of the institutional design of an
independent access to information, as it was confused with a Civil Service Commission, among other
institutions (Senate Records, September ￿).￿￿￿ Civil society organisations proposed a Parliamentary
Commissioner for this role (Senate Records, November ￿) which was initially well received by senators,
particularly due to the appointment process proposed which involved screening by the Senate. ￿is
proposal was blocked by the Treasury based on the broad reforms Uruguay already had in place, which
had led to the creation of several public bodies and increased fiscal costs. (Lanza, ￿￿￿￿, Percovich,
￿￿￿￿). Eventually, after a set of complex bargains, which involved ASIEG and Percovich, it was
decided to establish an independent unit within ASIEG to deal with the implementation and control
of this law.
As a result of the above-mentioned process, some parts of the law were amended following the
advice of local constitutionalists and administrative law experts who were worried about the scope
and lack of limits of the initial law, as well as the role of the courts (Senate Records, CEC, ￿￿￿￿).
Several terms relating to requests, extensions and classification of information were modified in this
instance as well. ￿e process shows a high degree of interaction between state government agencies, a
￿￿￿For instance, Senator Sanguinetti suggested that access-to-information requests should be handled by the Civil Service
Commission.
￿￿￿
particular senator and a few civil society groups. ￿e project had several hands working on it which
ended up aﬀecting the consistency of the law as well as weakening the original proposal. A significant
issue in this policymaking process is the absence of particular events that led political and social actors
to set up these laws. ￿e Broad Front had a commitment to this agenda, but there were no corruption
cases, nor scandals to help the speedy approval of this law. ￿erefore, its approval seems to be linked
to the political and policy channels and not directly caused by a particular event.
￿.￿ ￿ʜ￿ ￿ʀ￿ɢ￿￿ʏ￿ɴ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
￿e current RTI arena reflects the complex decision-making process described above. In this section,
I focus on the key elements of the Uruguayan RTI arena: the law, the state, actors and the RTI
enforcement institution.
￿.￿.￿ Uruguayan RTI law
Table ￿.￿ summarises the basic principles established in the Uruguayan access-to-information law in
Uruguay. ￿e law complies with international standards, but the absence of a specialised unit to deal
with conflicts is one of the most significant matters. ￿e inclusion of a human rights clause, which
establishes that if access to information is crucial to protect human rights, then information should
be released, is also a novelty of the Uruguayan system.
￿￿￿




Information about procedures, decisions and support documents should be
public. Information is understood in a broad sense (i.e. not just documents




￿e government has to publish on-line: structure, functions, normative
framework, tenured and contract personnel, contracts (identifying con-
tractors), public funds transfers to third parties, how to make access-to-
information requests, subsidies information, auditing information, budget
information.
Request mechanism ￿ere are no special provision in the law limiting the request procedure.
￿e government has ￿￿ working days to answer a request and can extend
this time limit for another ￿￿ days.
Exceptions and
Limits
￿ere is a clear list of exceptions: previous deliberation,￿￿￿ generic re-
quests, human rights, national security and national interest (including
international relationships and commercial interests). Other limits include
classification of information as reserved for ￿￿ years and privacy. ￿e public
interest test applies to exceptions. If the state does not answer on time, this
represents ‘positive silence’ and the information should be delivered.
Duty to assist ￿e law establishes a duty to assist the requester.
Fees In principle, there is no charge for getting documents. If charges are
applicable, they should be proportional.
Conflict resolution
System
￿e law establishes a conflict resolution mechanism through a special unit
in the executive.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Uruguayan state
￿e state is a major player in the Uruguayan governance setting, and, as a result, collects large amounts
of information, both public and private. However, the Uruguayan state is a fragmented entity, with
relatively low state capacity in some key areas (Ramos, ￿￿￿￿) as well as a slow pace of structural and
public management reforms (Panizza, ￿￿￿￿, Panizza, ￿￿￿￿). Furthermore, while Uruguay does have
stable policies with relatively good quality, it also has very low quality and unstable policies, such
as the case of state sector reform (Bergara et al. ￿￿￿￿). To this, it is necessary to add the existence
of a politicised bureaucracy and the absence of professional managers in several units, which also
undermines the provision of public information. According to Uruguayan RTI law, every public sector
body is subject to this regulation, which means that citizens have the right to request information
￿￿￿
from them, and these bodies are mandated by law to publish certain sets of information (proactive
disclosure). As a result, every single unit of the Uruguayan state is covered by this law. However, there
are some ‘grey areas’, such as certain types of state-owned enterprises.￿￿￿
￿e position of the core agencies
￿e core agencies collect large amounts of information to have an overall view of the government
system. In the Uruguayan case, these core agencies are: the Civil Service, the Oﬃce of Management
and Budget, the Treasury and ASIEG. Arguably, the combined power of those four institutions to
collect information gives an overall picture of virtually all activities of the Uruguayan state. However,
not all nodes have the same state capacity or political leverage, and, as a result, some of them have
better access and more detailed information than other organisations.
￿e Civil Service Oﬃce is an oﬃce of the Presidency of the Republic. Its main mission is to oversee
human resource management policy across the Uruguayan state and provide legal advice on hiring
public servants as well as consultants. ￿e Oﬃce collects crucial information about numbers of staﬀ,
positions available, dismissals and disciplinary procedures as well as management information about
the civil service. It does this through an electronic register which allows every unit to transfer the
information to the Oﬃce. However, it also relies on less modern techniques such as faxes or phone
calls to collect information.
￿e Oﬃce of Management and Budget￿￿￿ is an advisory oﬃce to the President of the Republic. Its
main task is to advise the Presidency on investment, budget and planning issues. As a result, the Oﬃce
covers a wide range of programmes, with national, regional and local impact, coordinating much of
the presidency’s work. ￿e Oﬃce has specialised sections to monitor the execution of the budget, the
status of state-owned enterprises, the status of public investments and the performance of the state
sector. ￿us, it has several information systems in place that collect part of the relevant information
which later produces policy analysis and executes programmes on behalf of the presidency.
ASIEG is an agency relatively independent of the Presidency of the Republic ￿￿￿ the in charge of
￿￿￿Uruguay has strong tradition of state involvement in the economy and, since the beginning of the ￿￿th century, set up
large state companies (SOE) under monopolist conditions and public law regulation. With the development of new public
management and the ‘hollowing out of the state’, new companies emerged owned by traditional SOEs.
￿￿￿In Spanish Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto
￿￿￿ASIEG’s Director is appointed by the President of the Republic. ASIEG also has a board of directors coming from
the private sector and other public sector organisations. ￿ese directors are appointed also by the President. ASIEG has a
special administrative status (organo desconcentrado) which allows the organisation to make decisions in an independent
fashion
￿￿￿
electronic government policy across the central government, as well as being in charge of advising
the Presidency on related matters, such as privacy regulation, transparency and issues regarding the
‘knowledge and information society’. As a result, ASIEG implements a wide range of programmes
which includes creating portals and setting up new online processes, as well as standardising and
setting up basic technical infrastructure across the Uruguayan central government. ASIEG also has
two units which deal with the implementation of privacy and transparency regulations, and should
be in charge of implementing both policies.
￿e Treasury￿￿￿ is in charge of designing, implementing and monitoring fiscal policy, which also
leads to a prominent role in the budget. ￿e Treasury collects information across the state through
several information systems, which provide information on several government programmes and
budget execution. ￿e Treasury also performs audits on several organisations and has direct access to
land value information.￿￿￿ Furthermore, the Treasury also controls the tax collection process which
allows it to gather a significant amount of information about the Uruguayan population.
Core agencies are important in arenas as they aggregate a significant amount of data which they are
able to provide to the centre for decision-making. However, nodes should not be seen as monolithic
organisations. Due to the complexity and politicisation of Uruguayan public administration, certain
units inside the nodes might not necessarily be aligned with the principal (the President, or the
minister). Regardless of this fact, there is a general tendency to share information inside the nodes,
but not necessarily among them. ￿ese agencies are usually in charge of collecting and releasing large
amounts of public information to which they need access to proceed with their complex functions.
Yet, there is still a lack of sharing of information in the public sector. ￿is makes sense in the context
of a politically responsive bureaucracy, and also in the context of low-quality provision of public
information.
However, powerful core agencies are able to pull their weight when information is needed in
order to fulfil government tasks. Core agencies are able to get information faster than any other
accountability agency such as the parliament or the judiciary and act on it. One senior policy oﬃcer
in one of the nodes puts it this way: ‘When we ask for information it usually appears... it has to. But it
all depends on who is asking. We demand information and we get it’ (ISCUY ￿￿).
￿￿￿In Spanish the Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas
￿￿￿￿is is the result of a very odd development in Uruguayan bureaucracy which also concentrates in the Treasury the
Tax Authority and the Games and Casino Department. In other, words Uruguay did not experience an agencification
(Pollit et al. ￿￿￿￿) process the way other countries did.
￿￿￿
Archives and information management
In the Uruguayan RTI arena there is one agency in charge of establishing the general policy about
archives: the General Archives. In ￿￿￿￿, Uruguay passed a law establishing a set of criteria to
implement record management across the Uruguayan state. According to the last census (AGU,
￿￿￿￿), there are ￿￿￿ archives in the country and most of them lack the proper human resource support
to classify information. ￿is is also the result of the lack of a clear policy to recruit archivists and other
specialised personnel in information management, as well as a national shortage of this profession.
￿is creates a set of problems for public information holders as they are not able to keep up with
the information they have. As one higher civil servant notes: ‘Sometimes, I do not even know the
information my unit has, and because we have no clear policy on how to store the information, some people
tend not to share the information they have on their computers’ (ISCUY￿). Another public servant noted
that ‘Information management is extremely complex, we have no expertise and we are usually dealing with
pressing issues that were supposed to be sorted by yesterday. We just can’t cope’ (ISCUY￿).
￿e state is very deficient in its handling of archives and information management which results
additional work for public servants retrieving information that requesters might need or that they
should proactively provide.
Implementation and public bodies
One of the key functions of information holders is to proactively publish public information. ￿is
is a duty established in the access-to-information law (Art. ￿) which mandates the publication of
the institutional mission, salaries of public servants, relevant information for citizens, and budget
expenditure and procurement, as well as ways the citizen can contact the state. ￿e last proactive
publication measurement available, which sampled ￿￿￿ of Uruguayan government websites, showed
that not one Uruguayan website complied fully with the duties established by law. Furthermore,
￿￿￿ of Uruguayan websites achieved a medium-low ranking in the index which indicates the relative
absence of public information on line (CAINFO-IELSUR, ￿￿￿￿). A recent survey by the Access-to-
Information Unit (Del Piazzo, ￿￿￿￿) notes that information on line about salaries and resources is
still scarce. Table ￿.￿ summarises this information.
￿e best-ranked units are usually islands of excellence which collect and store significant amounts
of public information￿￿￿. As a result, the flow of public information to the general public is quite low
￿￿￿However, being an island of excellence does not necessarily implies that it will be a transparent one.
￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Proactive Transparency in Uruguayan RTI arena
Salaries ￿￿￿ of the government websites do not show the salaries of public
servants.
Resources ￿￿￿ of the government websites do not
show resources from the national budget.
￿￿￿ of the government websites do not show resources from
international loans or other sources.
Source: [Del Piazzo, ￿￿￿￿].
and generally of low quality. ￿e lack of a good implementation plan was quickly felt in terms of
proactive transparency as well as in terms of request procedures, a campaigner and frequent requester
noted: ‘At the beginning, public servants would not even know about the law. ￿ey would even try to
charge us a legal fee to request information, and they would often not know what to do. To be fair they
did not have a warning because the Unit in charge of the policy was set up later on, further down the
implementation track’ (ISEUY￿). An example of this disarray of public authorities at the very beginning
of the implementation of the law is Montevideo City’s initial policy on access-to-information requests.
￿e city council aimed to charge for every request, as well as to apply an automatic extension of
twenty working days on every request (El Pais, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e policy changed later on, but today (￿￿￿￿)
the city still shows certain practices that hinder the request process, such as the use of a special form
and an administrative decree that declares reserved large portions of public information. For instance,
a recent request from the website quesabes.uy shows that the council still requires an identity card to
process a request (Quesabes, November ￿￿￿￿). As a general rule, local authorities in Uruguay are still
struggling with RTI, and some of them still openly resist the principle of access to information (Sena,
￿￿￿￿).￿￿￿
Public organisations with more state capacity and professionals developed internal policies to deal
with access-to-information requests, and thus were not taken by surprise by the RTI law.￿￿￿ A social
activist adds that ‘Due to the lack of a strong central guidance, each oﬃce was on its own. And as with
other issues in the Uruguayan state, the ones with more resources released more information, and also tend
to fence better when arguing exceptions’ (IEUY￿). ￿e Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and the Central
Bank swiftly set structures in place to deal with information requests and proactive transparency.
￿￿￿ Beyond paper, formats are important in order to use public information on line for other purposes. Friendly formats
are usually html and open formats which would allow more access and better use of public information. ￿is situation is
now being addressed through the open government data portal and other open data initiatives although success is.
￿￿￿￿is is the case for the SOE, Foreign Aﬀairs, the Presidency of the Republic and the Treasury.
￿￿￿
Both have managed to fence requests from activists and MPs in successful ways, arguing in court
against the release of specific items of information. ￿is shows that the more professionalized a
public bureaucracy is in the Uruguayan context, the more complex the debate around the topic.
Professionalized bureaucracies are also at the forefront of classifying large portions of information
and declaring this information reserved (Busqueda, ￿￿￿￿, El Pais, ￿￿￿￿). A few organisations set
up special procedures to deal with requests, particularly coming through email. For instance, the
state-owned enterprise (SOE) ANCAP set up software which establishes a set of procedures to reply
on time to the requester. ￿ese organisations are rare and often have the budget and understanding
of the process to develop such systems. Such a development does not guarantee that organisations are
more transparent but does guarantee an adequate work flow for requests.
According to the Uruguayan RTI, the highest level of the oﬃce hierarchy needs to sign an order
to release public information. ￿is authority is usually a politician. Dealing with an access-to-
information law in Uruguay is complex for a public servant. As one higher civil servant noted, ‘I know
I have to publish information. But sometimes I publish bad news and I feel punished for doing so’ (ISUY￿).
In a follow-up on an access-to-information request to the National Direction of Fire-fighters, there
was a very graphic answer: ‘Darling, if I give you that information, tomorrow I will be fired’ (CAINFO,
￿￿￿￿). ￿us, information that can be politically used in several accountability processes tends to be
scarcer than other types of information. However, public servants are often unable to identify which
information is of political use, thus leading to a very conservative approach in terms of releasing
public information. Public servants find it diﬃcult to share information in a politicised environment
where information sharing could lead to unexpected costs. As one public servant puts it, ‘it is very
diﬃcult to share information because you may be risking political exposure. Sometimes we have to get
information through other channels such as the press, government websites and other sources to avoid
asking for it directly’ (ISCUY￿). Not sharing information also leads to appropriation of information
by public servants. Some public servants exploit access to information that should be public to gain a
certain advantage. A former consultant working in the Uruguayan public sector notes, ‘We always
had to hire someone from the inside because he/she was sitting on the data. In those days, there was no
access to public information, but if we did not hire him/her for our project,we would not have been able to
work’ (ISCUY￿). An activist notes that, ‘you tend to notice that some public servants feel theyown the
information they have, which is wrong’ (IEU￿).
Increasingly, the government hires experts in communication (mostly journalists or former journal-
￿￿￿
ists) to engage in the process of receiving requests and releasing information. ￿ese are the specialists
in charge of dealing with the substance of a RTI request. Occasionally, this position is covered by
lawyers, although in organisations with a certain degree of expertise and complexity, there is a clear
diﬀerentiation in terms of roles. ￿ese government oﬃcials are in charge in the Uruguayan context
of ‘chasing’ the information around the organisation, and making sense of the request, as well as
engaging with the user.
￿.￿.￿ Demanding information in the Uruguayan RTI Arena
￿ere is no oﬃcial way to know how many requests were received by the administration. ￿is is
because the Uruguayan state does not collect or provide any sort of information about how requests
work. As a result, it is not really possible to quantity demand, quality and eﬃciency in terms of
requests for information. ￿is is significant in itself, showing the low priority accorded to access-to-
information policy. A study developed by a local NGO showed that out of thirty requests to the
national government, eleven were answered. Furthermore, among the requests that actually got an
answer, five were delivered after the legal deadline. A subsequent study developed by a group of
researchers at the University of the Republic (Gandolfo et al. ￿￿￿￿) showed that, out of seventeen
requests, four were not answered.
In the course of this research, I designed and co-developed an intervention, setting up a website
allowing people to request information from the government through an online portal. ￿e website
was developed partly as a research tool and partly as a campaign tool to foster RTI in Uruguay. It
covered up to eighty public sector bodies and is now administered by the local NGO DATA. Table
￿.￿ shows the following statistics
According to this data, the most typical answer from the state is ‘no answer’ or ‘pending reply’. ￿is
data seems to be confirmed by studies performed by the Uruguayan government. According to a study
(survey) performed by ASIEG in coordination with the Latin American Network of Transparency
Institution (￿￿￿￿), only ￿￿￿ of requests got a reply. In the study, only Ecuador ranked worse, with
only ￿￿￿ of the requests getting a reply.￿￿￿ Pineiro and Rossell (￿￿￿￿) concluded a study in which an
average ￿￿.￿￿ of requesters got a positive reply from the administration. ￿ere is no information
about the profile of requesters in the Uruguayan scene. A survey commissioned by ASIEG (￿￿￿￿)
showed that ￿￿￿ of the population is aware of the law. Around ￿￿￿ of the people surveyed had
￿￿￿￿ere is no oﬃcial information available about how many requests were made in this ‘mystery shopping’ exercise.
￿￿￿




Pending Reply ￿￿￿ ￿￿
Not held ￿￿ ￿.￿
Other situations ￿￿ ￿.￿
Requests (total) ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Source: [Author’s analysis based on Quesabes ￿￿￿￿].
graduate (university) level of studies. ￿e Uruguayan law presents low entry barriers in terms of
requesters as it does not discriminate on any grounds, and the law explicitly forbids public servants
from asking requesters the reasons behind the request. Nevertheless, requesters note that very often
public servants do ask the reasons behind the requests (CAINFO, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e situation described is a
direct consequence of the way the law was enacted and implemented. ASIEG and APIU (the Access
to Public Information Unit) were reluctant to invest in advertising to promote RTI law use, and for a
while the agency line was to be careful not to ‘overload’ the system. Oﬃcial attempts to promote the
use of the law were rare, apart for a few seminars, and there was no attempt to engage with citizens. A
case study working with grass-roots communities in Montevideo showed that there was no knowledge
of the law among the population and community-based radio broadcasters (Gandolfo et al. ￿￿￿￿). A
proxy for the low level of demand is the number of cases that ended up for review with APIU from
￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿.￿￿￿
Most of the administration initially refused to engage in request processes by electronic means
(e-mail), and there is evidence that some public organisations would only process a request if it met
the standards of a particular set of forms they provided (CAINFO, ￿￿￿￿). Activists describe the
request process as complex: ‘It usually takes a lot of time and eﬀort to make a request, and we tend to use
legal jargon in it to avoid problems’ (Da Rosa, ￿￿￿￿). In other words, making an information request is
not for everyone and still requires very specific legal knowledge, and there are several barriers average
citizens would need to face.
￿￿￿Only ￿￿ cases ended up for review with the APIU. A safe assumption is that there were more requests but only a few
requesters managed to appeal due to various constraints.
￿￿￿
Willing and able requesters
Journalists are relevant users of this law. In Uruguay, the Association of Journalists was heavily involved
in lobbying for access to information. Furthermore, the first legal ruling stating that citizens had
the right to access to information (Alsina v the State) was led by a journalist. ￿e obvious motive
in using an access-to-information law is to get more information which can be turned into news.
However, this requires a tradition of investigative journalism that is seldom present in Uruguay
(Alsina, ￿￿￿￿). Furthermore, the way journalists get information is usually through sources, and
eventually, when they have a hint, they make a request to get the information they are looking for.
‘Fishing expeditions’￿￿￿ are costly (as request mechanisms in Uruguay are slow and still pose barriers to
requesters), so journalists have no incentive to use the law. One journalist noted that ‘young journalists
with fewer networks could be prompted to use this law’ (IEUY￿). Once a journalist uses the formal
mechanism, other journalists and stakeholders could be alerted, thus potentially thwarting an attempt
to get the ‘exclusive’. Researchers tend to get public information through informal means, often
getting into direct contact with the public servants dealing with the data. As a result, there is a large
degree of personalisation in the way and to whom information is delivered. ￿is does depend on
the field of study, as some areas such as economic data from the Central Bank, Statistics Institute
and Budget, seem to be generally available to researchers. An important question that often worries
researchers is the way data was constructed, which is seldom specified, as well as the integrity of data
(i.e. if it is reliable). As an example of this, data produced about criminality in Uruguay tends to be
of low quality, and there were no clear parameters to measure the phenomenon through the years,
thus historical records are diﬃcult to assemble. When the first Broad Front (left) government took
power in ￿￿￿￿, it established a special unit to organise data about criminal activity, which produced
a set of comprehensive reports. When the second leftist government took power in ￿￿￿￿, the unit
was disbanded for political reasons, and, as result, much of the data collected was no longer available,
or showed serious inconsistencies with previous data. Crucially, micro-data that allowed researchers
to construct their own data was removed from the website. Researchers in the field noted that this
process was ‘severely irregular and showed that we could not rely much in the data the government provided,
with the result that we do not really have a full picture about criminality rates in Uruguay’ (IEUY￿￿).
Civil society organisations that specialise in transparency and human rights are the most active
requesters. ￿is also suits their mission as most of the funding for their organisations comes from
￿￿￿Another term used in the local jargon is ‘launching a grenade in a fish bowl’.
￿￿￿
several international players driving an agenda for transparency and access to information. In Uruguay,
there are only five civil society organisations working actively on the field￿￿￿. ￿ey are increasingly
developing strategies to collaborate with other civil society organisations in diﬀerent fields where public
information could contribute to solving several social issues, such as women’s rights, environmental
issues and migration. An in-depth study on domestic violence, performed by an alliance of NGOs,
showed how limited information is about what it is considered one of the greatest security problems
in the country. ￿e study asked the Home Aﬀairs Ministry twenty-nine questions, requesting
information about the methodology of collecting data and classifying information about domestic
violence and provision of this information, as well as administrative and budgetary aspects of the work
the Ministry was doing on this topic. ￿e request unearthed significant new evidence about domestic
violence in Uruguay (such as the number of children who died in domestic violence situations), but
also uncovered the lack of protocols in terms of collecting data about this topic (Da Rosa y Medina,
￿￿￿￿). ￿e project also uncovered the lack of coordination among agencies that are supposed to
register domestic violence incidents: the judiciary, the Education Administration Authority and the
Ministry of Social Development. In this context, researchers had to make this information usable in
order to make their findings available on line,￿￿￿ and also to allow other interested people to access
this data. One of the researchers notes that, ‘it was a very lengthy process; we had to reconcile data and
literally type some of the data into some sort of open format’ (Da Rosa, ￿￿￿￿).
Environmental groups face significant asymmetry of information, as websites usually do not provide
all the information needed and government tends to hide meetings about key topics, (IEUY ￿￿￿￿).
Much of the information also requires specific abilities in terms of analysis and these groups usually
have little access to funds or legal advice. ￿ree high-profile requests have been made so far with
relative degrees of success.￿￿￿
‘Snipers’ use of the RTI law with resources
Interest groups are also increasingly using this law. Interests groups usually have access to funding and
legal advice, and in this way they are able to fight their way through the proper institutional channels,
￿￿￿Centro de Archivos y Acceso a la Informacion (CAINFO), Transparency International (Uruguay), Datos Abiertos,
Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacion (DATA), the Press Association of Uruguay (APU) and the Peace and Justice Service
(Serpaj)
￿￿￿￿e project website is http://www.infoviolenciadomestica.org.uy/ accessed ￿￿th August ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿e requests were about: the status of the Aratiri project (to the Presidency and theMinistry of Transport), information
about a report on pulp-mill pollution (to the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs) and information about a contract between an
SOE and an American oil firm (CAINFO, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿
including, when necessary, litigation. An example of interest groups using Uruguayan RTI law are
public sector trade unions.￿￿￿ ￿ey are increasingly using the law to strengthen their positions in
labour negotiations .￿￿￿ CIPA, a ‘non-oﬃcial’ trade union related to the telecommunication SOE
ANTEL, requested information about the numbers of staﬀ aﬃliated to the oﬃcial trade union. ￿is
information was crucial for CIPA, as the union needed to get recognition from the International
Labour Organisation and labour authorities in Uruguay. ￿is was denied on the grounds that a union
was already in place. After a lengthy battle, information was released and granted (￿￿￿.com, ￿￿￿￿). A
similar process was followed by a police trade union demanding information from the Home Oﬃce
about police oﬃcer membership in several trade unions so that the most representative union could be
established.￿￿￿ Another interest group particularly active in terms of requests for access to information
are environmental groups.￿￿￿ Businesses associations are increasingly using this law to advance their
purposes. LIDECO, an association for the defence of commerce, managed to secure access to data
about firms working in the agriculture sector after a litigation process. Lideco noted that:
￿e guarantees and trust LIDECO oﬀered through its institutional development in terms of information
management and as leader in good practices in the matter, have been key to ensuring a judicial decision in
favour of our claim. (Antunez, ￿￿￿￿)
￿e statement shows that powerful actors with certain level of prestige in the arena are more likely
to get information than others that haven’t established their credibility. MPs are slowly becoming part
of the group of users of access-to-information legislation.
Traditionally, MPs used their legislative prerogative to request information from the govern-
ment￿￿￿.￿￿￿ Lack of answers is attributed to ‘lack of political will’ or ‘bureaucratic issues’. A prominent
senator from the opposition party mentioned that he does not use them any more as ‘It is pointless’
￿￿￿Unlike other countries in the context of this research, trade unions in Uruguay are powerful actors and represent ￿￿￿
of the workforce, the highest rate of unionisation in Latin America (UNHCR, ￿￿￿￿). Public sector trade unions have an
even higher rate of unionisation.
￿￿￿As a result of the left’s return to power, Uruguay reinstated collective bargaining negotiation in most areas of work.
Establishing who has access to the bargaining table is often defined by which trade union represents more workers in the
industry.
￿￿￿Judicial Decision ￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ available at www.poderjudicial.gub.uy
￿￿￿Uruguay has allowed a new mining project (Aratiri) in the countryside, as well as the construction of an important
pulp mill plant which led to significant debates about possible damage to the River Plate and Uruguay.
￿￿￿￿e Uruguayan Constitution grants MPs the right to request information about public aﬀairs from ministers
(Art.￿￿￿). Furthermore, Law ￿￿￿￿￿ establishes that ministers should reply in ￿￿ days. ￿is could be considered a ‘sui
generis’ access-to-information right.
￿￿￿Requests tend not to be answered by ministers, regardless of the party in power. Statistics from the Parliament
show that during the period ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ (Colorado Government), ￿￿￿￿ out of ￿￿￿￿ requests were answered. During the
period ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿ (Left Government), ￿￿￿￿ requests out of ￿￿￿￿ were answered. ￿e current administration seems to be
continuing this trend, as ￿￿￿ requests have been answered and ￿￿￿ have not been answered (Senate Website, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿
(Cabrera, ￿￿￿￿). However, when MPs used the RTI law, the government replied promptly.￿￿￿ If
MPs’ RTI requests are successful, then a key question is to establish why MPs do not use it more
often. Initial evidence shows that MPs might not be fully aware of the potential of the RTI law and
perceive their prerogative to request information as more important or useful.￿￿￿ However, there are
also political motivations not to use this law. An opposition MP notes that:
Sometimes we prefer to use our prerogatives because it allows us to score political points. We show that
the government is not going to answer, and we document that we did something about the topic, but it is
not very eﬀective. (IAUY￿)
Another opposition MP notes that:
If you get the information, through the law, or through a reply, it is because the government wants to
send a political message.... We usually ask when we have previous information by other means that oﬃcial
documents exist. (IAUY￿)
￿us, MPs will tend to use the law as long as they get political points out of it. A clear example of
this is the case of an opposition MP requesting data about the celebration ceremony for the newly-
elected government in ￿￿￿￿, paid for by the previous one. President Vazquez mentioned at the time
that he was ‘oﬀended by the opposition asking for the cost, as it was an investment in democracy’ (Portal￿￿￿,
￿￿￿￿). Finally, after a RTI request by a recently elected opposition MP, the President released the
information. Not doing so could have risked a judicial action at the end of his term (El Pais, ￿￿￿￿).
Local-level MPs are also using the law. For instance, a group of local MPs from Paysandu requested
information about the accounts from the traditional local ‘beer festival’. According to rumours
several providers were not paid, thus the opposition decided to use the law to get the raw numbers
(El Telegrafo, ￿￿￿￿).By now MPs, particularly in opposition, have incorporated this tool into their
options to control government. Companies have not used this law systematically yet in Uruguay.
￿ere are a few records of companies making use of this law, particularly in public purchase processes,
as well as to gather evidence for judicial proceedings.
￿￿￿In the context of this research, I have so far identified three cases where MPs have used the law: a request to the
President of the Republic about the cost of a celebration ceremony for the newly-elected government (￿￿￿.com.uy. ￿￿￿￿), a
request to obtain a copy of a contract between the government and an important company in the forestry sector, and a third
request about the hiring of three professionals in the Presidency of the Republic (Presidency of the Republic, Resolution
P/￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿As a matter of fact, a Colorado MP is looking to change the legislation to align the answer deadline of the legislative
prerogative with the RTI Law. ￿e current regulation establishes that, to answer a prerogative request, the government
potentially could have up to ￿￿￿ days, while the equivalent under the RTI law is twenty days.
￿￿￿
Innocent requesters
Individuals acting on their own are very unlikely to request public information. First, the state has
done little to promote demand and, as a result, a large proportion of citizens are still unaware of this
right. When individuals engage in using and quoting the law, they are usually disgruntled with local
or national services, and they activate request mechanisms. One individual detected during the course
of this research requested information from the local council of Montevideo that should have been
posted on the website. Montevideo Council denied this information; eventually, he went to court
and got access to this information.
However, mavericks are usually rare in the RTI arena. ￿e website quesabes.uy, set up in the
context of this research, provides a glimpse of certain behaviours that individuals using the portal
start to exhibit. For instance, lack of a reply from the administration triggers requests to website
administrators about the reason behind this. Users also tend to request that new units to be added to
the portal. User comments on the website help each other with diﬀerent ways to frame or interpret
replies from the administration. In this way, individuals with diﬀerent interests also collaborate,
enabling more ‘social’ access-to-information requests in the digital age. However, the number of users
still does not suggest that there is a huge demand but suggests that, given the chance, people might
make requests. Requests on this website shows no indication of vexatious requests.
￿.￿.￿ A weak enforcement institution: APIU and the role of the judiciary
In the Uruguayan RTI arena, there are two organisations in a position to order the release of public in-
formation: the Access to Public Information Unit (APIU) and the judiciary. Following the framework
presented in Chapter ￿, enforcement institutions can be classified on the basis of two dimensions:
independence and enforcement capacity.
Autonomy
Table ￿.￿ provides a summary of Uruguay’s enforcement institution independence:
APIU is a semi-autonomous institution dependent on ASIEG and ultimately dependent on the
Presidency of the Republic. ￿e Board of Directors consists of the ASIEG Director and two other
members appointed by the President of the Republic according to a set of merit criteria.￿￿￿
￿￿￿In Uruguayan administrative law APIU is known as ‘organismos desconcentrado’. Under this modality of administra-






Appointed by the President without scrutiny
Stability Appointments were not regularly performed
Oversight ￿e Courts, the Administrative Tribunal and￿e President can overrule
the decision coming from the APIU
Resources Budget allocation is not clearly established and is decided by the Presidency
Perception Not available
However, there is no scrutiny from the Legislative to the appointment of APIU members, unlike
the cases of Chile and New Zealand analysed in this work. Members of the board are not paid a salary
and payment consists of a insignificant stipend.￿￿￿￿is situation led to one of the first appointed
Councillors to resign, noting that ‘matters were becoming more complicated and delicate... It was not
serious to work in this way, not to fully devote ourselves to the work APIU really demands’ (Sanchez ￿￿￿￿).
￿e first Board was composed of three councillors and it took the authorities seven months to appoint
new councillors, leaving APIU somewhat paralysed. ￿e tenure of another member of the board was
not renewed and the executive filled the position with the first non-lawyer: an archivist. ￿e design
leads to a lack of legitimacy in terms of the board of directors, which, although technically competent,
have no political support. APIU authorities maintain that they are technically independent but admit
that the lack of political independence is an issue (Lanza y Da Rosa, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e Unit set up a consultative forum with members of civil society, academia,the judiciary, the
state prosecution and the private sector to deliberate on and recommend policy options. ￿ere
is no formal way of appointing members of this forum and the term of the appointment is not
clear. ￿e consultative forum seldom met initially after its creation and had little say on the policy
process.￿￿￿ APIU performs five functions in this arena: implementing the law across the Uruguayan
state, proposing second-level regulation, providing advice to the government, acting as a liaison with
civil society and academia, and settling disputes between public organisations and requesters. ￿is
challenged. ￿eoretically, once the President appoints the members, he cannot fire them, and in this way members are
independent.
￿￿￿In contrast, the sister Privacy Unit has its own staﬀ; the board of directors is paid and has so far carried out significant
work implementing the privacy law.
￿￿￿It did play a role advising the government to accept email requests as valid forms of communications.
￿￿￿
particular institutional design implies that APIU’s decisions can be abrogated by the President of the
Republic. Furthermore, their decisions can also be challenged before the Administrative Tribunal.
Enforcement capacity
Table ￿.￿: APIU Enforcement Capacity
Dimension Indicator
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of review pro-
cesses
Does not have access to documents.
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of enforcement
practices
Non Binding
Extent of the legal mandate in terms of imposing
sanctions?
No mandate to sanction
Resources (staﬀ, budget, capacities) to carry out the
assigned tasks
Does not have its own resources)
Service delivery Not available
Decisions or sanctions eﬀectively applied? Decisions are recommendations and
depends on the will of the administration.
Decisions are often challenged.
Implementation of RTI law has been complex and the Unit did not produce a robust implementa-
tion plan.￿￿￿. Table ￿.￿ provides a summary of the enforcement dimension in Uruguay. According to
its own data, APIU has managed to increase the level of reporting from several public oﬃces, as well as
to establish a network of RTI points of contact. Proactive transparency publication and classification
of information activities should have been carried out a year after the law was approved, but were
not in place.￿￿￿ By October ￿￿￿￿, the Unit issued a guideline to units to produce a self-evaluation
of the implementation process. By August ￿￿￿￿, the Unit issued specific regulations and guidelines
on how to proceed in terms of implementation. Some specific measures, such as the organisation of
seminars and setting up a website, were also part of the implementation eﬀort. In terms of advice to
other public bodies, the Unit is increasingly providing advice, but reactively rather than proactively.
As a result, the Unit has no capacity to reach public bodies that are not interested or willing to
￿￿￿￿ere is no record of strategic planning processes from ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿. ￿is is a diﬀerence with the processes of the
Council for Transparency
￿￿￿￿e law was approved on ￿￿ October ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
comply. In terms of settling diﬀerences between the requesters and the state, the Unit so far has issued
￿￿￿recommendations to public bodies, an average of ￿￿ recommendations per year.￿￿￿
Recommendations do not translate themselves into release of information, and some public bodies
challenge recommendations by ignoring them or challenging APIU competency in the matter. An
example of this is case ￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ where the Central Bank challenged APIU criteria on reserved
information. ￿e Bank eventually went to court and fought a legal battle to keep this information
reserved. Furthermore, it also obtained a decree from the President revoking APIU’s decision and
confirming that it has no competency on the matter. In a nutshell, the President revoked the decision
of the allegedly independent institution, which shows the fragility of APIU’s position.
APIU’s position can be also challenged in front of a Supreme Administrative Tribunal. In the case
￿￿/￿￿￿, APIU ordered the telecommunications SOE to release information about public spending in
oﬃcial publicity. ￿e Presidency decided not to intervene in this case, but the SOE challenged this
decision before the Supreme Administrative Tribunal who ended up confirming APIU’s decision to
release the information. However, the Tribunal noted that APIU did not have the power to order the
release and also noted it had no power to review how public bodies classify information.
A former Councillor noted that, ‘￿e only tool we really have is an annual report about the law, but
there is no possibility to sanction, and as a result the public bodies fulfil their duties according to the will
they have to be transparent; thus, the power of the APIU is diminished ’ (La Diaria, ￿￿￿￿).
To put together an Annual Report, APIU relies on self-reporting mechanisms from public authori-
ties. Table ￿.￿ shows the degree of compliance through the years
Table ￿.￿: Number of reports received by APIU
Year ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Number of reports re-
ceived/ number of public
authorities
￿￿/￿￿￿ ￿￿/￿￿￿ ￿￿/￿￿￿ ￿￿/￿￿￿
Source: [Author, based on APIU, ￿￿￿￿].
￿e low level of compliance shows that APIU has neither the ability nor the resources to force
these authorities to comply with basic duties under the Act.
￿￿￿Data available from ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿. In ￿￿￿￿, one of the members of the board resigned and, as a result, the board
cannot function.
￿￿￿
￿e role of the judiciary
According to the law, requesters can access the lower administrative courts in the capital and the lower
civil courts in the rest of the country to sue the state. ￿e process takes only six working days, and
the ruling can be appealed before a Higher Tribunal. Potentially, the Supreme Court of Justice could
intervene but only if points of law are at issue.￿￿￿ Courts have been active in terms of reacting to
access-to-information demands. Demand has been relatively low, but the courts have usually upheld
access-to-information requests. Up to ￿￿￿￿, twenty rulings were challenged in second-level courts.
So far, it has not been possible to retrieve the number of rulings at low-level courts. An initial search
of private databases shows that out of fifty cases, in forty the judge granted access to information. In
this way, the judiciary is setting a powerful precedent for openness. One activist notes that ‘some of
these cases are fairly obvious, and a waste of time for the tribunal; others are more complicated and deserve
attention from the judiciary’ (Lanza, ￿￿￿￿).
However, there is a set of cases that end up being informally resolved by the judge through
transactional mechanisms. In other words, the Judge decides not to issue a ruling if the matter is
relatively simple. ￿is is usually the case with ‘positive silence’ (when the state does not release the
information in due time) or where it has been a matter of internal communication inside a public
organisation and there is goodwill on the side of the state to releasing public information. As activists
note (CAINFO ￿￿￿￿), courts are not necessarily consistent when denying or granting access to
information. ￿is is the result of having the judiciary deciding on individual cases, which links back
the policy adoption process and previous institutions in place.
￿e legal process is relatively fast but it comes at a cost for the judiciary. As soon an access-to-
information request is processed, all the tribunal activity stops to deal with the request. As a result,
access-to-information requests, if used extensively, can create backlogs for other cases in the same
oﬃce. Furthermore, requesters need to have access to a lawyer in order to activate this process.
Lawyers’ fees can be expensive and public interest litigation is relatively unknown in Uruguay. ￿e
judiciary plays an increasingly political role mediating conflicts between political actors about access
to information. As opposition MPs begin to realise the power of RTI requests, judges are called
upon to decide on these matters. For instance, in ￿￿￿￿ a MP from the Colorado Party demanded
information about the state of public works on the Uruguay River. ￿e river is administered by
￿￿￿￿e court could intervene only on points of law or when dealing with issues that are related to a violation of the
constitution of the republic.
￿￿￿
Argentina and Uruguay and there are debates about jurisdiction, joint infrastructure projects, etc.
￿e government classified information about certain works as reserved and the MP demanded of the
Foreign Aﬀairs Ministry to know their status and cost. ￿e judge decided in favour of the Ministry,
noting that he understood the concerns of the MP, but was unable to deliver the information at that
stage (El Observador, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e judiciary also acted to uphold the constitutionality of the law. In
Uruguayan legal tradition, only the Supreme Court can strike down legislation. ￿e Court upheld
that the law was constitutional after it was challenged by the Cable TV association (El Observador,
￿￿￿￿). ￿e challenge originated when a local journalist asked for data on then number of client each
Cable companies had. All companies resisted the release of this data, asserting that the application of
the law was against free enterprise and commercial interests in their case. ￿e Supreme Court asserted
that the case was of constitutional importance and that the law was essential to ensure transparency
in markets. Activists note that courts, while usually ensuring the access-to-information principle, also
have problems in terms of applying a unified criteria. ￿is can be explained by the fact that judges are
still dealing with a new subject, there is little jurisprudence on this matter, and the judicial structure
ensures that each judge can provide his/her own interpretation of the law.
￿.￿ ￿ʀ￿ɢ￿￿ʏ: ɪɴɪ￿ɪ￿ʟ ￿￿￿￿ʙ￿￿￿ ʟ￿￿￿￿
￿e Uruguayan RTI arena is still evolving and subject to possible feedback loops. For instance, in
June ￿￿￿￿ the government decided to reform the access-to-information law, introducing a set of new
exceptions which included protection of policy advice and the possibility of classifying information
‘on the spot’ when a request is made. ￿e drafting came from the executive and was spearheaded
by Senator Topolansky who was an early defender of the RTI law. ￿e opportunity came amidst a
budget review which usually does not go through the same checks as an average law, due to time and
attention constraints. Civil society organisations quickly reacted, noting that there was no consultation
process in place through the formal institutional channels. Several organisations mounted an online
campaign, asking the government to withdraw the initiative and have a consultation on the matter. ￿e
government refused and the amendment passed the Chamber of Deputies, where further amendments
were introduced establishing exceptions that severely limited RTI(Declaracion.uy,￿￿￿￿).
Several MPs noted that APIU had become a nuisance for several state-owned enterprises and some
of them lobbied extensively behind the scenes to secure the modifications. Civil society gathered
international support from several international NGOs and the visit of the Special Rapporteur for
￿￿￿
Freedom of Expression, Frank La Rue, was also instrumental in raising issues about the reform. ￿e
national Ombudsman made a recommendation to desist and reconsider this reform. ￿e senate finally
decided to withdraw the amendment but Senator Topolansky requested that legislative measures
should be in place by the end of the year. ￿e government established a consultation mechanism
and a new reform was introduced with partial agreement from civil society. It included more legal
powers to APIU, a harm and a public interest test and the new exception about policy advice was
modified. ￿e new amendment could be defined as a compromise. It is likely that, depending on the
issues discussed and the use of RTI, more feedback loops like this will emerge from injured parties.
In addition, while in this particular case civil society was successful enough in mounting a campaign
and engaging policymakers, there is no guarantee that such success will be replicated as more tension
grows in the system. ￿e feedback loops indicate that the early statements from senators praising
the principle of transparency and the use of data changes dramatically once information is put into
action by interested parties.
￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿ɴ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
According to the typology presented in Chapter ￿, Uruguay is a contested arena. Table ￿.￿ shows the
dimensions and outputs in this arena.
Table ￿.￿: Outcomes
Availability of public information on a proactive
basis
Fulfilment of proactive publication duty is less
than ￿￿￿ (average) across government units.
Eﬃciency in dealing with RTI requests Not eﬃcient or eﬀective; ￿￿￿ of requests go
unanswered.
Accessibility and eﬀectiveness to resolve disputes ￿ere are no formal limits to accessing APIU.
Courts may charge fees.
Source: [Author, based on CAINFO, ￿￿￿￿APIU, ￿￿￿￿, Que Sabes ￿￿￿￿].
￿e current status of the Uruguayan RTI arena can be explained analysing the three factors
mentioned in this research: participation in the policymaking process, professionalisation of public
administration and independence of enforcement institutions.
RTI emerged in Uruguay as part of a larger quest for human rights linked to previous abuses of
the former dictatorship. It was always an agenda of a small group of activists that, when the Broad
Front came into power, managed to influence key decision-makers to pursue this agenda, turning
￿￿￿
Senator Percovich into a true political champion and entrepreneur for this cause. ￿e agenda was
largely supported in this last phase by international foundations such as the Open Society. Most of
the policy was put in place by civil society following international standards, but the powerful ASIEG
also played a role, introducing changes that weakened the law. Crucially in this adoption phase, the
idea of an independent enforcement institution was discarded and control of this function eﬀectively
ended up in the hands of ASIEG through the creation of APIU. ASIEG was more worried about
privacy than transparency and this meant that resources and focus were directed more to this goal,
leaving APIU as a shadow enforcement institution. In addition, decisions about institutional design
with no proper screening process ended up being adopted, aﬀecting the structure and roles of the
enforcement institution which largely depends on ASIEG. Lack of participation on the part of key
actors and an absence of technocratic advice explains the current design of the law.
￿e timing of the approval and implementation helped to diﬀuse responsibilities between the
outgoing administration and the new administration that arrived in ￿￿￿￿. As a result, there were dis-
continuities in policies and positions in terms of transparency initiatives. Michener (￿￿￿￿) speculates
that the delay in approving the law at the end of the presidential mandate was a conscious decision on
the part of the executive to leave a complex topic for the new administration to implement. ￿is delay
had lasting eﬀects and led to the law being poorly implemented, but it is more likely that ASIEG’s
autonomy and focus on privacy were responsible for this rather than the Presidency itself.
Uruguay’s politicised state bureaucracy fulfils the law partially. Part of this is explained by a relative
lack of resources for implementation but the other part has to do with the secrecy ethos public servants
and politicians have developed over the years. Information could be used politically and, as a result,
could damage public servants’ and politicians’ careers. Information is not only hidden from the
public but also from other public organisations to be used for various political purposes. ￿erefore,
to establish a regime that operates under the assumption that all information is public is a dramatic
change in what is eﬀectively a fragmented public bureaucracy. Some organisations are able to deal
more professionally with requests, releasing information but also establishing a complex patterns of
resistance. Less professional organisations are still dealing with implementation problems and change.
In Uruguayan public administration, the ultimate decision to release public information or not is
taken by a political appointee. As a result, requests are often perceived as a threat from a political
perspective. Resistance, obstruction and no response are part of this logic. Such a degree of politicisa-
tion leads to very complex dynamics in terms of releasing public information and most requests are
￿￿￿
deemed ‘political’. ￿e lack of structured processes to deal with RTI requests also shows the degree to
which informality and lack of state capacity play a role. For instance, while Uruguay is perceived as a
leader in e-Government in the region, a significant number of government agencies are still unable or
unwilling to answer an FOI request through electronic means, as the quesabes.uy experience shows.
Furthermore, the Uruguayan public administration did not fully incorporate an NPM logic and, as a
result, metrics barely exist in several public organisations and access to these numbers is diﬃcult and
usually contested. Oddly enough, sometimes it is the public service that gets more benefits from the
release of this information, as it allows more coordinated action which can be aﬀected by political
mistrust. ￿e weaknesses in terms of archives and information management processes led to problems
in terms of retrieving public information and are endemic to the whole system.
￿e weakness in terms of institutional design has major implications for the release of public
information, as well as in the performance of the arena. ￿e fact that the executive is able to revoke
an order from APIU (and the fact that this has already happened), as well as the lack of political
support for its functions, shows that it has a limited range of action. Furthermore, the fact that
APIU’s decision can also be challenged before an Administrative Tribunal casts a shadow over the
organisation’s eﬀective enforcement power. ￿e result is that, as a consequence of poor institutional
design, there is often uncertainty about how requests should be solved.
￿e legacy of a strong judiciary is the key to ensuring the RTI is upheld. ￿e Uruguayan judiciary
has delivered in terms of granting access to information as well as standing up for the constitutional
principle it represents. However, attacks on this principle have so far been blunt and unsophisticated.
It is likely that more complex issues about the scope of the law and which organisations should be
included might aﬀect how the judiciary deals with RTI requests. Furthermore, the fact that the
judiciary is also subject to the law (and often replies to requests) gives it more standing to intervene,
but the lack of understanding and doctrine in this field oﬀers poor guidance to lower-level judges on
how to deal with this matter. In addition, the unintended consequence of the legal mechanism is
that it can potentially create a backlog in judges’ oﬃces, and this might well pose questions about its
eﬀectiveness, as it is not sustainable in the long run. ￿e more political the nature of the requests
become, the more likely it is that the judiciary will end up mediating between politicians, as in other
areas of Uruguayan political life.
Uruguay is still a contested arena where RTI is becoming an institution, but the limits are not yet
clear. Uruguayan civil society is key demanding information and initiating accountability actions.
￿￿￿
￿e degree of success of these actions largely depends on the involvement of the judiciary, where
eﬀective accountability can be achieved.
￿￿￿
￿
RT I ARENAS : A COMPARAT IVE OVERV IEW
In the previous chapters, I provided a full account of three diﬀerent RTI arenas: functional, mixed
and contested. In this chapter, I provide a comparative overview, aiming to synthesise this work. First,
I set out to compare these arenas based on the three main factors that shape them: participation in
the policymaking process, professionalisation of the state bureaucracy, and enforcement institutions.
Second, I compare the actors working in these arenas. ￿ird, I look at change in RTI arenas, examining
how feedback loops evolved in the selected cases. Finally, I look at the outputs these arenas exhibit
and how they vary across the diﬀerent types.
￿.￿ ￿ʟ￿￿￿ɴ￿￿ ￿￿ɴ￿ɪɢ￿ʀɪɴɢ ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿: ￿￿ʀ￿ɪ￿ɪ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ, ￿￿￿￿￿
ʙ￿ʀ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿ʏ ￿ɴ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ɴ￿￿ʀ￿￿￿￿ɴ￿ ɪɴ￿￿ɪ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ￿
In this research I argued that RTI arenas based on similar principles end up working diﬀerently
leading to diﬀerent outputs. In Chapter ￿ I noticed that all these arenas share a RTI law establishing
similar principles about the availability of public information. I argued that there are three elements
that help to shape RTI arenas: participation in the policymaking process, the professionalisation
of state bureaucracy, and RTI enforcement institutions. In this section, I return to the definition
provided in Chapter ￿ and compare these elements for each arena.
￿.￿.￿ Participation in the policymaking process
I argued that participation in the policymaking process by relevant stakeholders leads to robust policy
design and the establishment of a policy community able to support the implementation of RTI laws.
￿e New Zealand case shows how participation contributes to setting up a functional RTI arena.
First, the large number of submissions to the Danks Committee, coming from diﬀerent parts of New
￿￿￿
Zealand society, is a strong indication of how local individuals and organisations were engaged in
this debate. Second, an active civil society, aware of developments overseas, but grounded in New
Zealand reality, contributed to the robustness of policy design. ￿ird, a group of fairly progressive
civil servants took the job of promoting the OIA inside the civil service and played a pivotal role in
designing this law. Unlike other cases in this research, the participation of a small but influential part
of the civil service proved beneficial for the establishment of this RTI arena. ￿e level of participation
and the influence certain participants exerted led to the establishment of a functional RTI arena.
In fact, this was the policy community that would be crucial for implementation and addressing
feedback loops in the NZ RTI arena.
In the Chilean case, participation came mostly from a small group of civil society advocates with a
legal background. A group of influential techno-pols pushed this agenda forward with the support of
two key politicians. ￿is was not a large nor particularly open community. ￿e process was influenced
by one international factor: international foundations and the Inter-American Court of Justice (IACJ)
in terms of policy. ￿e IACJ ruling was instrumental in aﬀecting the policy channel and setting up
the Council for Transparency. International foundations were instrumental in providing support for
civil society activists. ￿ese developments led to the establishment of a small, active and professional
policy community where not all the stakeholders were represented, which would later aﬀect the
implementation process.
￿e Uruguayan case shows how a small and determined group of activists, with the support of one
political champion and international foundations, can push for a RTI law. ￿e process was mediated
by strong interests who opposed the law and eventually managed to prevent the establishment of an
independent institution. International institutions, in particular international foundations and the
Inter-american Human Rights system, also played a role in providing policy ideas and support. ￿e
process led to the establishment of a small and dislocated policy community with little influence over
the implementation process.
Table ￿.￿ provides a synthesis of the above-mentioned processes
International support is important and plays a role in fostering participation. ￿e cases of Uruguay
and Chile show how diﬀerent international actors can aid the process by aﬀecting the policy channel
in Kingdon’s (￿￿￿￿) terms. However, external support cannot per se deliver a robust and functional
RTI arena. ￿e case of NZ shows that the involvement of a small but influential group of politically
neutral public servants and civil society advocates can deliver in terms of robust policy design without
￿￿￿
Table ￿.￿: Characteristics of participation
Case Level of Participation Key actors
NewZealand (Functional RTI) High level of participation Civil Society and Civil servants
Chile (Mixed RTI arena) Low level of participation Techno-pols, small civil society
group and two political cham-
pions
Uruguay (Contested Arena) Low level of participation Civil society + political cham-
pion
external support or influence. ￿us, is participation by relevant stakeholders what makes a diﬀerence
in these cases. Evidence indicates that while international actors are influential in terms of policy
ideas, but remains relevant is the participation of local stakeholders
One of the striking characteristics in most of the cases is the absence of political champions when
these laws are first proposed. In New Zealand, the process was largely driven by civil society and
public servants. In Chile, corruption scandals forced the hands of politicians to look for a solution,
which included RTI. In this case, champions emerged as a result of a political agreement, after a
lengthy battle on the part of civil society. In Uruguay, the issue was linked to human rights and the
shadow of a military dictatorship. After a lengthy battle by civil society organisations, one senator
was instrumental in securing the law.
Politicians following this agenda have a mixture of incentives and carry out a vital task. In New
Zealand, the few MPs involved saw the law as a way to limit Muldoon’s government. In Chile,
politicians used this agenda to show compromise and promote a ‘beyond parties’ approach. In
Uruguay, politicians linked this struggle to campaigns related to human rights. In short, there were
incentives but not suﬃciently strong to persuade a large number of politicians to support these laws
initially. Once the laws are to be discussed in parliament, it is diﬃcult to oppose them. In all cases,
only a few politicians decided to support this agenda, persuaded colleagues and secured consensus.
￿.￿ ￿ʀ￿￿￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ￿ʟɪ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ ￿￿ ￿ʜ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ʙ￿ʀ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿￿ʏ
￿e second factor that I argued shapes these arenas is the professionalisation of the bureaucracy. A
more professional bureaucracy leads to the ATI arena working more eﬃciently.
NewZealand shows the implementation of RTI by a professional bureaucracy. Such implementation
￿￿￿
was initially resisted by the bureaucracy. However, once processes were in place, the New Zealand
civil service carried the policy and implementation forward. ￿ey would occasionally do this even
against the will of their political masters. ￿e role of the Information Authority was key to securing a
certain degree of coherence in the system. Once this institution was gone, problems of consistency
emerged in the New Zealand arena. In Chile, by contrast, bureaucracy does not exhibit the same level
of professionalism. As a result, the implementation of RTI was initially patchy with some units openly
resisting publishing information. In addition, a politicised bureaucracy has much stronger incentives
to retain information than a more professional one. Accountability lines in Chilean bureaucracy are
very much aligned with parties. Having said this, Chilean bureaucracy managed to implement the
law with a good degree of success over the years, particularly in terms of proactive transparency.
In Uruguay, bureaucracy is even more politicised. Political appointees decide which information is
going to be released and how. ￿is aﬀects the way the system operates as the incentives of bureaucrats
and politicians are very much aligned. Public servants have little incentive to release information as it
could cost them in terms of their career. With a less professional bureaucracy also comes the problem
of poor implementation. A weak implementation unit with few resources is unable to cope with a
systematic implementation of the law. ￿is causes problems, especially for core agencies who could
benefit from having more public information available so as to be able to perform their roles.
In all three cases, professionalisation of the bureaucracy plays a crucial role in securing the im-
plementation of RTI. Even against its own interests, a professional bureaucracy will implement the
law. ￿e diﬀerent incentives of bureaucrats and politicians aids in this process. In addition, the
bureaucracy gets to establish a new process that, in the end, also justifies new structures and new jobs.
Professional bureaucracies are particularly astute when using RTI for strategic release of material to
advance their interests, as the NZ Treasury case shows. However, the state is not a monolith, nor is
the bureaucracy. ￿us, even in the best scenario, some organisations might resist processing a request
or publishing certain information properly. Some organisations have more resources and are more
politically astute when dealing with RTI than others. Core agencies remain key players in these arenas
and often benefit from information release to perform their functions.
Public records (and more generally information management) remain the Achilles’ heel of all RTI
arenas. As noted by White (￿￿￿￿), RTI requests are the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Once a request arrives,
a set of events and procedures unfold in a given oﬃce. Such procedures usually end up as simple
questions such as: Where is this information? Do we have it? Do we have to collate it and if so how? ￿is
￿￿￿
is the realm of information policies and archives which is usually neglected by public organisations. In
this research, I found evidence that archives were usually under-resourced, even before RTI laws came
into being. RTI laws exposed the need to have information readily available and to have procedures for
retrieving it. Information management policies also regulate how information should be collected and
registered. When such policies are not properly established or followed, information quality suﬀers,
aﬀecting requesters and other stakeholders in the arena alike. ￿e collation process obviously aﬀects
transparency as public servants take decisions on what to keep and what to release. Poor information
policies have an impact on RTI arenas. Information policies are related to each organisation’s capacity
and its awareness of the value of information.
Table ￿.￿ outlines the points made above.
Table ￿.￿: Politicisation of Bureaucracy
Case Level of Professionalism Expected process
NewZealand (Functional RTI) Professional bureaucracy Processes are in place in terms
of publication and receiving re-
quests. Process often consistent
Chile (Mixed RTI arena) Politicised bureaucracy with
professional management
Processes are in place with
some political interference
Uruguay (Contested arena) Politicised bureaucracy + Polit-
ical management of the request
Processes are not consistent
￿.￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ɴ￿￿ʀ￿￿￿￿ɴ￿ ɪɴ￿￿ɪ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ￿
I argued that autonomy and enforcement capacity of RTI enforcement institutions played a key role
in shaping RTI arenas. In this research, I compared three models of such an institution.
In New Zealand, the Ombudsmanmanaged to establish itself as an autonomous and able institution.
History played an important role, as the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce was already an established institution
in New Zealand. It was respected by the civil service and, as a result, it was fairly routine for the
Ombudsman to interact with it. Other institutions such as the judiciary played a significant role in
defending the Ombudsman when challenged. While, paradoxically, the Ombudsman’s Oﬃce can only
make recommendations, most of its recommendations were unchallenged. ￿us, the Ombudsman
was an autonomous and eﬀective institution to which requesters could turn.
￿￿￿
In Chile, the establishment of the Council for Transparency was the result of a complex bargain. As
a specialist institution, the Council managed to secure its place and influence in the arena. However,
issues in terms of the appointment and re-appointment of councillors, as well as complex cases where
the Council encountered resistance from the courts, show limits to its autonomy, though most of the
Council’s decisions are backed up by the courts and the Constitutional Tribunal. It is an eﬀective
organisation able to deliver on its main mission, although it does face challenges in terms of resources.
In Uruguay, the absence of an autonomous institution leaves the arena at the mercy of implemen-
tation agencies. APIU is not autonomous and can be challenged by several actors in this arena. ￿e
President, the Administrative Courts and even the judiciary can overturn APIU’s decisions. ￿ere
is no screening process for APIU’s oﬃcials. ￿e appointment process experienced problems in the
past, eﬀectively undermining the agency’s independence. ￿e lack of resources also makes APIU a
regulator with little opportunity to engage with public servants. ￿us, while APIU does play a role in
implementing this law, it is a weak role. ￿e judiciary remains Uruguay’s most relevant institution
when information is denied, which comes at a cost for the requesters and the regulator.
All three models exhibit evidence that the autonomy and enforcement capacity of these organisations
are crucial factors for their success, regardless of their institutional form. Legacy can play a role (as
in the case of NZ), but the Chilean case oﬀers an example of how a new institution can emerge.
Coordination with other horizontal accountability institutions is important to secure the establishment
of these institutions in the early days. In all cases, these organisations are often called on to decide on
complex matters, eﬀectively acting as arbiters in highly political disputes, highlighting the importance
of establishing independence and ability in a RTI arena. Furthermore, in all three cases, leadership
of these organisations is an important factor. Successive leaders of these organisations dealt with
politically complex issues, which required certain political and administrative skills. Leadership can
be shared or individual, but is one of the salient points. When eﬀective leadership is in place, these
institutions thrive and are able to exercise their powers fully.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿
Actors exhibit a similar set of behaviours in all arenas. Journalists are often one of the key supporters
and most active users of RTI. However, they are not always keen on using it as it can aﬀect traditional
ways of working or information could be obtained too late to be used.
A very particular type of organisation in civil society is also present in all arenas. ￿ese NGOs
￿￿￿
usually emerge as part of a campaign for freedom of information. ￿eir core mission is to promote
RTI and fill access-to-information requests, evaluating the implementation of RTI policies. ￿ese
NGOs are usually small, with a legalistic outlook and supported by international foundations. ￿ey
operate with small budgets, facing several constraints in terms of material and human resources. ￿ey
play a crucial role, particularly in the early days of implementation, when testing the system is needed.
Increasingly, these NGOs worked with others to expand RTI use, developing joint requests with
other organisations according to relevant issues on the political or social agenda. In New Zealand,
use of RTI was closely associated with the environmentalist movement, which played an important
role in advancing RTI in the first five years. As RTI awareness expanded, other organisations such as
unions, universities and civic associations started using the law.
Politicians are usually latecomers to the use of RTI. Only a few of them used RTI to pursue their
political agendas. Once politicians understood the value behind RTI, they become avid users, as the
New Zealand case demonstrates. Politicians know that the lack of a reply is still something they can
use, particularly in opposition, to embarrass the government. Once politicians become users of RTI,
they legitimise the instrument, making it an integral part of their toolbox. Politicians mostly request
information to score political points, which usually results in diﬀerent treatment at the receiver end.
In addition, a politician may already have information in advance when making a RTI request.
Corporations are increasingly a player in RTI arenas. Corporations are taking advantage of RTI,
particularly to analyse regulation or to gather evidence in trials. Increasingly, the civil service resist
these requests which are considered intimidatory in all three arenas.
In Chile and Uruguay, individual requesters are few. Most individual requesters are lawyers
representing clients. Individual requesters do not engage, which reflects the lack of information about
these policies and the diﬃculties in terms of access. ￿is is one of the most worrying aspects of RTI
arenas, as the lack of requests coming from individuals challenge the democratic ideal behind these
laws. New Zealand oﬀers a rare case where individuals did request information. In some cases, this
was linked to their own personal information as New Zealand RTI law included a section on this.
A new breed of organisations is also emerging in these countries. ￿ese organisations used open
software to set up portals that would allow citizens to ask for information from the government. In
doing so, they created a new channel of communication which, although it was not oﬃcial, was
diﬃcult for authorities to ignore. ￿ese organisations designed processes influencing how users could
request public information. ￿e websites were a service, but crucially, also a political statement about
￿￿￿
how RTI should work. In all the arenas, the websites created reactions, forcing the government to
acknowledge this new reality. In Uruguay and Chile, the government decided to create its own portals.
￿e websites did not fully democratise access-to-information request processes but they acted as an
indicator of how a system works. However, sustainability of these tools might be an issue. Except for
the Chilean case,￿￿￿ these websites have no support except from volunteers.
RTI laws put pressure on the civil service. In particular, across the three arenas analysed, the
matter of ‘free and frank advice’ or confidential advice to ministers emerges as a common issue. ￿e
discussion is embedded in the nature and role of the civil service in each country and how it should
operate. By exposing the workings and names of civil servants, RTI erodes one of the basic principles
of traditional (‘Weberian’) bureaucracies: anonymity. Furthermore, it allows a set of complex games
between bureaucrats and ministers and might promote not recording/writing down decisions or
advice. ￿ere is no easy solution to this particular conundrum. By exposing information about how
the government makes decisions, RTI contributes greatly to accountability in a democratic society.
On the other hand, it may lead to gaming among politicians and public servants and behaviours such
as not writing down advice or lying about its existence in the first place. ￿e level of sophistication
of arguments about this issue and feedback loops associated with it shows how civil servants and
activists alike worry. While all the arguments about releasing or not releasing could be justified, the
bottom line is that the problem is how information is framed, used, by whom and to what eﬀect.
￿us, it is the connection with political use (not the information per se) that is problematic. Such a
problem requires assessment according to its particular context, with case-by-case analysis under the
principles of RTI, and it is unlikely to be solved at a normative level. What emerges from the research
in this particular area is that in functional arenas, where bureaucrats and politicians exhibit diﬀerent
incentives in dealing with public information requests, sophisticated games develop between ministers
and civil servants. Where political interests are more aligned, such behaviours are less common.
￿.￿ ￿ʜ￿ɴɢ￿ ɪɴ ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿: ￿￿￿￿ʙ￿￿￿ ʟ￿￿￿￿
As discussed in Chapter ￿, RTI arenas change. Change is the result of conflict that emerge in these
arenas. When someone decides to file a RTI request, that is a statement about things he/she wants
to find out. As noted by several public servants and requesters in this research, RTI is not a way to
￿￿￿￿e Chilean website was discontinued by Fundacion Ciudadano Inteligente in ￿￿￿￿ as a result of the launch of
the government website. ￿e New Zealand website www.fyi.org.nz is still in operation with support of the New Zealand
Herald. ￿e case was not discussed at length in this work due to the historical period covered.
￿￿￿
‘ask in a friendly way for information’. Such conflicts usually escalate and end up generating feedback
loops which are moments when actors decide to challenge the status quo of a RTI arena. Feedback
loops are usually about the scope of the law, matters of procedure and the powers of the enforcement
institution.
In the New Zealand case, feedback loops were positive, enhancing RTI.￿e ￿￿￿￿ reform included
more units in the Act, as well as establishing a clear timeframe. ￿e next feedback loops supported
and expanded the role of the Ombudsman, limiting the veto power of the executive. Furthermore,
this RTI arena survived major changes such as the NPM and MMP reforms. ￿e ability to survive the
test of time and the positive feedback loops is directly linked to participation and the establishment
of a policy community able to steer these changes. In Chile, feedback loops have yet to materialise. A
case about access to government e-mails triggered a reform that may have regressive results. In any
case, feedback loops in Chile will remain at the margins.
In Uruguay, the government pushed for what initially was a regressive reform as a result of a
high-stakes game about education. A campaign from a small and determined group in civil society
was decisive and managed to stop what initially was a reform aimed at broadening exceptions. ￿e
campaign led to a complex bargain. Eventually, a deal was struck with government to set up a new
legal exception not to release public information, but also to include a public interest test. ￿e
initial proposal, the complexity of the bargaining process and the subsequent developments show the
dislocations among the small policy community in Uruguay. Table ￿.￿provides a summary of the
outputs in each arena
Table ￿.￿: Feedback loops
Case Feedback loops
New Zealand (Functional RTI) Feedback loops at the margins. Usually to ex-
pand RTI
Chile (Mixed RTI arena) Feedback loops at the margins with some im-
portant developments to expand RTI
Uruguay (Contested arena) Feedback loops can be serious. ‘Up for grabs’
scenario
￿￿￿
￿.￿ ￿ɪ￿￿￿ʀ￿ɴ￿ ʀ￿ɪ ￿ʀ￿ɴ￿￿ ￿￿ʀ￿ɪɴɢ ￿ɪ￿￿￿ʀ￿ɴ￿ ʟ￿￿￿ɪɴɢ ￿￿ ￿ɪ￿￿￿ʀ￿ɴ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In this research, I argued that arenas can be characterised by three types of outputs : availability of
public information, eﬃciency in dealing with RTI requests and accessibility and eﬀectiveness in terms
of conflict resolution.
In New Zealand, availability of public information was high and remained this way over time. ￿e
Information Authority played a significant role in this until it was disbanded. In addition, some civil
servants and public organisations saw an opportunity to use information in advancing their policies.
A professional bureaucracy was able to control the flow of information according to their interests.
In terms of eﬃciency when processing requests, New Zealand’s bureaucracy was able to respond to
requests within a reasonable length of time and, after an initial patchy implementation, the system
adjusted to and complied with timeframes. ￿e New Zealand Ombudsman’s Oﬃce operated as an
independent institution to resolve disputes. When it was initially challenged, other institutions played
a role in securing its role. ￿e Ombudsman’s Oﬃce provided an accessible and eﬀective system to
resolve conflict.
￿e Chilean experience shows initial reticence to implement proactive transparency, but information
has gradually become available at a central level, though local governments are still a challenge in the
Chilean RTI arena. At a local level, there are still issues about how requests are received and processed.
In some organisations at a central level, some minor issues remain in terms of implementation. ￿e
Council has established itself as a legitimate mechanism to resolve conflicts, though there have been
issues about appointments and certain important disagreements with the courts. ￿e Council is an
accessible and eﬀective unit to seek solutions to conflicts.
Uruguay shows a lack of public information proactively published. Furthermore, there are serious
problems in terms in terms of receiving and processing requests. Uruguay does not have an independent
institution to resolve disputes. ￿e administrative unit in place provides an accessible but ineﬀective
process. ￿e only way to secure resolution of a conflict is through the courts, which is usually costly.
Table ￿.￿ provides a comparative overview
To sum up, in this chapter I provided a synthesis of this comparative endeavour. I compared how
participation, state bureaucracy and RTI enforcement institutions diﬀer in all the case studies, thereby




New Zealand (Functional RTI) • Full proactive availability of public in-
formation
• Eﬃciency in handling requests
• Accessibile and eﬃcient resolution of
conflicts for users of the law
Chile (Mixed RTI arena) • Almost full proactive availability of
public information
• Partial eﬃciency in handling requests
• Accessible and eﬃcient resolution of
conflicts for users of the law
Uruguay (Contested Arena) • Partial proactive availability of public
information
• Ineﬃciency in handling requests
• Lack of accessible and eﬃcient resolu-
tion of conflicts for users of the law




CONCLUS ION : R IGHT-TO- INFORMATION
ARENAS REV I S ITED
‘We shall not cease from exploration And the end of all our
exploring Will be to arrive where we started And know the place
for the first time’
— T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding
In this research I asked: Why do RTI regimes that operate under similar principles work diﬀerently,
leading to diﬀerent outputs? I argued that three factors are important to answer this question: partici-
pation in the policymaking process, the level of professionalisation of the state bureaucracy and the
autonomy and enforcement capacity of RTI enforcement institutions. In particular, I showed how
the configuration of these factors contributes to shape three kind of RTI arenas: functional, mixed
and contested. I showed in the previous chapter how these configurations lead to diﬀerent outputs.
In this final chapter, I draw conclusions from this comparative endeavour.
First, I outline the contributions this work adds to the current state of the field. Second, I provide
a set of recommendations for practitioners. ￿ird, I outline a research agenda for future studies in the
matter.
￿.￿ ￿￿ɪɴ ￿￿ɴ￿ʀɪʙ￿￿ɪ￿ɴ￿ ￿￿ ￿ʜɪ￿ ￿￿ʀ￿ ɪɴ ￿ʜ￿ ￿￿ɴ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ʜ￿
￿￿ʀʀ￿ɴ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ʜ￿ ʟɪ￿￿ʀ￿￿￿ʀ￿
Literature in this field is often concerned about how these policies emerge. As noted in the introduction,
part of the literature deals with why countries adopt RTI in the first place. Among these explanations,
￿￿￿
there are arguments about the role of international organisations (Berliner, ￿￿￿￿), the role of ideology
and capitalism (Stubbs, ￿￿￿￿), policy transfer and emulation processes and the role political systems
play in this(Bennet, ￿￿￿￿) , or the role played by historical sequencing and political organisation
(McLean, ￿￿￿￿). I decided to take a diﬀerent approach, emphasising the participation of key
stakeholders in the policymaking process and previous institutions in place, advancing a middle-range
theory (Merton, ￿￿￿￿).
My contribution is to highlight that who participates in the policymaking process and how,
determines the robustness of policy design and the establishment of a policy community able to
influence the way implementation works. In this way, the ‘details’ of how these laws are set up make a
diﬀerence regarding design and implementation. ￿e former contrasts with other explanations in
the literature, such as the one provided by Michener (￿￿￿￿) where the size and composition of the
cabinet in terms of the numbers of political parties included, seems to play a role in how strong these
laws are. My cases show governments with a large single- party or coalition majorities, approving
relatively strong laws, but with very diﬀerent actors involved in the process in each case. My argument
is that the interaction between technocrats, civil service, civil society and politicians explains the
robustness of these laws and links to the type and quality of implementation later on, as all of these
actors are involved in it. ￿is connection is not often stressed in the literature, hence one of my core
arguments here: the ‘details’ in the policymaking at a meso level matter. ￿e nuts and bolts of these
early decisions are crucial to understanding the evolution of RTI arenas. ￿us, my argument does not
seek a grand explanation of this phenomena. It is a nuanced, evidence-based into the making of these
regimes.
About the point mentioned above, unlike Berliner (￿￿￿￿ p. ￿￿￿) who finds no evidence that the
involvement of international institutions is significant to explain the rise of RTI arenas, the cases
presented here suggest otherwise. Chile and Uruguay were influenced by international organisations
at crucial moments of policy formation. Donors, development banks and international technocrats
played a role in the policy stream in both cases. Influence by external actors does not imply that
Uruguayans or Chileans did not ‘own’ their process, but it does say that diﬀerent international
networks influence the policy stream. My explanation, limited to my cases, levels participation by
key stakeholders and certain events drive the approval and design of these laws. It is the specific
intertwining of actors and events that matter.
￿e literature also indicates that the state is a central player in RTI arenas. Several works by Roberts
￿￿￿
(￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿) and Piotrowski (￿￿￿￿), among others, showcase how the state adjusts procedures to resist
or adapt to the way RTI works. ￿e bureaucracy that holds the information is the same bureaucracy
that is in charge of retrieving and eventually releasing it. My contribution in this aspect is to highlight
the role the professionalism of a bureaucracy plays in the way RTI arenas work. While it is true that
bureaucracies may well resist the release of information, they do this in several forms. In particular,
the alignment of incentives between civil servants and politicians explains several diﬀerences in how
diﬀerent RTI regimes work. When the interests of politicians and civil servants diﬀer in terms of
accountability, bureaucracy might implement the law in a more impartial way. When politicisation is
high, it aﬀects the way requests are processed and information released, usually in a negative manner.
￿is work also shows that the state is not a monolithic entity, thus, even if a case shows a good
degree of professionalism in the public service, there may well be organisations that will still resist the
application of RTI or proceed in a less professional manner. My explanation does not exclude the
possibility that the outputs in RTI arenas could also be aﬀected by issues of resources or previous
capacity. However, the three cases I showed that lack of good archive policies and information
management aﬀects professional and less professional bureaucracies alike. My work also contributes
to understanding key actors at a meso level in the state, showing it is not a monolithic entity.
As noted in the introduction, there is a small stream of literature in this field dealing with en-
forcement institutions in RTI arenas (Neuman, ￿￿￿￿, Holsen and Pasquier, ￿￿￿￿). ￿is literature
argues in favour of specialist institutions dealing with RTI regimes. RTI enforcement institutions
are not often explored in detail or from an empirical perspective. My contribution to this emerging
literature is to stress that regardless of the institutional form, two characteristics are important for
these institutions: autonomy and enforcement capacity. A specialist institution may act as a focal
point for the policy community as the case of Chile shows, thus empowering such community. Setting
up these institutions is also mediated by history and context. Institutions that work in one place
might not work in other places in terms of resolving conflicts in these regimes. However, if there are
adequate autonomy and enforcement capacity, then resolving conflicts in a RTI arena will be more
likely.
￿e literature available contains a few frameworks giving evidence of demand or the behaviours
of public servants (Michener and Worthy, ￿￿￿￿, Pasquier and Villeneuve, ￿￿￿￿, Snell ￿￿￿￿). My
contribution to the literature in this particular field is to design a framework to capture several
elements that relate to each other in these arenas. In this way, the framework allows for a holistic
￿￿￿
view of RTI. By deploying this framework, I am able to capture the way the state, requesters and
norms work; in other words, the ‘dynamics’ of RTI in the cases provided. ￿e framework provides a
conceptual device, theoretically anchored, which could be used to structure further comparisons in
this field.
From an empirical viewpoint, this work adds a new perspective and more empirical material to
the three cases. In the New Zealand case, I revisit the work done by previous researchers (Hazell,
￿￿￿￿, Snell, ￿￿￿￿, White, ￿￿￿￿). Like Snell (￿￿￿￿), I argue that the New Zealand case is a functional
system due to the role early designers played, as well as the previous existence of the Ombudsman. I
also stress in the New Zealand case the role of a competent bureaucracy. For this particular case, I am
also able to provide a more comprehensive explanation to understand the way the regime worked
in those early years and why it remains a functional arena. In the Chilean case, I contribute with
a systematic study considering the history, the role of the civil service and the role of enforcement
institutions. In the Uruguayan case, I provided what is to the best of my knowledge the only systemic
study, as well as contributing an analysis assessing the current state of the Uruguayan RTI arena. ￿e
website quesabes.uy is, as of today, the only source for information about how, and if, the Uruguayan
state answers FOI requests.
￿e distinctive characteristic of my work is to consider, from a middle-range theory perspective,
how three key factors – namely participation, state bureaucracy and RTI enforcement institutions
– shape the way RTI works. I also stress that decisions made at a very early stage in these arenas
shape the way they work. I show how these early decisions and the inherited institutions combined,
leading to certain outputs. In this way, this work joins others signalling the considerable impact
policy inheritances have upon the substance of policymaking (Heclo, ￿￿￿￿ p.￿￿). Further, when
change comes to these regimes, it is possible to connect the degree of these changes with the way
RTI regimes were originally configured, explaining the ‘persistence’ of these regimes in the face of
significant challenges. In historical institutionalist terms, once the pattern has been established, it is
diﬃcult to change it. ￿us, my contribution is based on a broad ‘path dependence’ view of politics. I
argue that a set of initial conditions matters in term of policy design and outputs. ￿ose conditions
are often fluid, and a few key actors can play a dominant role as I have shown through this work. ￿e
historical sequencing of these reforms is also important to understand how the cases arrived at where
they are today.
Finally, there is the issue of change in RTI arenas. To explain change I introduced the concept of
￿￿￿
feedback loops, which aims to capture how RTI arenas evolve over time. ￿is concept is anchored
in a historical institutionalism tradition and helps to explain why RTI regimes continue to evolve
in a certain way. Further, it helps to explain why the configuration initially established persists and
is diﬃcult to change. Once a RTI law has been established each arena evolve, generating feedback
loops through the accumulation of conflicts. Conflicts are usually about central issues in the arena
that key actors want to change. Once conflicts are significant in an arena they will trigger a feedback
loop. Feedback loops are points of time in which an arena face a potential reform. Each type of RTI
arena develops diﬀerent feedback loops. Diﬀerences between feedback loops are a matter of degree.
Functional arenas tend to develop feedback loops that oﬀer an opportunity to improve elements
of the RTI law, and often reforms are ‘discussions at the margins’. Mixed arenas tend to develop
feedback loops where there is a possibility to reform central elements of RTI. Contested arenas tend
to develop feedback loops where everything is ‘up for grabs’. As feedback loops evolve a ’branching
out’ process starts to unfold reinforcing the dynamics of each RTI arena. Feedback loops operate
as a device not only to explain the persistence of these regimes, but also potential gradual change.
As noted by Mahoney and ￿elen (￿￿￿￿) historical institutionalism can provide room to explain
change in gradual ways. ￿us, feedback loops can lead to ‘virtuous’ cycles of reforms or can lead to
the weakening of RTI institutions in each arena. To stress the importance of previous institutions in
place in each arena as well as to stress the importance of ‘positive returns’ and ‘path dependence’ are
traditional features of an historical institutionalism approach to public policy (Peters, ￿￿￿￿). In this
work, I attempted to add value to the RTI literature oﬀering this particular view.
Naturally, this work has limits. First, the cases I selected come from relatively small, democratic and
comparable countries and from countries where the state plays a central role. As it was acknowledged
in Chapter ￿, this approach might be unable to explain how RTI works in places where there is no
state, or where the state is fragile. Furthermore, the theory advanced here might also be unsuitable in
the case of federal states, which are considerably more complex. In short, my findings are applicable
to the cases I presented, and I invite others to build on them and disprove or refine my claims. Second,
as this work has a broad base in historical institutionalism, it shares in some of the criticisms this
approach face. Peters et al.(￿￿￿￿) note that there are challenges to historical institutionalism such as:
explaining policy initiation, the role of politics, the evolution of policies, the role of ideas structure,
and the role of agency.
Historical institutionalism face challenges when explaining change, at the origins and through the
￿￿￿
evolution of the policies (Peters et al. ￿￿￿￿). I address this challenge by going into a detailed and
structured explanation of how these policies emerged and were set up. In short, by using Kingdon’s
heuristic, I acknowledge that these arenas were not ‘just there’ but had a complex history which
actually aﬀects how they are configured. Furthermore, I present the diﬀerent options policymakers
had when setting up RTI and potential counterfactuals. For instance, had the IACJ not intervened in
the Chilean case, the Council for Transparency might not be there in its current form. ￿ere is, of
course, a risk in terms of analysing events in retrospect and fitting evidence to the theory developed.
However, all the claims in this work can be verified and potentially contested, thus mitigating this risk.
As noted by Peters et al.(￿￿￿￿), ideas are a powerful force often not taken into account. For instance,
it would be diﬃcult to explain the rise of neoliberalism and the significant change in the welfare state
without reference to the underlying political ideology. In the three cases, I traced how certain ideas in
the policy stream were critical to putting the enforcement institutions in place. Feedback loops can be
influenced by ideas about secrecy or the role of government in certain areas. For instance, doctrines of
‘national security’ can influence the introduction of more exceptions to RTI laws. However, because
this work is interested in a middle-range explanation, I argue that ideas alone cannot deliver change.
Ideas need to interact with structures and actors to eﬀect change in a RTI arena.
In addition, as Peters et al. (￿￿￿￿) argue, institutionalist accounts often emphasise a particular view
of public policy. In short, this is a world of public servants and policymakers, forgetting sometimes
the role politics plays in policies. In this view, politics and political incentives matter, and historical
institutionalist accounts sometimes forget this. In this research, I showed the role politicians played
in all cases. ￿e focus of this comparative endeavour has been to explain the connection between the
policymaking process and the outputs in these arenas. I acknowledge and explore the role of political
champions in these arenas, as well as the political use of public information. However, my work seeks
to shed light on the connections between policymaking and outputs. Such an analysis would not
be possible focusing only in the reasons for politicians to adopt these laws, which has, up to a point,
been explored by others in the literature (McLean, ￿￿￿￿, Michener, ￿￿￿￿)
In this work, I argued that the combination of three factors led to diﬀerent types of RTI arena. In
this way, I argue that these arenas evolve in a particular way through a reinforcing logic that leads
them on a path to being functional, mixed or contested. ￿e argument of this work might then
be interpreted as saying that arenas are ‘locked’ into a certain way of working once feedback loops
keep evolving. However, by introducing the concept of ‘feedback loops’ in RTI arenas and noting
￿￿￿
RTI arenas have a conflictive nature, I also seek to show that these arenas are spaces where power
is being disputed. In short, while these arenas might exhibit patterns, a feedback loop could well
result in major change, depending on the context of the arena. As a middle-range theory, this work
might not be able to explain unexpected and unprecedented changes in RTI arenas which could
be the result of larger forces at play, such as a regime change or a dramatic reform of government
institutions. However, as Berliner (￿￿￿￿) has previously noted, this work argues that arenas are quite
resilient even in the face of large-scale reforms, as the New Zealand case shows. As with many other
institutionalist accounts, this work does not oﬀer a predictive outlook on arenas, but identifies the
structural elements that are likely to matter in the event of a reform.
￿ere are other caveats about this work and the literature in general. RTI is usually connected
with notions of transparency and accountability. ￿e explanation and the framework are agnostic
about the relationship between RTI and transparency. As noted, transparency has several meanings
but implies the availability of information about an actor for other actors to exercise accountability.
Some definitions focus more on the mere availability of information and others are more demanding,
focusing more on the fact that information should be inferable. ￿e kind of transparency one finds
in a RTI arena is influenced by the way the principle of availability of public information works, but
also by other factors such as the capacity of civil society and other stakeholders to use information,
larger issues such as education levels in a given society, and also the civic ethos in those societies. ￿e
fact that more or less information is available does not indicate per se that there is more transparency
in several definitions.
In addition, the framework is agnostic in terms of how RTI relates to accountability. As noted
by Fox (￿￿￿￿), the relationship between accountability and transparency is complex. In some of
the cases presented here, the release of public information led to certain accountability outputs:
politicians or public servants resigned and mistakes were corrected. However, just because there is
more information available does not guarantee accountability will happen. Accountability institutions
also have problems in terms of independence and ability. Depending on the context, such institutions
could use information released to act but some of them might not be able to do so. ￿e release
of public information (often a complex and conflictive matter) is just one step towards fostering
accountability in a given setting.
￿￿￿
￿.￿ ￿ʜ￿ ɪ￿￿ʟɪ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɴ￿ ￿￿ ￿ʜɪ￿ ʀ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿ʜ ￿￿ʀ ￿ʀ￿￿￿ɪ￿ɪ￿ɴ￿ʀ￿
Practitioners in this field come from diﬀerent backgrounds. Journalists, public servants, funders,
activists, politicians and lawyers among others are the most frequent actors in these arenas. Due to
the limited number of cases analysed in this research, the conclusions are not necessarily applicable to
other cases. ￿e following points might be useful for actors either promoting these institutions or
dealing with frustration as a result of what seems to be faulty implementation.
Participation in this process by civil society and the public service is important. If there is involve-
ment by a group of able activists in civil society and an able group of public servants, it is likely that
reforms will endure. Taking into account local views, experiences and feedback is essential for these
reforms to endure. On the other hand, if processes are exogenous as part of grand design exercises or
international experimentation, then these reforms are likely to be another case of policy transfer with
no real embedment in a domestic political system. ￿is is particularly relevant for funders and interna-
tional organisations that usually promote ‘best practices’ without taking local factors into consideration.
￿ere is a role for these organisations to play and this role is often in the ‘policy stream’. Participation
ensures these reforms a certain degree of sustainability as actors will have incentives to drive the agenda
forward, establishing policy communities that will help this agenda to evolve. However, sustainability
also depends on expanding the use of the instrument and securing enforcement institutions that work
properly. As a result, donors should consider significant engagement not only when instituting a
reform but also when a reform needs to be sustained, nurturing the policy community that works
around the issue. Challenges to these reforms usually emerge when the reforms gain visibility and
when engagement in terms of capacity for civil society and enforcement institutions is most needed.
Expanding the use of these laws beyond the traditional circle of users is important in terms of
fostering democratic regimes. While reformers and donors usually seek a ‘killer case’ where political
accountability is the direct result of the use of a RTI law, these are rare. Furthermore, they might
not even be desirable as they could create feedback loops which can jeopardise the stability of the
system. Cases where vulnerable groups use the law to advance their case or where social issues are
being resolved thanks to the availability of public information and its use by several parties are worthy
of support. ￿is implies collaboration between organisations which are specialists in the RTI field
and other organisations. In short, it requires working more with ‘trusted intermediaries’ (Roberts,
￿￿￿￿) rather than just focusing on what information does.
Practitioners should realise that RTI is an important institution, structuring new behaviours in
￿￿￿
a given system. ￿e dramatic change from secrecy to openness is not always administered easily in
all societies. For instance, when data about schools is published, it can indeed create side eﬀects
such as discrimination against the excluded population. But these side eﬀects are also related to
the production process, framing, the media and other contextual factors that should be taken into
account. In Uruguay, not to disclose the names of recipients of social programmes as it could lead to
potential discrimination against them could be criticised, as public money should be open to scrutiny
as to how it is spent (MIDES, ￿￿￿￿). Furthermore, it could be argued that some of these people
might be on the payroll of political parties. In Mexico, this situation is completely diﬀerent and
information is shared publicly. ￿e limits of privacy and potential side eﬀects should be considered in
the context of each arena.
Once these reforms are set in place, governments should acknowledge they are permanent. ￿erefore,
lack of investment in RTI management can only backfire. Information processing units and people
handling requests should be given a clear role in the organisation. Information-related professions are
often ignored in the public service and people dealing with these requests are often seen as ‘bad news’.
In at least two of the cases (Chile and Uruguay), people sent to work in archives are not competent
and the assignment is usually seen as a punishment rather than a promotion. ￿is is part of a larger
problem in terms of how these professions are treated, but it is crucial for information management.
Reforms may be intended to be permanent but the early stages of implementation are often a very
messy process It takes significant time for the public service to adjust to the very idea that public
information should be released and that it goes beyond the mere proactive publishing of sets of public
information. In all cases, problems in terms of receiving requests, processing them and information
published are very common at the beginning of the implementation process. Some of them are just
part of the nature of a RTI arena and the conflict it poses about who gets the information and how.
One of the most common fears regarding these reforms is the ‘avalanche of requests’. ￿is did not
happen in these cases. Although there can be a spike of requests early on, it does not materialise later.
Finally, a note of caution. RTI regulation does not operate as a magic fix for all the problems of
asymmetry of information in a given polity. While more information will be released and a new logic
can potentially be put in place, actors still use their resources and strategies to get public information.
Furthermore, RTI establishes a principle but does not cover all the possible applications of this
principle, which are in constant review in these arenas. Nor does it resolve the issue of information
appropriation by public servants or other actors with privileged access to public information. It
￿￿￿
makes such practices more diﬃcult and potentially penalises them, but they are not eradicated just
by the introduction of a law. ￿erefore, it should be understood that RTI might help to improve
transparency in a given society, but it does not create transparency ipso facto. It is a foundation, and it
is unlikely that it alone will be able to reduce asymmetry of information among several actors in an
arena.
￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿ ʀ￿￿￿￿ʀ￿ʜ
￿is research articulates an argument explaining how RTI arenas work and the diﬀerent outputs
they produce. As RTI arenas become increasingly established, more research could add to our
understanding of how they work and the outcomes these arenas produce. First, more research could
test and either confirm or question the framework provided in this work. ￿us, by adding more cases,
diﬀerent elements of the framework could emerge. In particular, it would be possible to explore the
connection of several behaviours exhibited by requesters and public servants and diﬀerent types of
arenas. It would be possible to explore if certain ritualised behaviours are attached to a particular
type of arena configuration. From a theoretical perspective, this would add value by connecting
historical, contextual and previous legacies to behaviours exhibited in these arenas. ￿ere is also a case
for exploring further the role of ideas in setting up RTI laws, particularly in terms of how political
actors justify their adoption and use, as well as how these ideas influence later reform. In addition, by
exploring several historical processes in depth, it should be possible to understand better what kind
of participation contributes to certain outcomes, adding to the ideas advanced in this work and by
McClean (￿￿￿￿).
Second, the evolution of public information will be strongly associated with technological develop-
ments in the information science/management field. As a result, it will be necessary to expand the
understanding of information production processes, the classification of information and techniques
that allow using this information for several purposes in the context of the state. In this research, I
observed a new breed of organisations setting up web portals to promote demand for public informa-
tion, as well as governments adopting such portals. Little is understood about the way they work and
how these new developments aﬀect users of the law, as well as the civil service. More research should
focus on this particular area and would have the potential to improve service delivery and eﬃciency.
Another development connected with the evolution of technology is the rise of the ‘open data’
movement. ￿is movement shows that public information combined with other sources of information
￿￿￿
can potentially create social and economic value. Open Data implies that information should be
released in certain open formats, allowing its reuse, which assumes that there are processes and
structures ready for its release. As noted in this research, proactive transparency is still a complex
issue. A recent ruling by a UK court (McNally, ￿￿￿￿) shows that requesters have the right to get the
information in their preferred format. ￿e implications for the public sector of this kind of ruling,
as well as for requesters, are fundamental. Requesters might be able to use data in several ways to
advance their campaigns, run analyses and potentially even improve and enrich the information.
Such dynamics are going to aﬀect these arenas and need to be better explored. ￿ese new breeds of
organisations could build visualisations and generate analysis which could reach basically everyone
with an internet connection. However, such information should be published in a special format and
in a reliable and timely manner. Should public information be provided in a special format and if so
which? What kind of capacity does this new way of publishing information demand? How does the
state evolve as an ‘info-producer’?
￿ird, the evolution of public information and transparency is linked with privacy. Exploring the
ethical, normative and technical limits that citizens have in terms of sharing information that could be
in the public domain can aﬀect RTI arenas. How these limits are set and the cultural factors that aﬀect
them should also be part of future research endeavours. Fourth, the relationship between information
and unintended consequences needs to be better explored. In the context of this research, cases about
education and social services show an inherent tension between the right to know and potential
discrimination due to the release of public information. If information is released about beneficiaries
of public services, would they be discriminated against? Evidence in these cases is still very sketchy
and the dynamics of how this happens is poorly understood. ￿ere is an obvious relationship with
what actors might understand as transparency and eventual accountability in a given case.
Fifth, this research shows that initially RTI promotion and use is dominated by elites. As a result,
only a few people and organisations use RTI regulation to get information they need and could
potentially be used to foster change. If RTI is to fulfil its democratic ideals, then a better understanding
of how the weakest groups in society are to benefit from it is needed. Conversely, a discussion should
be encouraged about RTI empowering already powerful groups in society who are the only ones with
the access, knowledge and capability to use this tool. ￿us, it is necessary to understand better the
users and uses of these laws in given contexts, to understand the eﬀects of these laws in terms of more
transparency and redistribution of power.
￿￿￿
Sixth, there are still serious diﬃculties in collecting data in this field. Numbers of RTI requests,
resolutions from enforcement institutions and the working of these kinds of laws in general is often
poorly documented. ￿is indicates the need to collect better data and develop a better understanding
of the use of these laws. Experiments based on web portals could also aid in understanding more
about users’ perception and uses of the law in the digital age. More systematised data at a comparative
level could provide benefits by developing reliable indicators based on empirical evidence in this field.
Seventh, the role of the media in the use of public information should be explored more consistently.
￿e fact that only a small group of reporters are avid users of these instruments shows unequivocally
that not all media is engaged in using public information and potentially sharing what they find. In a
world of data, this means that potentially other journalists can build on previous work more easily,
but incentives to do this remain elusive. Practices such as mentioning that information was obtained
through RTI are beneficial as they show the usefulness of the instrument but not enough to harness
all the potential that it has to oﬀer.
In this research, I tried to show the complexity of factors that aﬀect a crucial institution for our
democracies. ￿e conflictive nature of public information will remain, even when technology solutions
promise a frictionless world of information; and could help to enhance delivery and understanding of
public information. ￿ere is not such a thing as a frictionless RTI arena even in a tech utopia. Conflict
about who gets public information, when it is used and how, will be at the core of these arenas. RTI
laws work in complex ways. We should embrace complexity and a multiplicity of actors to foster
solid RTI institutions that can promote more transparency and accountability. Promoting strategies
to foster these institutions should take into account previous institutional legacies and contexts. Even
if imperfectly implemented, RTI remains an essential institution for a democratic society in the ￿￿st
Century. Conflict about public information is a healthy sign. Like clean air, public information is
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ANNEX : L I ST OF INTERV IEWS
ɴ￿￿ ￿￿￿ʟ￿ɴ￿
• ISNZ ￿ Interview former New Zealand senior civil servant, Wellington, November, ￿￿￿￿
• ISNZ ￿ Interview New Zealand civil servant, Wellington, November ￿￿￿￿
• ISNZ ￿ Interview New Zealand former Ombudsman, November ￿￿￿￿
• SNZ ￿ Interview New Zealand former Ombudsman, November, ￿￿￿￿
• ENZ ￿ Interview New Zealand senior academic
• IENZ ￿ Interview New Zealand former policy advisor
• IENZ ￿ Interview New Zealand journalist
• IENZ ￿ Interview New Zealand lawyer
￿ʜɪʟ￿
• IACH ￿ Interview Senator, Chilean Senate, April ￿￿￿￿
• IACH ￿ Interview former Member Council for Transparency April ￿￿￿￿
• IACH ￿ Interview, Member Council for Transparency April ￿￿￿￿
• IACH ￿ Interview former politician April ￿￿￿￿
• IACH ￿ Interview former politician April ￿￿￿￿
• IACH ￿ Interview politician April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview Civil Servant Council fro Transparency April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview Civil Servant Council for Transparency April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview Civil Servant Public Administration April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview Civil Servant Central public administration April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview Senior Civil Servant central public administration April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview senior civil servant public administration April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview civil servant public administration April ￿￿￿￿
• ISCH ￿ Interview civil servant central public administration April ￿￿￿￿
• IECH ￿ Interview Senior Editor Newspaper April ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿
• IECH ￿ Interview academic April ￿￿￿￿
• IECH ￿ Interview academic April ￿￿￿￿
• IE CH ￿ Interview journalist April ￿￿￿￿
• IE CH ￿ Interview civil society expert April ￿￿￿￿
• IE CH ￿ Interview civil society expert April ￿￿￿￿
• IECH ￿ Interview civil society expert April ￿￿￿￿
• IE CH ￿ Interview civil society expert April ￿￿￿￿
￿ʀ￿ɢ￿￿ʏ
• IAUY ￿ Interview former president of the Republic September ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿Interview senator September ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿ Interview senator September ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿ Interview former senator August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿ Political appointee August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿ Interview Member of Parliament August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿ Interview member of Parliament August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿ Former political appointee August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿ Former political appointee August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿￿ Local legislative authority August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿￿ Local legislative authority August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿￿ Political Appointee August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿￿ Political Appointee August ￿￿￿￿
• IAUY ￿￿Member of the Judiciary August ￿￿￿￿
• ISCUY ￿ Senior Public servant central administration, August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Senior public servant central administration September ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Senior public servant central administration August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Public servant central administration September ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Public servant central administration September ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ public servant local government August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Public servant central administration August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Senior public servant central administration August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Activist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Activist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Activist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ International Expert August ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Activist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Journalist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Journalist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Journalist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿ Journalist August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿￿ Expert August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿￿ Expert August ￿￿￿￿
• ISC UY ￿￿ Expert August ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿
